239. Telegram From the Embassy in Cambodia to the Department of State 1
1613. Department pass ICA/Washington, USIA, Defense, CINCPAC. Department pouch Rangoon, New Delhi, Djakarta, Singapore, Colombo, Hong Kong, Taipei, Manila, Paris, London. This is Country Team message. As indicated Embtel 1515, Cambodia has initialed aid agreement with Communist China.2 It is probable (Embtel 16013) this will be signed within next fortnight and ratified shortly thereafter. Last sentence Embtel 15434 promised recommendations on what to do about it. As pointed out in Embtel 1515 Cambodia is first independent country of Asia to be selected by Communist China for experiment of economic assistance. In consequence, pebble now to be thrown in this small pool may splash more widely by implication and its waves touch shores more distant than Cambodia.
I do not believe we should suffer an attack of “Aswan Dam fever” or be stampeded into opposite course of “making an example” of Cambodia by stopping our aid program altogether. To cease aid altogether would not only negate statement of Secretary of April 175 and give ample ammunition to Communist propaganda apparatus, but would force Cambodia closer to Communist orbit. Our strategic objective to deny lower Mekong basin to Communist influence would thus be defeated.
To increase aid to Cambodia under circumstance of Chinese impending assistance would merely encourage Prince Sihanouk in his cocky assumption he can have best of both possible worlds by playing off United States against Communist China. Furthermore, it would provoke reactions on part of our allies in Southeast Asia. It is not likely in any event Congress would increase aid funds to Cambodia, nor is it needed either economically or politically at present to meet ChiCom. It is further true ChiComs have cast gauntlet where we have opportunity to beat them at their own game.
It is questionable if aid should be maintained at present level, not because of imminence of Chinese aid, but because on close analysis [Page 524] which we understand Sessions report6 will bear out, amount of aid given Cambodia may be in excess of country’s real needs. However, care must be exercised in any reduction of our assistance to armed forces for obviously political reasons. Evidence accrues that Army may be source of healthy restraint on Prince Sihanouk …. Military aid therefore is an important element in achieving political objectives and final decision on character and amount of military assistance must be left to political authority. Furthermore, to cut down assistance coincidental with advent of Chinese aid will require careful handling. Immediate instinct of Sihanouk … will be to cry he was right all along and had accurately predicted United States, dissatisfied with his policy of neutrality, would punish him by reduction in aid. This outcry from Sihanouk will at once be picked up by propaganda media in Hanoi, Peking, Moscow and possibly Delhi.
Since a reduction in United States aid to Cambodia will bring about an inevitable reaction, it seems to me wiser to seize nettle boldly. I would propose following course of action:
I would request audience of King and Queen and recall to them what I told Penn Nouth on February 23;7 namely, that our aid program has been severely criticized by Sihanouk in private and in public, that in consequence I had requested a study group to examine what was wrong with it; that study group after consultation with Cambodian experts has now returned its report and found Cambodia could get along with less United States aid in future.
I would remind King and Queen this finding had been made without prior knowledge of Chinese aid agreement and was based upon economic analysis. I would anticipate to Their Majesties that Sihanouk would probably burst into print and make allegations similar to those which had endangered friendly relations with United States during February, March and April of this year. I would tell Their Majesties privately that although American policy toward Cambodia varied in no degree from Secretary’s statement of April 17, it should be clearly understood that application of that policy would have to take into account public statements of responsible officials and new factor of economic aid from Communist China. I personally thought Chinese aid was quite simply a Communist Trojan horse which might stay quiet for a year or so but would ultimately be a most certain threat to integrity of the state and continuance of that neutrality which was a cardinal element of Cambodian policy.
[Page 525]This being said, I would wish Their Majesties to understand steadfastness of American policy toward Cambodia and undiminished desire to assist Cambodia to retain its independence. To this end United States Government would propose if Congress voted necessary funds to continue aid to Cambodia in those aspects which were most essential to that cardinal purpose—maintenance of Cambodia’s independence.
