Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

119. National Security Council Report¹

NSC 5612/1

Washington, September 5, 1956.

NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON U.S. POLICY IN MAINLAND SOUTHEAST ASIA

REFERENCES

• A. NSC 5405
• B. NSC Actions Nos. 1526–b and 1527–c
• C. NSC 5429/5, paragraph 5–d
• D. NSC 5429/5, Annex A
• E. NSC Action No. 1415–c
• F. NSC Action No. 1571
• G. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “U.S. Policy in the Event of the Renewal of Aggression in Vietnam”, dated September 16, 1955²
• H. Progress Report, dated July 11, 1956, by OCB on NSC 5405 and Portions of NSC 5429/5
• I. NSC 5610
• J. NSC 5612
• K. NSC Action No. 1599

The National Security Council, the Acting Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, the Acting Secretary of Commerce, the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament, and the Director, Bureau of the Budget, at the 295th Council meeting on August 30, 1956, adopted the statement of policy on the subject contained in NSC 5612, subject to the amendments thereto which are set forth in NSC Action No. 1599–b.

The President has this date approved the statement of policy in NSC 5612, as amended and adopted by the Council and enclosed herewith as NSC 5612/1; directs its implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government; and designates the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency.

The enclosed statement of policy, as adopted and approved, supersedes NSC 5405 and Annex A of NSC 5429/5.

James S. Lay, Jr.³

[Enclosure]

[Here follows a table of contents.]

STATEMENT OF POLICY ON U.S. POLICY IN MAINLAND SOUTHEAST ASIA⁴

I. General Considerations

1. General. Since mainland Southeast Asia does not represent a unified area, courses of action must generally be determined in the light of widely varying country situations. However, basic objectives and main directions of U.S. policy can and should be established on a regional basis.

2. Consequences of Communist Domination. The national security of the United States would be endangered by Communist domination of mainland Southeast Asia, whether achieved by overt aggression, subversion, or a political and economic offensive.

a. The loss to Communist control of any single free country would encourage tendencies toward accommodation by the rest.

b. The loss of the entire area would have a seriously adverse impact on the U.S. position elsewhere in the Far East, have severe economic consequences for many nations of the free world, add significant resources to the Communist bloc in rice, rubber, tin and other minerals, and could result in severe economic and political pressures on Japan and India for accommodation to the Communist bloc. The loss of Southeast Asia mainland could thus have farreaching consequences seriously adverse to U.S. security interests.

3. The Communist Threat

a. Overt Aggression. Although Communist policy now emphasizes non-military methods, the danger of overt aggression will remain inherent so long as Communist China and North Viet Nam continue a basically hostile policy supported by substantial military forces. There is only a cease-fire in Viet Nam and sporadic hostilities continue in Laos. The Viet Minh have continued to improve their combat capabilities since the Geneva Conference of 1954.

b. Subversion. In most countries of Southeast Asia a threat also arises from the existence of extensive local Communist capabilities for all types of subversive activities, ranging up to armed insurrection. Additionally, the large overseas Chinese communities in Southeast Asia offer a fertile field for subversion. The weak internal security systems of the Southeast Asian states make them highly vulnerable to such activities.

c. Communist Political and Economic Offensive. At present overt aggression and militant subversion are less likely than an intensified campaign of Communist political, economic and cultural penetration in the area. The political instability, economic backwardness, export problems, and extreme nationalism of these countries provide many opportunities for Communist exploitation by trade and economic assistance, conventional political and diplomatic activity, and extensive infiltration. This offensive now constitutes a threat to U.S. interests more subtle and more difficult to cope with than other threats.

