Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

199. Telegram From the Embassy in Cambodia to the Department of State¹

Phnom Penh, April 29, 1955—6 p.m.

984. Country team appreciates opportunity afforded Department circular telegrams 559² and 560³ to comment on excellent OCB paper on means to provide internal security in countries vulnerable to Communist subversion. So far as possible format suggested in final three numbered paragraphs Department circular telegram 559 will be followed forthwith:

I. State of development of threat of subversion.

Cambodia at moment is probably that country of Southeast Asia least vulnerable to immediate Communist subversion. Population of Cambodia is homogeneous and welded together by amalgam of loyalty to royal house and Buddhist church. Previous Communist subversion has been of foreign origin and easily identifiable as such as witness Viet Minh invasion during closing phase of Indochina war. Indigenous Communists are limited to intellectuals largely in capital city and to students returning from France where Communists have made skillful and successful play to capture their imaginations and loyalty. Even Indian chairman of ICC has estimated local Khmer–Is-sarak adherents (nationalists, bandits, but not necessarily Communists) as not more than 1,500 in population of 4.5 million.

Fact that Cambodia fortunately at moment is not subject imminent Communist subversion does not, however, mean that in fairly near future various forces of insurrectional activity and external infiltration may not be encountered. These elements are both of domestic origin and of foreign derivation. On domestic side there are “rallied” bands of recent rebels, such as those of Son Ngoc Thanh, Puth Chhay and Prince Chantaraingsei, who, although they have been formally amnestied by royal government in actuality remain in state of quasi-outlawry not yet forgiven by Palace or Central Government and not yet loyal to authorities in Phnom Penh. To meet these current sources of armed disaffection, we believe remedy proposed by General Tioulong⁴ is the adequate one. Tioulong would break up present feudal armed bands owing loyalty to such chieftains as Puth Chhay and Prince Chantaraingsei. Regular units of ARK would be used to occupy those remote forested or mountainous areas, such as the Cardamom Range, or mountains on Vietnamese frontier in province of Kratie, to forestall infiltration of these spaces by Viet Minh or Communist guerrillas. If this plan is carried out, present armed bands of local feudal leaders will be absorbed into national army and kept under control by army discipline.

Greater danger to Cambodia lies along its frontier with Vietnam. Cambodian Government has already on repeated occasions invited attention of US Government constant depredations by Hoa Hao and Cao Dai private armies against Cambodian populace along border with Cochin China. Our prediction is that as conditions of public order in South Vietnam deteriorate, these depredations by sectarian forces will increase, and at that time Viet Minh Communists will channel operations which began as simple marauding forays and give them political color and strategic guidance. This will then pose threat to Cambodia of guerrilla warfare of foreign origin and eventual Communist domination.

II. Adequacy of indigenous countermeasures.

Under leadership of Prince Sihanouk there increased recognition bordering on over-exaggeration of threat to royal house allegedly embodied by Son Ngoc Thanh and his followers. There is less awareness on part of Central Government of potential threat of private armies of Puth Chhay and Chantaraingsei since these leaders have officially rallied to Sihanouk and he is tempted to feel their personal loyalty to him is assured. Sihanouk and royal family likewise, by their open breach with democratic party and public accusation that this party is dominated by crypto-Communists, have recognized threat to regime from this source which, as in case of Son Ngoc Thanh, is undoubtedly over-played. Many members of democratic party are solid supporters of monarchy and are moderate men who only seek reconciliation with Sihanouk and Padqos. However, Sihanouk seeks to entrench his popular following by creating an opposition as a stalking horse. In so doing he may … fail to recognize greater danger of Communist subversion taking over and making use of indigenous foci of political infection.

As for capability of indigenous forces to meet subversion, excellent and comprehensive Engle–Page report, whose recommendations were summarized in Embassy telegram 853,⁵ stresses in conclusion neither national police nor home guard is at present equipped, trained or capable of recognizing Communist subversion or of dealing with it. National army which, following dismissal of its energetic and able chief, Tioulong, has disintegrated as disciplined military force, is likewise at present time incapable of dealing with well organized Communist subversion or guerrilla warfare. … In consequence, it is an exercise in a vacuum to outline police-type preventive activities suggested in paragraph I (1) as these facilities do not exist in Cambodia. However, local observers concur that thus far Communist agents, personalities, and groups are few in number and as yet ineffective in Cambodia. Therefore, there is an opportunity, by improving Cambodian security forces, to meet threat of internal and external subversion before it materializes.

