Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

118. Memorandum of Discussion at the 295th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, August 30, 1956¹

Washington, August 30, 1956

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda items 1 and 2. For text of the discussion of item 1 on the Suez Canal dispute, see volume XVI, page 324.]

3. U.S. Policy in Mainland Southeast Asia (NSC 5612; NSC 5610;² NSC 5429/5; NSC 5405; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “U.S. Policy in the Event of a Renewal of Aggression in Vietnam”, dated September 16, 1955;³ NSC Actions Nos. 1415, 1526,⁴ 1527,⁵ 1571;⁶ Progress Report, dated July 11, 1956, by OCB on NSC 5405 and Portions of NSC 5429/5;⁷ Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Current U.S. Policy Toward the Far East,” dated August 15, 1956;⁸ Memo for All Holders of NSC 5612 from Executive Secretary, dated August 27, 1956;⁹ Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “U.S. Policy in Mainland Southeast Asia; Change in Current U.S. Policy Toward the Far East”, dated August 29, 1956¹⁰)

Mr. Anderson commenced his briefing of NSC 5612 (copy of briefing note filed in the minutes of the meeting). When he reached paragraph 2, he pointed out that the Joint Chiefs of Staff wished to change the last sentence of the paragraph, which originally read “The loss of the Southeast Asian mainland could thus destroy the possibility of establishing an equipoise of power in Asia”, to read as follows: “The loss of Southeast Asia mainland could thus have far-reaching consequences seriously adverse to U.S. security interests.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that the original sentence improperly implied that “establishing an equipoise of power in Asia” was or should be the U.S. objective in the area. The President indicated his approval of the change proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Mr. Anderson resumed his briefing, and explained to the Council the split views in paragraph 11,¹¹ on the general subject of the U.S. attitude toward neutralist countries on the one hand, and toward countries which joined with us in collective security arrangements on the other hand. The State proposal in paragraph 11 did not clearly indicate that the United States should give preferential treatment in the fields of economic and military assistance to countries which participated with the United States in collective security arrangements. Mr. Anderson then called on Secretary Dulles to make any further comments he wished on this issue.

Secretary Dulles stated that he did not believe there was any serious difference of substance between the Defense Department proposal on the one hand and the State Department proposal on the other. The difference was largely verbal, and Secretary Dulles assured the Council that the State Department wholly shared the views of the Defense Department that nations actually aligned with the United States in collective security pacts should be given preferential treatment over non-aligned countries with respect to U.S. assistance programs. The essence of the State Department position was simply that State did not wish to lay down as a fixed policy statement the principle of preferential treatment for countries formally aligned with the United States. It might well happen that some country aligned with the United States in some kind of collective security pact would not actually be in need of military or economic assistance; whereas some other country which was in a neutralist posture might need our help to prevent itself from being absorbed into the Communist orbit. For example, we actually give more assistance to India than we do to Belgium. Nevertheless, Secretary Dulles again emphasized that he had no quarrel whatever with the thesis that nations formally aligned with the United States should normally get preferential treatment in our assistance programs.

The President pointed out that in both the State version and the Defense version of paragraph 11 the most significant criterion governing the extension of military and economic assistance was that such assistance be “justified by U.S. strategic objectives”. The President expressed understanding of Secretary Dulles’ desire to avoid making preferential treatment to allies an iron-clad rule, but also agreed that, other things being equal, the United States should extend preferential treatment to allies over neutrals. He reiterated with great emphasis that the reason that countries like the Philippines entered into defensive alliances with the United States was to insure for themselves the protection of the strong arm of the United States. This was the great advantage which these nations derived from entering into alliances with the United States.

In the course of further discussion of the issue set forth in paragraph 11, Acting Secretary of Defense Robertson pointed out that it was his experience, when he visited the Southeast Asian countries, that it would be a very great help if these countries could be convinced that the United States would really come to their assistance in the event that they were threatened by Communist bloc countries. Unhappily, they are not so convinced, and if we proceed to give military assistance to neutral nations like Burma, nations allied with us will assume that this assistance will be given to Burma at their expense.