4. United States Role. The United States is likely to remain the only major outside source of power to counteract the Russian-Chinese Communist thrust into Southeast Asia. Thus, the retention of this area in the free world will continue to depend on the extent and effectiveness of U.S. support as well as on the local efforts of the countries themselves.

a. Political. The underlying purpose of U.S. assistance in the area is to help the non-Communist countries develop more effective political organizations, strengthen their internal administration and enlist greater allegiance in both urban and rural districts. In part this purpose will be served by programs for military and economic aid dealt with below. In part it will require an intensification of present programs for training competent Asian managerial and technical personnel. And in part new approaches, both governmental and private, will be needed. These should not concentrate exclusively at the national level, but should include activities designed to strengthen and vitalize indigenous traditions and institutions and to have an impact on village life, rural society, and educational systems.

b. Military. Because these countries do not have the capability of creating armed forces which could effectively resist large-scale external aggression, the United States will be required to provide a basic shield against Communist aggression. For the foreseeable future local will to resist aggression will depend on a conviction in Southeast Asia that the United States will continue its support and will maintain striking forces adequate to counter aggression in Southeast Asia with the capabilities described in NSC 5602/1 (paragraphs 11, 15 and 16).⁵ The combination of such U.S. forces and local will to resist would constitute the best deterrent against aggression. Should the deterrent fail, this combination would also provide the most effective insurance that, in conjunction with indigenous and allied forces, the United States could suppress aggression in the area quickly and in a manner and on a scale best calculated to avoid the hostilities broadening into general war.

c. Economic and Technical. The insistence, throughout most of the area, on economic development provides the strongest lever for the exertion of influence by the free world or by the Communist bloc. Without increased external help from some source, most of the governments of the area will be unable, even with adequate indigenous effort, to manage the political demand for rapid betterment in the conditions of life and provide for sound economic development. Failure to obtain such assistance from the free world will tend to drive these countries toward economic dependence on the Communist bloc. The general preference in Southeast Asia for Western technical and economic assistance gives the United States and the free world an opportunity to obtain primacy over Communist efforts in key economic sectors. The outcome may, however, be strongly influenced by the success with which the free world can cope with Communist efforts to exploit the existence of Southeast Asian export problems, particularly those involving rice. In the period ahead, flexibility of U.S. procedure and rapidity of U.S. action will be increasingly important, if effective advantage is to be taken of unexpected and transient opportunities.

5. The Problem of Regional Association. Over the long run, the small, vulnerable, and essentially dependent nations of Southeast Asia cannot exist satisfactorily as free nations without closer associations than now exist.

6. The Problem of Alignment. To preserve their independence, strengthen their internal stability, and protect themselves against aggression, some countries in Southeast Asia prefer to join regional security arrangements. Some, however, prefer to avoid alignment with other nations. The basic objective of both groups is to maintain the independence of their countries free of outside interference or dictation, and the independence and vitality of both are important to the United States and to each other.

II. Policy Conclusions

7. The national independence of the mainland Southeast Asian states is important to the security interests of the United States. If such independence is to be preserved, U.S. policies must seek to build sufficient strength in the area at least to identify aggression, suppress subversion, prevent Communist political and economic domination, and assist the non-Communist governments to consolidate their domestic positions. U.S. policy should not depend primarily on the degree and nature of Communist activity at any particular time, but should seek to promote these goals within the limits of the economic capacities of the countries concerned and U.S. resources available for the area.

8. Where a national determination to maintain independence and oppose external aggression is sufficiently manifest, the United States should be prepared to provide military assistance based upon the missions of the forces as indicated in the “Country Courses of Action” (Part V, below).

9. In the event of aggression against a Southeast Asian state willing to resist, the provisions of the UN Charter or the SEATO Treaty should be invoked, but the United States should not forgo necessary action in behalf of such a state or states because of the possibility that other allies might be loath to participate or to furnish more than token military forces.

10. In the long run, the ability of the non-Communist governments to attain political, economic and social objectives will be the dominant factor in defeating the Communist attempts to dominate Southeast Asia. The United States should assist the non-Communist states of the area to formulate and execute programs designed to promote conditions of sound development, to demonstrate that they can achieve growth without reliance on Communist methods or dependence on the Communist bloc, and to give their peoples a greater stake in the continued independence of their countries.

11. The United States should continue to make clear its own devotion to the principle of collective security, its belief that regional security arrangements provide maximum protection at minimum cost for all, and its expectation that a country’s decision to participate in such arrangements is based on its own calculation of its best interests and does not of itself constitute a claim for increased financial aid. Where countries participate, measures to assure adherence are desirable, normally including preferential treatment in the fields of economic and military assistance as justified by U.S. strategic objectives. Where new opportunities for affiliation develop they should be encouraged. The United States should, however, accept the right of each nation to choose its own path to the future, and should not exert pressure to make active allies of countries not so inclined. The genuine independence of such countries from Communism serves U.S. interests even though they are not formally aligned with the United States. The United States should accordingly support and assist them so long as they remain determined to preserve their own independence and are actively pursuing policies to this end.