Problem boils down to implementation of Engle–Page report in providing national police and home guard with proper equipment and training. We concur in kindred nature is [sic] strategic threat to new Cambodian port on gulf of Kompong Som which lies in fact that great island of Phu Quoc points like a dagger at line of communications along coastal road from Kampot to new port. Phu Quoc through historical aberration of French is Vietnamese although it lies in Cambodian territorial waters, and during recent war was never completely removed from Viet Minh control. If Phu Quoc were fortified, forces there could interdict access by sea or coastal road to new port and such fortification would undoubtedly be coordinated by Viet Minh with guerrilla activity to stop access to Phnom Penh by use of Mekong flowing through Cochin China. Phu Quoc, therefore, assumes relationship to new Cambodian port similar to Quemoy and Matsu in respect to Amoy and Foochow. Antidote might be agreement with Vietnam for demilitarization of this island with French (or SEATO) guarantee.

Engle–Page estimate that small, hand-picked US training mission could within three or four years produce a national police and home guard organization which could prevent internal subversion in Cambodia unless such subversion were overwhelmingly supported from external sources. We likewise feel with advent of American MAAG, and presupposing some degree of cooperation from French military mission which does not now exist, it will be possible to make small and efficient Cambodian army [which] could fulfill task of guarding Cambodia’s land frontier and seacoasts against external infiltration. In this case we would warn against repeating mistake we made in Vietnam of giving Cambodian armed forces too much heavy equipment. Cambodian troops should be taught to walk to work and not to ride in trucks. They should likewise be trained in field weapons effective against guerrilla infiltration and not in weapons familiar to classic European battlefield. Their amphibious capacity should be materially increased since much of Cambodia is inundated half the year and their capacity to control coast line and means of river access should be multiplied many fold. It is probable that excellent Cambodian parachute battalion should be given on-the-spot drop capacity in order to reach quickly remote areas open to infiltration from Laos or Vietnam. Furthermore, ARK should be given both air support and air transport capabilities. We visualize light aircraft (L–20s) for former and C–47s for latter.

We do not believe home guard and national police forces should be placed under Ministry of Defense as tendency of Cambodian army is to pick off best elements from police cadre, skim cream of weapons and equipment, and leave home guard with cast-off remnants. At same time, we do not believe police should be built up as counter weight to army as King Sihanouk once suggested to me. Both have clearly defined responsibilities: Police and home guard to prevent internal subversion and to spot external infiltration which has broken through frontier screen; and army and naval forces to protect land and sea frontiers against foreign subversive and guerrilla elements.

III. Local US programs of assistance.

Local US programs of assistance are yet in formation stage. We have still to complete arduous and long drawn-out negotiation for MAAG bilateral and economic aid agreement. Concrete proposals have been submitted to USIA for USIS participation with other US agencies in program of indoctrination both of home guard, police, and army. This has not yet been approved by USIA Washington. Engle–Page report cites specific steps which can be taken to improve internal security forces but approval of this report awaits Washington decision. If interested agencies in Washington approve recommendations made by country team, we have reasonable confidence Cambodia can be maintained secure from both internal indigenous subversion and external Communist infiltration.

We see nowhere in foregoing picture any possibility of SEATO forces being able to assist Cambodia in meeting these types of subversion other than possible demilitarization of Phu Quoc. Until our experts develop political bomb which can be used as antidote to political threat, we regretfully conclude use of SEATO strategic forces would be unavailing in this theatre. This does not mean, however, that there is not a good prospect of holding Cambodia immune from Communist penetration if relatively simple measures already recommended are accepted by Washington, adequately staffed and financed, and carried into effect by unremitting diplomatic effort in the field.

McClintock

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751H.5/4–2955. Top Secret.
2. In circular telegram 559, March 23, the Department instructed recipient Chiefs of Mission “to have the country team, including representatives from FOA, MAAG (or service attachés),…prepare a report on the possibilities and requirements for U.S. assistance in increasing the effectiveness of police-type forces to deal with communist subversion and, in those countries where communist subversion has reached the stage of actual or potential large-scale insurrection, increasing the effectiveness of the regular armed forces to deal with communist subversion and insurrection.” (Ibid., 700.5/3–12355). This information was to enable the OCB to formulate a concept for U.S. assistance in the development of forces adequate to provide internal security in countries vulnerable to Communist subversion. Eventually this information was for the use of the NSC. (NSC Action No. 1290–4; Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. II, Part 1, p. 844, footnote 10)
3. In circular telegram 560, March 23, the Department further explained that this attempt to combat Communist subversion grew out of Eisenhower’s personal interest and country team assessments would weigh heavily in NSC deliberation; therefore the assessments should be prepared by the best officers of the mission, should include points of disagreement as well as agreement, and should be submitted on schedule. (Department of State, Central Files, 700.5/3–2355)
4. General Nhiek Tioulong of the Royal Khmer Army.
5. Byron Engle, Chief of the Police Administration Division of FOA, and Lewis Page prepared a police study report on the internal security services in Laos and Cambodia. Telegram 853, April 1, summarized the conclusions and recommendations relating to Cambodia. (Department of State, Central Files, 851H.501/4–155)