Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

254. Paper Prepared by the Operations Coordinating Board¹

Washington, April 10, 1957.

OUTLINE PLAN OF OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO CAMBODIA

I. Introduction

A. References:

(1) U.S. Policy in Mainland Southeast Asia, NSC 5612/1, Approved by the President, September 5, 1956.²

(2) NIE 63.2–55, Probable Developments in Cambodia to July 1956, dated August 16, 1955.³

(3) NSC 5602/1.⁴

B. Special Operating Guidance:

1. U.S. operations in Cambodia should be conducted in the context of U.S. objectives which are: to prevent the countries of Southeast Asia from passing into or becoming economically dependent upon the Communist bloc; to persuade them that their best interests lie in greater cooperation and stronger affiliations with the rest of the free world; and to assist them to develop toward stable, free, representative governments with the will and ability to resist Communism from within and without, and thereby to contribute to the strengthening of the free world.

2. As political power in Cambodia is centered at the present time in Prince Norodom Sihanouk and … caution should be exercised to avoid arousing his hostility to U.S. policy or to American representatives.

3. U.S. military aid should be continued as long as Cambodian leaders demonstrate a will to resist internal Communist subversion and to carry out a policy of maintaining Cambodian independence. Encouragement and support should be given to individuals and groups who resist Communist pressure. Our purpose should be to deny Cambodia to Communism, not expecting a greater show of gratitude or even substantially improved cooperation on the part of the Cambodian Government.

4. The economic and technical aid program though concentrating on a few well-defined objectives, should be kept flexible (a) to avoid duplication with other country assistance to Cambodia, (b) to exclude as far as feasible Communist aid from “sensitive” projects (such as police training, teacher training, organization of farmers’ cooperatives) and other vital projects where Communist influence would jeopardize the attainment of U.S. objectives. The Cambodian Government recognizes the problems inherent in commingling of aid sources, and has already agreed to exclude Communist participation in U.S. financed projects. The U.S. should continue to press for advantage in the selection of projects, and for Communist aid programs to be confined to projects in non-controversial activity areas. U.S. programs should be carried out in such a way as to encourage the Cambodian Government not to request Communist aid missions to help complement specific U.S. aid projects.

5. A continuing effort should be made to reduce U.S. financial support of the Cambodian armed forces to the minimum necessary for accomplishment of their internal security mission.

6. The U.S. view of the proper mission for the Cambodian armed forces is to provide internal security with the U.S. limiting its support to equipment and forces appropriate to such a mission. The mission could involve such actions as support of police forces, suppression of armed insurrection, suppression of a coup, or retrieving a subverted government by means of a coup. In order to be prepared for this type of mission, Cambodian military leaders should have (a) a firm pro-free world orientation, and (b) an alert awareness of the Communist threat. For the moment emphasis should be placed on cooperation with the French in the training of Cambodian troops.

7. Continue to explore the possibility of arranging discussions with Cambodia in an endeavor to achieve agreement as to future U.S. aid programs which will be more moderate in their demands upon U.S. resources and the local economies.

8. Special Situation: Chinese Communist Aid to Cambodia

An economic aid agreement was signed with the Chinese Communists last June,⁵ providing for total aid to Cambodia of $22.8 million over a two-year period. This aid will consist of equipment and of consumer goods to be sold for local currency; both would be used to build textile, cement, paper, and plywood plants, to develop agricultural irrigation, to supply rural communities with electricity, to build universities, hospitals, youth and sports centers, roads, bridges, etc. The Chinese insofar as they have the capacity will send technicians and specialists who will give assistance in research, surveying and building operations as well as training Cambodian technicians. To execute this agreement there has been an exchange of economic missions. The Chinese Communist mission arrived in Phnom Penh in late September.

It was reported that in February 1957 relations between the Chinese Economic Mission and the Government of Cambodia were deteriorating. Cambodians came to feel that the mission was not producing and the Chinese aid had not materialized. However, in March 1957, our Embassy in Phnom Penh received reliable reports that the Chinese Communist Aid program is expected to begin actual operations in the near future with the construction of a building to house the Ministry of Plan, thereby followed by other construction projects for the Ministry of Education and for the Directorate of Posts and Telecommunications. Plans for textile, cement, plywood, and paper factories are reported progressing only slowly.

Aid has also been promised to Cambodia by the USSR and Czechoslovakia. Cambodia seems to have been chosen as the site for a new Communist experiment designed to use economic aid programs as a means of political penetration of countries outside the Communist Bloc. The advent of this new aid program gives us not only a new challenge but also a fresh opportunity. The best interests of the United States would be served not by quitting Cambodia in a huff nor engaging in competition for Cambodian favor by bidding for the highest aid program. Rather, it is in our best interest to try to meet the priority needs of Cambodia in the most efficient manner. When projects are selected under our aid program we should complete them more efficiently and expeditiously than do the Chinese Communists.

It is a safe presumption that the Chinese Communist aid mission is devoting its efforts and its large number of personnel to penetrating and gaining control over the Chinese communities in Phnom Penh and all over Cambodia. Chinese “technicians” are reported seen throughout the country. Vietnamese Government officials claim many Vietnamese communists are serving on the mission as “Chinese” for subversive purposes. One objective of United States programs in Cambodia should be to frustrate this first real Chinese Communist attempt at economic aid and the Chinese Communist organization of a base and center in Cambodia to subvert Southeast Asia.

[Here follows section C, “Selected U.S. Arrangements with or Pertaining to Cambodia,” and Part II, “Actions Agreed Upon.”]

1. Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Cambodia. Top Secret. Approved by the OCB at its meeting of April 3. (Preliminary Notes of OCB meeting, April 3; ibid., OCB Preliminary Notes)
2. Document 119.
3. Document 217.
4. NSC 5602/1, entitled “Basic National Security Policy,” March 15, 1956, is scheduled for publication in volume XIX.
5. See Document 239.