III. Objective

12. To prevent the countries of Southeast Asia from passing into or becoming economically dependent upon the Communist bloc; to persuade them that their best interests lie in greater cooperation and stronger affiliations with the rest of the free world; and to assist them to develop toward stable, free, representative governments with the will and ability to resist Communism from within and without, and thereby to contribute to the strengthening of the free world.

IV. Regional Courses of Action⁶

13. Support and assist the countries of the area on the basis of their will and ability to defend and strengthen their independence.

14. Respect each country’s choice of national policy for preserving its independence, but make every effort to demonstrate the advantages of greater cooperation and closer alignment with the free world, as well as the dangers of alignment with the Communist bloc.

15. Encourage the countries of Southeast Asia to cooperate closely with each other on a basis of mutual aid and support, and support indigenous efforts to develop regional associations so long as they do not weaken SEATO or the spirit of resistance to Communism.

16. Participate actively in SEATO, and seek to develop both its military and non-military aspects in a manner that will convincingly demonstrate the value of SEATO as a regional association, the usefulness of which extends beyond deterrence of Communist expansion. Encourage limited participation of non-Communist, non-SEATO Asian nations in certain SEATO activities.

17. Encourage and support the spirit of resistance among the peoples of Southeast Asia to Chinese Communist aggression as well as to indigenous Communist insurrection, subversion, and propaganda.

18. Maintain, in the general area of the Far East, U.S. forces adequate to exert a deterrent influence against Communist aggression, in conformity with NSC 5602/1.

19. Should overt Communist aggression occur in the Southeast Asian Treaty area, invoke the UN Charter or the SEATO Treaty, or both as applicable; and subject to local request for assistance take necessary military and any other action to assist any Mainland Southeast Asian state or dependent territory in the SEATO area willing to resist Communist resort to force: Provided, that the taking of military action shall be subject to prior submission to and approval by the Congress unless the emergency is deemed by the President to be so great that immediate action is necessary to save a vital interest of the United States.

20. In case of an imminent or actual Communist attempt to seize control from within, and assuming some manifest local desire for U.S. assistance, take all feasible measures to thwart the attempt, including even military action after appropriate Congressional action.

21. As appropriate, assist the police forces in Southeast Asian countries to obtain training and equipment to detect and contain Communist activities.

22. In order to strengthen the non-Communist governments of the area and to help forestall their economic dependence on the Communist bloc:

a. Provide flexible economic and technical assistance as necessary to attain U.S. objectives.

b. Encourage measures to improve the climate for private investment, both domestic and foreign, and to mobilize the maximum investment of U.S. private capital in the area consistent with the prevailing climate.

c. Encourage United Nations agencies, other Colombo Plan countries, and other friendly countries to contribute available resources to promote the economic growth of Southeast Asia.

d. Encourage the Southeast Asian countries to orient their economies in the direction of the free world and to rely primarily on non-Communist markets and sources of supply for trade, technicians, capital development, and atomic development.

e. In carrying out programs involving disposal of U.S. agricultural surpluses abroad:

(1) Give particular attention to the economic vulnerabilities of the Southeast Asian countries and avoid, to the maximum extent practicable, detracting from the ability of these countries to market their own exportable produce.

(2) Give particular emphasis to the use of the resources to promote multilateral trade and economic development.

f. Promote as appropriate the expansion of trade relationships between the United States and the countries of Southeast Asia.

g. Take advantage of adverse local reactions to Communist barter agreements with countries in the area by demonstrating the advantages to these countries of conducting trade on a multilateral commercial basis.

23. Make a special, sustained effort to help educate an expanding number of technically competent, pro-Western civilian and military leaders, working bilaterally, through the United Nations, with the other Colombo Plan countries and with other friendly countries. Stress the development of potential and secondary leadership to support the thin stratum of elite now administering the central governments and bring to their support modern techniques and technology in public information and organization.