Secretary Dulles repeated that his only concern was that paragraph 11 should not consist of a fixed rule or statement of policy that would actually prevent the United States from providing military assistance to neutral countries like Burma if it proved to be in our strategic interest to do so. Admiral Radford replied that he certainly had no objections to a modest economic aid program for Burma, but warned that the initiation of a military assistance program to neutralist Burma would be very upsetting to the states of Southeast Asia which were allies of the United States.

Secretary Dulles then made the point that if the United States failed to provide military assistance for neutrals like India or Burma, they would almost certainly seek such assistance and obtain it from the USSR. We wished to be able to prevent such a development. Admiral Radford replied that he could only say that we would never be able to retain our allies in Southeast Asia if our allies felt that other countries were in a position to obtain U.S. assistance without ever joining any kind of an alliance with the United States. Admiral Radford also emphasized that it was the view of Congress that we should give military assistance only to dependable allies of the United States. Secretary Dulles then observed that we had better begin getting rid of our allies if having such allies was going to prevent us from doing what is in the best interests of the United States. For example, said Secretary Dulles, he would rather see us lose Thailand, an ally, than to lose India, a neutral.

Admiral Radford pointed out that if we followed the line laid down by Secretary Dulles we would soon have to face precisely this decision. He added that the loss of Thailand would just about finish off the U.S. position in Southeast Asia. In reply to this, Secretary Dulles insisted that we should in each case carefully study what is truly in the strategic interests of the United States. Perhaps upon investigation it might be better to keep Thailand on our side than India or Burma out of the hands of the Communists. Nevertheless, he wanted no fixed formula or statement which by its wording would prevent the United States from providing military assistance to Burma or to India. To make his point, Secretary Dulles read from the text of a cable from Bangkok, dated July 29,¹² indicating that Thailand strongly favored U.S. assistance to Burma.

Admiral Radford said that the assistance recommended for Burma by Thailand was economic assistance rather than military assistance. Secretary Reuben Robertson indicated that he was not opposed to reimbursable military aid to Burma, and that he actually favored U.S. economic aid to Burma. At this point, Secretary Dulles suggested that the Council adopt the formula proposed by the Defense Department in favor of preferential treatment to allies, but to insert language which would indicate that such preferential treatment was to be the normal or the general rule. This would allow for exceptions when exceptions were in the strategic interests of the United States. The President agreed with the solution proposed by Secretary Dulles.

Mr. Anderson continued his briefing. When he reached paragraph 19 he read the paragraph in toto as follows:

“Should overt Communist aggression occur, invoke the UN Charter or the SEATO Treaty, or both as applicable, and subject to local request for assistance take necessary military and any other action to assist any Mainland Southeast Asian state or dependent territory willing to resist Communist resort to force: Provided, that the taking of military action shall be subject to prior submission to and approval by the Congress unless the emergency is so great that immediate action is necessary to save a vital interest of the United States.”

Mr. Anderson then pointed out that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had suggested a revision of paragraph 19 which would delete the last sentence of the existing text, beginning with the words “Provided, that”, and substitute for the deleted sentence a new sentence to read “The Congress should be requested to give to the President advance authority to act quickly in times of crises, including the use of armed forces. The grant of such authority should be publicized.” The Joint Chiefs believed that full knowledge that the President had been given authority by the Congress to act, with military force if necessary, would serve as a strong deterrent to Communist aggression. Mr. Anderson also pointed out that whatever the agreed wording of paragraph 19 of NSC 5612, it would be substituted for the existing paragraph 5–d of NSC 5429/5.

When Mr. Anderson had completed his explanation of the proposal to change the text of paragraph 19, the President said that he could not go along with the change proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The President also expressed some concern lest the wording of paragraph 19 commit the United States to military intervention in mainland Southeast Asia too readily. He thought that our intervention should be further qualified by the insertion of the phrase “where American vital interests are involved”. For example, he said, the United States might not deem it wise to intervene in certain instances where a Communist take-over was very far advanced. In any event, he reiterated that our intervention should be qualified by a clear reference to the fact that our vital interests were deemed to be at stake.