It was clear that first item on list was continued assistance to Cambodian Armed Forces. However, here MAAG felt that due to United States aid already made available, by streamlining and general improvement in efficiency, military security could be improved with less money and a recommendation to that effect had already been made.
Second item of priority importance would be road to new port of Kompong Som. Despite years of talk about this port it had been American impetus which had galvanized this project in 1954 and we were on point of letting contract which would result in an excellent highway from capital to Kompong Som.
A third priority project should be irrigation. USOM had on order valuable equipment to extent of $600,000 which should be devoted to that purpose.
Other assistance would be forthcoming in field of transportation, including certain airports, and creation of telecommunications network with other free nations of SEA. Likewise there would be continuance of aid for humanitarian projects and assistance in creation of small industries.
If Department concurs with above approach I strongly recommend that similar representation be made to Nong Kimny when he is in Washington. This would have advantage of having relatively unpalatable news first conveyed by a Cambodian Ambassador and not an American Ambassador. It could likewise be made clear to Kimny that if he is able to convince Sihanouk to curb his emotions and to desist from statements which conduce to Communist propaganda use our attitude toward his policies might be a more favorable one. Point must eventually be got across to Royal Family and more perceptive souls here that Sihanouk, by his … remarks, has been working on Communist side of fence and thus not only violates his professed neutrality policy but endangers that independence of Cambodia of which he is self-proclaimed champion.
Department will note that with exception of aid for military account much of projects listed above are identical with those ChiComs have elected in taking up challenge in Cambodia to compete with American aid. I am convinced that we have an opportunity in this small country not to sulk in our tent but to get out and prove to other SEA countries that American assistance is more efficient and [Page 526] more effective than anything Communists can offer. Above all, since ChiComs have elected to run race on track in which our horses are entered, it would appear we have cardinal opportunity to beat them at their own game, to do this however our horses must be of very finest pitch of training and pedigree and must not be hobbled by administrative restrictions imposed on them.
Foregoing recommendation has been based entirely on assessment of situation as between Cambodia and United States with due regard to strategic position of Cambodia in SEA. We are however not unmindful of wider implications both in this area and elsewhere of effects our aid program to Cambodia will have upon our SEATO allies or other free nations in Asia who might likewise be tempted to shop around for Communist assistance in addition to that granted by United States.
It is not our province to speculate on wider aspects of experiment of economic assistance on which ChiComs are now embarked. Department with its access to information on reactions in other Asian countries will be able to assess these implications. Our guess is that at least initially ChiComs will walk softly and wear their brightest co-existence smile. Their aim is, in a strategical sense, to disrupt unity of free nations of Asia and to cast apple of discord into SEATO garden. If tactically they pick up some small change in Cambodia that is a fringe benefit for them. Our purpose should be to show allied and neutralist countries of Asia they can find a more steadfast friend in United States and a better guarantee of their independence in United States assistance than they can by yielding to blandishments of Communist China.
I am convinced our basic policy should be unchanged—namely to assist Cambodia to remain independent—and I believe that by applying suggestions outlined above we may be able to turn force of Cambodian neutralism against its natural enemy, which is Communism.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 451H.9341/5–3156. Secret. Pouched to Saigon, Vientiane, and Bangkok.↩
- According to telegram 1515, May 12, the amount of the aid for a 2-year period would be “not more than 800 million riels equivalent 8 million pounds sterling” and would be used for irrigation and hydraulic engineering projects, light industries, transportation and communications, electric power installations, and hospitals and schools. (Ibid., 451H.9341/5–1256)↩
- Dated May 28, not printed. (Ibid., 451H.9341/5–2856)↩
- Dated May 16, not printed. (Ibid., 451H.9341/5–1656)↩
- Text transmitted in Document 235.↩
- Supra .↩
- A report of the meeting between Penn Nouth and McClintock is in telegram 1080 from Phnom Penh, February 23, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 751.5–MSP/2–2356)↩