Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

268. Telegram From the Legation in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, January 28, 1955—6 p.m.

293. Reference Department telegram 227 repeated Bangkok 1963, Saigon 3119, Phnom Penh 321.² Phoui has never expressed such view to us nor has he done so to French, British, Canadians or others in Vientiane. He would have informed us. Thai Minister, with whom I have had occasion to discuss Phoui several times in connection with Udom affair,³ has never quoted him to this effect. Phoui’s views as expressed to us and others have been consistently opposed to Pathet participation in government. …

What Phoui might have said was that negotiations with Pathets were required in order to reach “political settlement” referred to Article 14, Geneva Agreement. ICC has persistently urged this view on Lao Government and all Ministers have accepted it. Even Katay, however, though he at first contemplated offering Pathets participation in Central Government as easiest means of arriving at settlement, never contended government was required by Geneva Accord to make such offer. It is my present impression that idea of Pathet participation in Central Government has been effectively scotched by our action. We shall, of course, continue to follow closely as possible and shall intervene again if it becomes necessary.

I have many times expressed view to Katay, Phoui, and other Ministers that Lao Government is not obligated by Geneva Accords to conclude with Pathets “political settlement” that goes behind guarantees of nondiscrimination all non-reprisal for past acts, of individual rights accorded to all citizens, and representation “aupres de” Royal administration of Samneua and Phongsaly. I shall take appropriate occasions to repeat Department’s legal position to Lao Ministers and Breal. Basic difficulty is not, however, real or imagined legal obligation but temptation dangled before Katay by Pathets that if he makes concessions peace, sweetness and light will be restored.

Next ticklish point, which has apparently been only lightly touched on in negotiations so far, is likely to be disposition Pathet military forces. Oun–Hueun informs us Pathet negotiators propose those who wish to return to civil pursuits do so but that remainder be incorporated into Royal Forces. I have pointed out previously to Katay that Laos is under no obligation whatsoever to admit to Royal Forces individuals who were not therein before outbreak hostilities, and that United States could hardly be expected to provide financial support for Pathet units in Royal Forces. I have not pressed this point hard, since likelihood negotiations reaching settlement has seemed remote, but will do so if necessary.

In conversation last evening (before we received Department telegram 227), Phoui raised question whether it might not be in government’s interest to stall and block negotiations in order confine Pathet Lao to two northern provinces until after elections. Settlement, he pointed out, would inevitably involve granting Pathets right to propagandize freely throughout country during electoral campaign. In reply, I expressed personal view that most important immediate task is to reestablish Royal authority and administration in two provinces and prevent them being consolidated by Pathets into state within a state. While reasonable settlement with Pathets seems to me exceedingly unlikely, I thought it would be offering such settlement, including free Pathet participation in elections, if that should prove necessary Price to regain control of northern provinces. Of course, if such freedom were accorded Pathets, government would have to demonstrate considerably more vigor and effectiveness than hitherto in organizing its own propaganda and improving its performance. Phoui did not contest those views.⁴

Yost

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/1–2855. Top Secret. Repeated to Saigon and Bangkok.
2. In telegram 227 to Vientiane, January 26, the Department informed the Legation of a report that Lao Foreign Minister Phoui Sananikone had stated that under the Geneva Agreements the Royal Government of Laos was obligated to unite with the Pathet Lao and that Souphanouvong had agreed to join the government. Yost was instructed to inform Katay and Phoui that the United States, after careful study, found no compulsion in the Geneva Agreements for the Lao Government to come to terms with the Pathet Lao. (Ibid., 751.00/1–2655)
3. Reference is to the recent assassination of former Defense Minister Kou Voravong by Udom Louksurnidir.
4. In telegram 238 to Vientiane, February 1, the Department concurred with the Legation’s analysis contained in telegram 293. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/1–2855)