Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

267. Letter From the Minister in Laos (Yost) to the Officer in Charge of Vietnam–Laos–Cambodian Affairs (Hoey)¹

Vientiane, January 27, 1955.

Dear Bob: Both of us are so swamped these days that we rarely have a chance to exchange private letters; however, I do think it would be useful if we found time occasionally to exchange a little background, and I shall do my best to do so.

I had a most interesting visit to Luang Prabang over the weekend. The Crown Prince could not have been more hospitable and friendly. We took all but one of or meals with him and his family and he also took us on an all-day excursion up the river to the grottoes at Pak Ou. As I have reported,² his convictions and intentions correspond very closely to ours and we can expect him to be almost invariably on our side. However, for the reasons I have mentioned, we should not count on his acting as vigorously or promptly as we should like.³ It is simply not in his make-up to do so, nor can we go too far in urging him to act without arousing his resentment on the score that we are being critical if his behavior or interfering with his conduct of business.

In this connection it would be very helpful if you could give us some indication whether it is likely that the question of the two northern provinces of Laos will be considered at the Bangkok Conference as both the Crown Prince and I believe it should. If there is little likelihood that any effective action on this question will be taken there, I should like to start promptly to dampen excessive expectations.

It would also be a relief to all concerned here if you could satisfy our curiosity concerning what I assume to be the Defense Department’s hesitation about approving a military program for Laos. Is it likely that we will receive shortly authorization to negotiate on this matter or shall we have to continue to live from hand to mouth for some time to come? In this same connection, is there any hope of ever getting any helicopters for the ICC?⁴ My feeling is that if we refuse to give them the tools with which to act, it simply means that more responsibility is thrust upon us.

I received a call the other day from a curious character named Prasit, who for the last few days has been visiting Xieng Mao and is now accompanying Souvanna Phouma on a tour of the North, including Luang Prabang. He apparently has lived in Bangkok for many years, accompanied Prince Souphannouvong when the latter went over to Ho Chi Minh in 1950 but returned to Bangkok six months later, and is a close friend of all the Laos Issaraks⁵ who lived in Bangkok from 1946 to 1949. He claims to be the descendant of the Kings of Vientiane who were carried away as prisoners to Siam 130 years ago. … Without having any concrete evidence, I suspect him of being an emissary of Prince Phetsarath.

As you have undoubtedly gathered from our telegrams, Katay is working out rather badly. His attitude toward the Pathet Lao was not unexpected but he has not demonstrated the ability and drive in directing his government which we had hoped. Nor has he abandoned intrigues against his Cabinet colleagues. Yet it still seems doubtful that either they or he could set up a durable government without the help of the other. In my view if the present government should fall apart (which we, of course, are doing our best to prevent) the ideal alternative would be for the Crown Prince, himself, to take over temporarily. However, I fear he would not do so. General Phao’s candidate would, of course, be Prince Phetsarath and, if the latter would make a truce with the Royal family and firm up his position toward the Pathet Lao, this possibility should not be completely excluded. The pickings here are awfully thin.

However, I hope the adhesive tape will hold together at least until the elections.

With best personal regards,

Sincerely yours,

CHARLIE

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.51J/1–2755. Secret and Personal.
2. In telegram 284 from Vientiane, January 25, Yost reported on his conversations with Crown Prince Savang over the weekend. He summarized the Crown Prince’s views as follows:

   “Gist of his argument is that Laos was left in dire predicament by great powers, particularly France, when at Geneva they pressured her, despite her willingness to continue fight, into accepting cease-fire which recognized Pathet Lao and turned two provinces over to them. Before Geneva, Pathets were artificial Chinese creation with little internal following and no status, but now they have been given international protection which can only be withdrawn by international action. Great powers having got Laos into this mess, it is up to them to get her out.” (Ibid., 751G.00/1–2555)

3. In telegram 284, Yost expressed doubt that Savang would “exercise the forceful personal leadership which we might wish.”
4. A discussion of the ICC’s air transportation needs and the gravity of the situation is in telegram 2784 from Saigon, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/1–555)
5. The Lao Issara (Free Laos) was a government formed in 1945 which unsuccessfully opposed French reoccupation of Laos. When French forces entered Vientiane in April 1946, the Lao Issaraks fled across the Mekong River into Thailand, where they continued as a government-in-exile and carried on guerrilla raids against the French. In May 1949, the Lao Issara split. Prince Souphanouvong, the commander of the Lao Issara guerrilla army, was removed from his post and formed a separate faction. In October 1949, Souvanna Phouma and 25 members of the Lao Issara returned to political life in Laos under the French Union.