Admiral Radford pointed out that, on the contrary, unless the United States were to give some strong assurance that we would intervene to help these Southeast Asian states if they were threatened by Communist aggression, these countries would insist on providing themselves with much larger domestic military establishments or else would take refuge in a policy of neutralism, neither of which alternatives was advantageous to the United States.

Governor Stassen said he could see Admiral Radford’s point, but that if, on the other hand, the United States made automatic pledges of intervention to assist other nations, the United States would lose control of its own foreign policy. These nations would think that no matter what they did the United States would be bound to come to their assistance if they got into difficulties. Admiral Radford replied that he believed that the United States could protect itself adequately against such a danger. Governor Stassen, however, suggested the addition of a new qualification in paragraph 19, to the effect that we would intervene only if the President deemed the vital interests of the United States to be at stake.

Addressing himself to Mr. Anderson, Secretary Dulles confessed that he had some misgivings over the purport of paragraph 19, and he would like clarification. Was it conceivable that under this paragraph as presently worded, U.S. armed forces could intervene to assist a state of mainland Southeast Asia without having either a mandate from the UN or the cover of the SEATO treaty? If this were the case, then the purport of paragraph 19 went beyond anything that could be described as constitutional.

Mr. Anderson pointed out that military action by the United States, as set forth in paragraph 19, would not take place prior to submission to and approval by the Congress, unless the emergency was so great that immediate action was necessary to protect our vital interests. Secretary Dulles, however, was not satisfied, and reemphasized that if the paragraph conceivably could mean that the President could decide to intervene with our armed forces in the absence of any cover of UN or SEATO action, such a move went beyond the constitutional powers of the Presidency.

The President said that he agreed in general with Secretary Dulles’ argument, and he did not believe that he could constitutionally go as far as paragraph 19 would suggest if it were modified to include the proposed language of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The President continued by stating that except in the event of a direct attack on the United States itself or the armed forces of the United States, we could not possibly go to war without a declaration of war by the Congress.

Secretary Dulles added that it had always been his own view that if there was an attack on a treaty area to which the United States was a party and Congress was not in session, the Chief Executive had the power to intervene under the terms of the treaty, although, of course, the President should consult as soon as possible thereafter with Congress.

Mr. Anderson pointed out that the Department of Justice had recommended the language covering the proviso in the last sentence of paragraph 19. Nevertheless, the President repeated his belief that no concept of the vital interests of the United States would justify his intervening with military force except a direct attack on the United States or on U.S. forces.

Dr. Flemming¹³ suggested that the problem might best be met if the substance of paragraph 19 was divided into two paragraphs. One paragraph would deal with possible U.S. intervention in the SEATO treaty area; the other would deal with the possibility of intervention on behalf of Burma, which was not a party to the SEATO treaty and whose territory was not in the SEATO treaty area. Admiral Radford thought that there was very good reason to differentiate between our mode of intervention to assist allied countries and intervention to assist a neutral country. The President suggested language to cover the general point, and Mr. Anderson indicated his belief that it was the decision of the Council that the present paragraph 19 should cover only the SEATO treaty area countries and that the Planning Board would prepare a new paragraph to deal with possible intervention on behalf of Burma.

Mr. Anderson then continued his briefing on NSC 5612, pointing out that with respect to paragraph 20 the Joint Chiefs of Staff had made the same suggestion that they had earlier made with respect to paragraph 19—namely, to gain Congressional authority for action in advance. The President suggested the substitution of the word “action” for “consultation” in the last line of paragraph 20.

At this point Mr. Anderson reminded the President that he had wished to make some comments to the National Security Council on the general subject of regional economic intercourse. The President replied that the business of promoting regional economic intercourse ought to be a fixed policy of the United States, not only in Southeast Asia but everywhere in the world. Without such economic intercourse there would be no lasting peace in any of these areas. Anything that fostered interchange of goods and services would prove to be to the advantage of the United States, if for no other reason than that it lessened the dependence of so many countries on the United States.

