Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

198. Letter From the Acting Secretary of Defense (Anderson) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, April 6, 1955.

Dear Mr. Secretary: I refer to my letter to you dated 16 March 1955,² and the following messages received from Department of Defense and Department of State field representatives.

a. From USARMA, Phnom Penh (OARMA 28–55, 20 March 1955³)

b. From USARMA, Phnom Penh (OARMA PC 27–55, 18 March 1955⁴)

c. Embtel Paris 3990, 18 March 1955⁵

d. Embtel Phnom Penh 785, 21 March 1955⁶

In my letter of 16 March emphasis was placed on the increasing concern of the Department of Defense regarding the recent events which have taken place in Cambodia and specifically the attitude that the French seem to be taking toward the organization and training of Cambodian forces. Further, the information contained in the four reference messages would appear to imply that French interests in Cambodia will not effectively assist in the development of loyal and efficient forces, as desired by the United States.

United States objectives in Cambodia are to provide, in addition to political and economic stability, those military forces which are required to maintain the internal security of Cambodia and which will also provide a limited capability for its defense. Based on these objectives and the information contained in the reference messages, it is considered that the factors outlined below should be the basis for the development of these military forces.

a. United States weapons, matériel and equipment are designed to take the maximum and most efficient advantage of U.S. organizational concepts which are flexible enough to fit the situation in any given area of the world. Therefore, it would appear logical that in the accomplishment of the U.S. objective of producing efficient Cambodian forces, U.S. organizational concepts should be used in the development of these forces thus taking maximum advantage of U.S. weapons, matériel and equipment, and tactical doctrine.

b. The French have demonstrated by their efforts in Indochina, prior to the cease-fire agreement, their marked inability to conceive, plan for, organize, train and fight a force composed of indigenous personnel. The same deficiency is apparent in relation to their current efforts in Cambodia. Therefore, an appropriate solution to the adequate development of Cambodian forces might be the employment of U.S. organizational and training methods and procedures supervised by U.S. personnel.

Based on the factors outlined above, it is recommended that you reconsider the Department of Defense proposal for the eventual withdrawal of the French training mission to Cambodia and that a secret memorandum to that effect be signed with Cambodia at the time the bilateral for the establishment of the MAAG is concluded.

It is further recommended that the French be informed at the forthcoming bilateral discussions on Indochina of U.S. intentions to make every effort to assume, in conjunction with the Cambodians, control of the organization and training of the Cambodian armed forces.

I have requested Assistant Secretary Hensel to discuss this matter with your staff in order to arrive at a solution to this problem.

Sincerely yours,

R. Anderson

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751H.5/4–655. Top Secret.
2. Document 195.
3. Document 196.
4. Not found.
5. Telegram 3990 contained the preliminary views of the French Foreign Ministry on the Cambodian training responsibilities. (Department of State, Central Files, 751H.5/3–1855)
6. In telegram 785, March 21, the Embassy in Phnom Penh suggested that OARMA 28–55 “be required reading in the Department before Franco-US discussions on Cambodia commence next month.” (Ibid., 751H.5–MSP/3–2155)