24. Place increased emphasis on community development projects, educational programs, and other activities aimed to influence the welfare and attitudes of the people at the village level.

25. Strengthen informational, cultural and educational activities, as appropriate, to foster increased alignment of the people with the free world and to contribute to an understanding of Communist aims and techniques.

26. Hold or reduce the number of U.S. officials in each country to a strict minimum consistent with sound implementation of essential programs, in order to head off an adverse political reaction to the presence of a large number of Americans in relatively privileged positions.

27. Promote increasing Asian Buddhist contact with and knowledge of the free world. Explore with friendly religious organizations ways of developing Buddhist fraternal associations and identification with free world religious leaders and movements.

28. Continue activities designed to encourage the overseas Chinese communities in Southeast Asia (a) to organize and activate anti-Communist groups and activities within their own communities; (b) to resist the effects of parallel pro-Communist groups and activities; (c) generally, to increase their orientation toward their local governments and toward the free world; and (d) consistent with their obligations and primary allegiance to their local governments, to extend sympathy and support to the Chinese National Government.

29. Discreetly encourage local governments to work toward assimilation of racial minorities.

30. Implement as appropriate covert operations designed to assist in the achievement of U.S. objectives in Southeast Asia.

31. Promote economic cooperation between the countries of the area and Japan and with the Government of the Republic of China, to the extent feasible without jeopardizing the achievement of U.S. objectives toward the individual Southeast Asian countries.

32. In order to promote increased cooperation in the area and to deny the general area of the Mekong River Basin to Communist influence or domination, assist as feasible in the development of the Mekong River Basin as a nucleus for regional cooperation and mutual aid.

V. Country Courses of Action In Addition to the “Regional Courses of Action” Above

Burma

33. In view of the emerging opportunities in Burma and the repercussions that developments there will have on the uncommitted areas of Asia and Africa, make a special effort to influence an increasingly favorable orientation in Burma’s policies.

34. Encourage and support those elements in Burma which can maintain a stable free government that identifies its interest with those of the free world and resists Communist inducements, threats, and programs to subvert Burma’s independence.

35. Encourage Burmese assumption of regional and international responsibilities compatible with our own objectives.

36. For political purposes, upon Burmese request make available military equipment and supplies on a loan or reimbursable basis, as consistent with U.S. interests.

37. Encourage the Burmese Government to establish internal security throughout the country, and discourage further foreign assistance to Chinese Nationalist irregulars and ethnic rebel groups in Burma.

38. Should overt Communist aggression occur against Burma, invoke the UN Charter and, subject to Burmese request for assistance, take necessary military and any other action to assist Burma if Burma is willing to resist Communist resort to force and U.S. vital interests are involved: Provided, that the taking of military action shall be subject to prior submission to and approval by the Congress.

Cambodia

39. In order to maintain Cambodia’s independence and to reverse the drift toward pro-Communist neutrality, encourage individuals and groups in Cambodia who oppose dealing with the Communist bloc and who would serve to broaden the political power base in Cambodia.

40. Provide modest military aid for indigenous armed forces capable of assuring internal security.

41. Terminate economic and military aid if the Cambodian Government ceases to demonstrate a will to resist internal Communist subversion and to carry out a policy of maintaining its independence.

42. Assist where possible in solution of Cambodian-Thai border problems and in fostering good relations between Cambodia and Viet Nam.

Laos

43. Seek to strengthen the determination of the Royal Government to resist subversion and to maintain its independence.

44. In order to prevent Lao neutrality from veering toward pro-Communism, encourage individuals and groups in Laos who oppose dealing with the Communist bloc.

45. Develop an attitude of confidence on the part of Lao leaders that the UN Charter, SEATO, and U.S. support provide a favorable basis for Lao resistance to Communist pressure and inducements.

46. Encourage and support close bonds between Laos and Thailand, including such political associations, economic cooperation, and joint military planning as feasible.

47. Support the expansion and reorganization of police, propaganda, and army intelligence services, provided anti-Communist elements maintain effective control of these services.

48. Continue support of the Royal Lao Army to assure internal security and provide limited initial resistance to an attack by the Viet Minh.