Mr. Anderson then moved on to the courses of action dealing with the specific countries of Southeast Asia, beginning with Burma. He explained the split of opinion in paragraph 36, with respect to the provision of military aid to Burma. He pointed out that the State–ODM proposal called for a modest military aid program to be made available to Burma for political purposes, on conditions acceptable to Burma. On the other hand, the Defense–Treasury–Budget–JCS proposal called for making military equipment and supplies available on Burmese request and only on a reimbursable basis.

After listening to the explanation of this difference of view, the President said he wished to put a question to the Council. Was it not possible to put an aid program technically on a reimbursable basis, even though we knew perfectly well that we would never be repaid for the assistance we had given? Mr. Hollister replied that it was certainly possible to do this. Secretary Dulles pointed out that in fact Burma would insist that, in form at least, any military assistance to her from the United States should be on a reimbursable basis. Admiral Radford warned that any loans of this type would come out of our MDAP funds and thus from the total resources available for our military aid programs. He believed that if we do decide to go in for any military aid program to Burma, it would be best to extend this aid through the agency of SEATO.

Secretary Dulles reminded the Council of how fluctuating were the positions of the Governments of Burma, Laos and Cambodia. Sometimes they appeared to be moving in our direction, and then suddenly the direction changed and they seemed to move in the direction of neutralism or the Soviet bloc. He added his belief that, as a practical matter, we would have more chance of recouping our weakened position in Laos and Cambodia if we lopped off some of the money we were giving these two states for military assistance and assigned the resources instead to Burma.

The President expressed the opinion that the version of paragraph 36 proposed by Defense, Treasury, Budget and JCS, was the more correct statement of our policy with respect to military assistance to Burma. As a matter of fact, even though we say this aid will be granted to Burma on a reimbursable basis (as the Burmese themselves desire), we are also pretty certain that we will never get our money back.

Secretary Dulles then asked if he might invite Under Secretary Hoover to comment on this problem. Secretary Hoover said he thought it would be unfortunate to include the term “reimbursable basis”, because that term had come to have the particular meaning of “cash on the barrelhead”. Secretary Hoover then called on Assistant Secretary of State Walter Robertson, who briefly commented on Burma’s recent request for U.S. assistance. He pointed out that the Burmese prefer reimbursable aid. Actually, however, they only want to be assured that they may make payment for such aid in rice. Assistant Secretary Robertson added that this was indeed the psychological moment to assist Burma if the United States proposed to take advantage of the current disenchantment of Burma with the Communist bloc. He concluded by pointing out that the Burmese had been authorized to talk with us about the possibility of U.S. military assistance.

The President then inquired whether anybody could suggest a better word than “reimbursable”. Various suggestions were made, and the President himself suggested simply striking “reimbursable” and adding the term “loan basis”. Assistant Secretary of Defense Gordon Gray pointed out that if we made loans to Burma to provide military aid for political purposes, we would make it clear that there was a distinction between Burma and those countries which we desired to assist as part of our regular military program for military rather than for political purposes. After further discussion, agreement was reached on an appropriate rewording of paragraph 36.

As the next point in his briefing, Mr. Anderson called attention to the split views in paragraph 47, on the degree of support the United States should provide to the armed forces of Laos. The Defense–JCS proposal called for continued support of the Royal Lao Army to assure internal security and provide limited initial resistance to an attack by the Viet Minh. The State–ODM–Budget proposal called for continued U.S. military assistance to Laos to assure internal security and provide limited initial resistance to external aggression sufficient clearly to identify it as such. Mr. Anderson explained that in general the cost to the United States of the State–ODM–Budget proposal would be less than the cost of the Defense–JCS proposal, although he could not give the precise figure as the President requested.

The President expressed the opinion that the differential would not be very great, because the approximate $50 million a year which we were proposing to provide by way of military assistance to Laos would not in any case support very much in the way of a Laotian military establishment. On the whole, he said, he was inclined to prefer the Defense–JCS proposal.

The Director of the Budget indicated the difficulties attendant upon efforts to assign a precise meaning to the term “limited initial resistance”. Both the Secretary of State and the President indicated uncertainty likewise as to the meaning and definition of this phrase.

