Office of the Historian

195. Letter From the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to the Secretary of State1

Washington, March 16, 1955.

Dear Mr. Secretary: Since our meeting with the President, February 17, 1955,2 on the Cambodian MAAG, I have become increasingly concerned with the events that have taken place. The attitude the French seem to be taking toward their training responsibilities in Laos (Department of State secret message, Vientiane to SecState No. 384, February 26, 19553) and the reception General Ely gave your proposal for the training and organization of Cambodian forces (Sectos 51 and 544), convince me that French interests in these two countries will not lead to the development of efficient forces or disciplined forces. The recent riotous outbursts of Cambodian army units in Phnom Penh is but one example of what might be expected under a continuation of French training.

While the proposal contained in Department of State secret cable, Secto 54, from Manila, March 2, 1955, has definite merit in concluding a bilateral speedily and would be in conformance with the instructions given you by the President, I firmly believe that there would be no safeguard against poor French training. Neither does it provide for the eventual replacement of the French by U.S. [Page 438] personnel which I am sure you will agree would be to the best interests of Cambodia and the United States.

As you have so often pointed out in your letters concerning force levels, the stability of governments in this area is generally dependent on stable, loyal military forces. Because of this, we are striving to do everything possible to create and support effective forces in the area. Therefore, in spite of the latitude given you by the President for negotiation of a MAAG bilateral agreement, I wish to recommend that you reconsider a Department of Defense proposal for the eventual withdrawal of the French training mission from Cambodia and that a secret memorandum of understanding to that effect be signed with Cambodia at the time the bilateral for the establishment of the MAAG is concluded.

Attached is a memorandum which contains the Joint Chiefs of Staff comments5 on your letter to me of February 15, 1955,6 on this subject. The Department of Defense concurs in the views of the JCS. You are aware of this, but I feel your Department should receive this memorandum to complete your record of this case.7

Sincerely yours,

C.E. Wilson
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751H.5/3–1655. Secret.↩
  2. See Document 191.↩
  3. In telegram 384, the Embassy reported that it had raised with French officials in Vientiane the problems of reduction of French forces at Seno, failure to replace rotated French officers involved in training the Lao Army, and the general low morale of the French training mission in Laos. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.5/2–2655)↩
  4. Documents 192 and 193.↩
  5. See Document 190.↩
  6. Document 189.↩
  7. Dulles replied in a letter to Secretary Wilson, April 2, in which the Secretary of State acknowledged receipt of the Wilson letter and the JCS memorandum, and noted they had been “studied with interest.” The letter continued:

    “We plan to discuss the Cambodian training problem during bipartite talks now being scheduled with the French along the lines of the formula which the President approved and, if practical, we shall move in the direction you suggest. It is hoped that representatives of the Department of Defense will participate in those talks to assist in obtaining the best possible compromise solution.” (Department of State, Central Files, 751H.5/3–1655)

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