49. Terminate economic and military aid if the Lao Government ceases to demonstrate a will to resist internal Communist subversion and to carry out a policy of maintaining its independence.

Thailand

50. Promote the development of Thai leadership which is increasingly united, stable and constructive, is supported by the Thai people, and willing to continue the alignment of Thailand with the United States and the West.

52. Provide military assistance to Thailand for support of forces sufficient:

a. To maintain security.

b. To present limited initial resistance to external aggression.

c. To make a modest contribution to collective defense of contiguous SEATO areas.

53. Encourage and support close bonds between Thailand and Laos and between Thailand and Cambodia, including such political associations, economic cooperation, and joint military planning as feasible.

Viet Nam

54. Assist Free Viet Nam to develop a strong, stable and constitutional government to enable Free Viet Nam to assert an increasingly attractive contrast to conditions in the present Communist zone.

55. Work toward the weakening of the Communists in North and South Viet Nam in order to bring about the eventual peaceful reunification of a free and independent Viet Nam under anti-Communist leadership.

56. Support the position of the Government of Free Viet Nam that all-Viet Nam elections may take place only after it is satisfied that genuinely free elections can be held throughout both zones of Viet Nam.

57. Assist Free Viet Nam to build up indigenous armed forces, including independent logistical and administrative services, which will be capable of assuring internal security and of providing limited initial resistance to attack by the Viet Minh.

58. Encourage Vietnamese military planning for defense against external aggression along lines consistent with U.S. planning concepts based upon approved U.S. policy, and discreetly manifest in other ways U.S. interest in assisting Free Viet Nam, in accordance with the SEATO Treaty, to defend itself against external aggression.

Singapore and the Federation of Malaya (The following courses of action only, and not the regional courses of action, are applicable to the Federation of Malaya and Singapore.)

59. Accept the present primary role of the British in Malaya in so far as they are willing and able to maintain it, and collaborate with the British so far as practicable.

60. Encourage the British and local authorities to take vigorous actions to curb Communist subversion, and be prepared to assist in such action as requested by British or local authorities.

61. Employ all feasible means to prevent Singapore and the Federation of Malaya from falling under Communist control. In the case of armed attack, place initial reliance on Commonwealth, ANZUS, or SEATO resources as appropriate, but be prepared to take such additional U.S. action as may be required.

62. Encourage the development of a strong, stable, independent Malayan nation within the Commonwealth.

63. Seek to assure free world strategic interests in Singapore, favoring, only if consistent with this end, elective institutions in Singapore and Singapore’s incorporation with an independent Malaya within the Commonwealth.

64. After Malaya attains full self-government and independence, be prepared, as appropriate and consistent with recognition of Commonwealth responsibility, to assist Malaya to maintain stability and independence, and encourage it to join SEATO.

VI. Supplementary Statement of Policy on the Special Situation in North Viet Nam

65. Treat the Viet Minh as not constituting a legitimate government, and discourage other non-Communist states from developing or maintaining relations with the Viet Minh regime.

66. Prevent the Viet Minh from expanding their political influence and territorial control in Free Viet Nam and Southeast Asia.

67. Deter the Viet Minh from attacking or subverting Free Viet Nam or Laos.

68. Probe weaknesses of the Viet Minh and exploit them internally and internationally whenever possible.

69. Exploit nationalist sentiment within North Viet Nam as a means of weakening and disrupting Sino-Soviet domination.

70. Assist the Government of Viet Nam to undertake programs of political, economic and psychological warfare against Viet Minh Communists.

71. Apply, as necessary to achieve U.S. objectives, restrictions on U.S. exports and shipping and on foreign assets similar to those already in effect for Communist China and North Korea.

[Here follows a financial appendix.]

1. Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5612 Series. Top Secret.
2. For text, see vol. I, p. 535.
3. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
4. For purposes of this paper “Mainland Southeast Asia” consists of Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Viet Nam, Malaya and Singapore. In addition, there is attached a supplementary statement of policy on the special situation in North Viet Nam. [Footnote in the source text.]
5. “Basic National Security Policy”, dated March 15, 1956. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5602 Series) For documentation on the NSC 5602 series, see volume XIX.
6. The regional courses of action are not applicable to Malaya and Singapore. [Footnote in the source text.]