Mr. Anderson then referred to the fact that the problem of providing appropriate support to the armed forces of Laos was a problem which applied with equal force to a number of other countries, including Thailand and Vietnam. Essentially the problem was involved with the ability of the economies of these backward countries to support the kind of military establishment we might wish them to have. Mr. Anderson recalled that this whole problem had been studied in a number of instances by the so-called Prochnow Committee.

After further discussion of the problem, Governor Stassen spoke strongly in favor of reducing, or at least not increasing, the amount of our military assistance to countries like Thailand, on the ground that if we did so we would create terrible economic problems for these countries. Accordingly, Governor Stassen said he favored the State–ODM–Budget version of paragraph 47.

The President commented that what the Council was now talking about boiled down to just how much money you could put into one of these countries without disrupting the country’s economy. Furthermore, said the President, in each fiscal year the appropriations for giving military assistance to these countries tend to increase. Where would we end up if this trend continued? The Acting Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Burgess, stated that we were creating a financial and economic burden too great both for these countries and for the United States. The President agreed that this was so, and pointed out that nevertheless every single one of these countries wants a larger military establishment than it now has. How do we work out some scheme which will satisfy both these countries and ourselves? Certainly the decision as to the size of our assistance programs could not be a wholly unilateral U.S. decision.

Acting Secretary of Defense Robertson thought that the answer to the President’s question might take the form of intimating discreetly to these countries our willingness to intervene with small atomic forces to assist them against aggression. He pointed out that Admiral Radford had made this suggestion on several earlier occasions. The President thought this proposal had merit if it included the proviso of Congressional approval. Secretary Robertson commented that it would certainly mean a smaller expenditure of U.S. resources.

Mr. Anderson then asked the President which versions of paragraphs 47 and 51, on the general question of the size of our military assistance programs, the President preferred. The President answered that he was inclined to favor the Defense–JCS proposal, calling for assistance designed to assure internal security and provide limited initial resistance to an attack. Nevertheless, said the President, he agreed with the Director of the Budget that we ought to be provided with a clear idea of the duration of the term “limited initial resistance”. He accordingly requested the Department of Defense to provide the Council with a definition.

There followed a lengthy discussion of the related problem of providing jet aircraft for Thailand. It was pointed out how difficult it would prove to be to reverse the developing trends in our aid programs without losing our allies. At the end of the discussion Acting Secretary of Defense Robertson suggested that Secretary Dulles might wish to discuss the entire dimensions of our assistance programs to the countries of Southeast Asia in the context of a SEATO meeting. The object would be to try to get a less selfish point of view on the part of each country respecting the size and character of the U.S. assistance programs in that country. In response to this suggestion the President requested the Department of State to explore this possibility.

At the conclusion of the meeting, Mr. Dillon Anderson pointed out that this constituted his last NSC meeting as Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and accordingly the President thanked Mr. Anderson for his services.

The National Security Council:¹⁴

a. Discussed the draft statement of policy contained in NSC 5612, prepared by the NSC Planning Board pursuant to NSC Actions Nos. 1526–b and 1527–c, in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, transmitted by the reference memorandum of August 29.

b. Adopted the statement of policy in NSC 5612, subject to the following amendments:

(1) Page 2, paragraph 2–b: Revise the last sentence to read as follows: “The loss of Southeast Asia mainland could thus have farreaching consequences seriously adverse to U.S. security interests.”

(2) Page 7, paragraph 11: Adopted the wording in the right-hand column, subject to the insertion of “normally” before “including”.

(3) Page 9, paragraph 19: Revise to read as follows:

“19. Should overt Communist aggression occur in the Southeast Asian treaty area, invoke the UN Charter or the SEATO Treaty, or both as applicable; and subject to local request for assistance take necessary military and any other action to assist any Mainland Southeast Asian state or dependent territory in the SEATO area willing to resist Communist resort to force: Provided, that the taking of military action shall be subject to prior submission to and approval by the Congress unless the emergency is deemed by the President to be so great that immediate action is necessary to save a vital interest of the United States.”

(4) Page 10, paragraph 20: Change the last word from “consultation” to “action”.

(5) Page 14, paragraph 36: Adopted the wording in the right-hand column subject to the insertion of “For political purposes,” at the beginning of the sentence, and the words “loan or” before “reimbursable”.

