255. Memorandum From Robert McClintock of the Policy Planning Staff to the Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning (Bowie)1
SUBJECT
- U.S. Policy Toward Cambodia
On his trip to Canberra,2 the Secretary remarked to the Counselor of the Department that it might be a good thing to have a new look at our past and current policies toward Cambodia. The underlying paper3 is responsive to that wish.
The first part of the paper traces past U.S. policy toward Cambodia, which was to furnish economic and military assistance to the extent necessary, coupled with aid from other Free World countries, to enable the Kingdom to maintain its independence. U.S. aid, both military and economic, has averaged about $50 million a year, but in FY ‘57 it has been considerably reduced (to $32 million) and the downward trend is projected into 1960. Primary among U.S. aid programs for Cambodia were maintenance of reduced but more efficient armed forces; the construction of an important highway from the capital to the sea; and effective work in the field of basic education. France, Colombo Plan countries, India, and Japan have contributed modest amounts of aid to Cambodia. In 1956, the Chinese Communists promised a two-year aid program of $22.4 million, and Cambodia has signed trade and aid agreements likewise with Czechoslovakia and the USSR. It is generally agreed that without foreign assistance [Page 563] at this stage of its development, Cambodia is not a viable state; but with proper training of personnel and a rational development of the economy, the country could in a fairly short time be placed both economically and militarily on its own feet.
The Government of Cambodia is a dictatorship by its former King, Prince Norodom Sihanouk. … governance in Cambodia is a jerky thing, a benevolent despotism sustained by monarchy and tempered by Buddhism. The Prince, who has no other rivals, believes he is following a policy of strict neutrality as between the Free World and the Communist camps, but his pronouncements and travels in Communist countries have made it possible for him to be used effectively by Communist propaganda in the Far East and elsewhere.
India is watchful of developments in Cambodia as part of its policy to ring the periphery of China with a buffer of neutral states. In general, although Indian policy works constantly against Cambodian participation in SEATO, the Government in Delhi favors U.S. aid programs and realizes that without them the Kingdom would probably become Communist.
Since 1956 Chinese Communist influence has greatly increased in Cambodia, particularly in the large Chinese community. The congregations which administer Chinese internal affairs are now openly in favor of Peking, and the Chinese educational system has been completely penetrated by the Communists. However, thus far Prince Sihanouk has refused to recognize Peking and has followed a similar policy toward the Communist government of Hanoi. Relations with Viet-Nam and Thailand, Cambodia’s two immediate neighbors, are chronically bad.
Any assessment of what to do about Cambodia boils down to the problem of Prince Sihanouk. … periodically the temptation is almost overpowering to make Cambodia a test tube case of what should happen to neutralist countries which accept Communist aid and whose leaders by their pronouncements and attitudes give advantage to the Communist cause.
However, if the United States should cease its aid programs for Cambodia, it would not bring the Cambodian people to their knees because their wants are so simple they can get along without any outside aid and still survive. Furthermore, in the judgment of the present country team in Phnom Penh, withdrawal of U.S. aid would leave a vacuum which would be filled shortly by the Chinese Communists and there would be an early loss of Cambodian independence. This would pose difficult problems for the United States. Both our principal SEATO ally, Thailand, and our principal Southeast Asian client, Viet-Nam, would be alarmed if the Communists took over in Cambodia, and the American Government would be faced with the problem as to whether in fact such a take-over came within [Page 564] the province of the SEATO Treaty, and if so, what SEATO should do about it. The tendency in either Bangkok or Saigon to take over Cambodia in such a contingency might spark a war in Southeast Asia through affording a pretext for an attack by North Viet-Nam against the South or even by mainland China as a guarantor of the Geneva settlement.
The application of U.S. policy to a neutralist state of seeking to aid it to obtain its sovereign independence has a scope much wider than Cambodia. In this small country there is found in microcosm all the elements with which the Free World must deal in adjusting its policies to the great anti-colonial revolution which in varying degrees has been completed Or is in the process of occurrence in the zone from Southeast Asia through the continent of Africa, and including the Middle East. It is submitted that despite the many ups and downs of the application of our policy toward Cambodia, the policy itself has not varied, and the Cambodians have in fact maintained their independence. Thus in Cambodia, as elsewhere in the uncommitted area of the former colonial countries, we have been able to apply a policy which although perhaps not as desirable as that of perfecting systems of collective security, has at least demonstrated the advantage of utilizing the inert weight of neutrality as a counterpoise to communism.
In sum, therefore, the policy of the United States toward Cambodia of assisting it to maintain and defend its independence should not be changed. The continuing requirement is the application of diplomatic skill, fortified by modest but adequate aid programs and sustained by enduring patience.
- Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, Cambodia. Secret.↩
- To attend the SEATO Council meetings, March 11–13; see Documents 139 ff.↩
- Attached but not printed.↩