(6) Page 15: Insert, after paragraph 37, a new paragraph reading as follows:

“Should overt Communist aggression occur against Burma, invoke the UN Charter and, subject to Burmese request for assistance, take necessary military and any other action to assist Burma if Burma is willing to resist Communist resort to force and U.S. vital interests are involved: Provided, that the taking of military action shall be subject to prior submission to and approval by the Congress.”

(7) Page 16, paragraph 47: Adopted the wording in the left-hand column.

(8) Page 17, paragraph 51: Delete the asterisks and the footnotes relating thereto.

c. Noted the President’s request that the National Security Council be provided with a report by the Department of Defense of its definitions, particularly as to the period of time involved in each case, of the term “limited initial resistance” as contained in paragraphs 47, 51 and 56 of NSC 5612 as amended.

d. Adopted the draft revision of paragraph 5–d of NSC 5429/5, prepared by the NSC Planning Board pursuant to NSC Action No. 1415–c and transmitted by the reference memorandum of August 15, subject to the following amendments to make it consistent with paragraph 19 of NSC 5612 as amended above:

(1) Insert “in the SEATO area” after “dependent territory”.

(2) Insert “deemed by the President to be” after “emergency is”.¹⁵

e. Noted the President’s request that the Department of State, in consultation with the Department of Defense, explore the possibility, based upon a study of the rising trends of U.S. aid programs in the entire SEATO area, of arranging conferences with the nations in that area in an endeavor to achieve agreements as to future U.S. aid programs in that area which will be more moderate in their demands upon U.S. resources and the local economies.

Note: NSC 5612, as amended and approved by the President, subsequently circulated as NSC 5612/1 for implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government, and referred to the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency designated by the President.

The action in c above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense for implementation.

The action in d above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to all appropriate departments and agencies, together with a revised page 5 of NSC 5429/5.

The action in e above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, for appropriate implementation.¹⁶

S. Everett Gleason

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason on August 31.
2. “Report by the Interdepartmental Committee on Certain U.S. Aid Programs” (Prochnow Committee Report), dated August 3, 1956. Regarding this report, which includes country reports on several East Asian nations, see vol. X, p. 124.
3. See vol. I, p. 535.
4. NSC Action No. 1526 was taken at the March 8 NSC meeting; see ibid., p. 655.
5. In NSC Action No. 1527, also taken at the March 8 meeting and approved by Eisenhower on March 9, the NSC directed the Planning Board, during its review of NSC 5405, to review promptly the objectives of military assistance to Thailand. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95) See vol. XXII, p. 860, footnote 8.
6. NSC Action No. 1571 was taken at the June 7 NSC meeting; see vol. I, p. 702.
7. Not printed. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5405 Series)
8. Document 114.
9. Not found in Department of State files.
10. The JCS memorandum of August 24, Document 115, was attached to this memorandum.
11. For this and all subsequent references to numbered paragraphs, see Document 115.
12. Telegram 273 from Bangkok, July 28, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 411.90B41/7–2856)
13. Arthur S. Flemming, Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization.
14. Paragraphs a–e and the Note that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1599, approved by the President on September 5. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)
15. Following these changes, the revised paragraph 5–d of NSC 5429/5 reads as follows: “Should overt Communist aggression occur in the Southeast Asian treaty area, invoke the UN Charter or the SEATO treaty, or both, and subject to local request for assistance take necessary military and any other action to assist any state or dependent territory in the SEATO area willing to resist Communist resort to force: Provided, that the taking of military action shall be subject to prior submission to and approval by the Congress unless the emergency is deemed by the President to be so great that immediate action is necessary to save a vital interest of the United States.” (NSC 5429/5, December 22, 1954, with page 5 revised as of September 5; ibid., S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5429 Series)
16. An exchange of letters between Gordon Gray and Walter Robertson in January 1957 indicates that as of that time the Departments of State and Defense were considering means to implement this proposal. No subsequent substantive documentation on this subject has been found in Department of State files. (Letters from Gray to Robertson, January 4; Robertson to Gray, January 28; both ibid., Central Files, 790.5–MSP/l–457)