Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

117. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, August 29, 1956.

SUBJECT

• U.S. Policy in Mainland Southeast Asia (NSC 5612) Scheduled for Discussion by the National Security Council Thursday, August 30, 1956

Discussion:

1. The proposed NSC 5612 revises U.S. policy toward mainland Southeast Asia. Parts I–IV contain considerations applicable to all the free countries of the area, and Part V defines specific courses of action for particular country circumstances. Part VI, Malaya and Singapore, and Part VII, North Viet-Nam, constitute the first individual statements of U.S. policy toward these areas to appear in NSC form.

2. Policy emphases deal principally with:

a. the current Sino-Soviet shift to nonmilitary methods (paras. 3,4a);

b. the need for political, economic, and social advances by the free governments to strengthen their independence (paras. 4a, 4c, 10, 22, 23);

c. the conditions for U.S. military intervention (paras. 4b, 9, 18, 19 and 20);

d. the problem of alignment (paras. 6, 11, 13 and 14);

e. the reversal of a neutralist drift (paras. 33 and 34 on Burma, 38 and 40 on Cambodia, 43 and 48 on Laos, and 49 on Thailand).

3. The principal single innovation is the emphasis on developing greater numbers of non-Communist leaders in the area (para. 23). FE believes that the effective implementation of this section is important and suggests the appointment of a prominent and capable American educator to organize concerted, coordinated efforts on this project within the Government and with private agencies. This would be in consonance with the President’s proposal for stimulating educational development in foreign countries (made at Baylor University May 25, 1956).²

4. There are three major splits in the paper—the problem of alignment, military aid to Burma, and definitions of military force missions appropriate to the individual circumstances of the several countries. These are reviewed in attachments A, B, and C.

5. NSC 5612 has taken into consideration the Prochnow Committee studies³ on aid to Thailand and Viet-Nam. The policies proposed are not inconsistent with the results of those studies. NSC 5612 in general terms recommends continued military and economic assistance as required to accomplish U.S. objectives, but does not attempt to specify aid levels.

Recommendation:

That you support the approval of the draft with the positions taken by Departmental representatives on the three splits, with the exceptions noted in Tabs A and C.

Tab A

“THE PROBLEM OF ALIGNMENT”

In Part II, “Policy Conclusions”, there is a split opinion in paragraph 11, on page 7, regarding preferential assistance to allies. It is suggested that in order to reconcile this difference you propose adding to the State proposal the following: “having due regard for the preferable position of such countries from the point of view of U.S. interests.”

Tab B

“MILITARY AID FOR BURMA”

In para. 36 on page 14 there is a split opinion over whether the US should provide military aid to Burma only on a reimbursable basis. This question covers a basic issue of aid to Burma which Defense has been opposing in principle. In this draft paper, Defense, Treasury, Budget and JCS have favored only reimbursable aid whereas State and ODM propose a modest program of military aid using US funds. Inasmuch as Burma is not in a position to reimburse the US except by token, the Defense position could mean in practice the denial of aid to Burma. However, it would appear that the agencies sponsoring the dissenting opinion have at least accepted the principle of the significance of Burma, inasmuch as all agencies have agreed to the important course of action in para. 33 “to make a special effort to influence a favorable orientation in Burma’s policies.”⁴ In view of the sharp Burmese response to increasing Chinese Communist penetration and Soviet bloc aid, FE believes that the opportunity will become even more propitious during the next three or six months for developing contacts with Burmese military forces which, in turn, could have fruitful political repercussions in Burma and Asia, especially among neutrals. Burmese military authorities have the approval of the Burmese Cabinet to enter into discussions with American representatives for military aid, but so far the Defense Department has refused them a hearing. Recent CIA reports indicate that the Burmese Cabinet has been considering appealing to the UN, SEATO, or the UK and the US for help in the frontier situation. Burma might turn out to be a key in our efforts to thwart the Communist campaign in the Middle East and South Asia, if we can capitalize on opportunities there.

Tab C

“FORCE MISSIONS FOR LAOS”

This paper sets up four categories of force missions from the least to the most:

(1) to maintain internal security;

(2) to do that and also to provide limited initial resistance to aggression [and] to identify it as such;

(3) to assure internal security and provide actual initial resistance to aggression over and beyond merely identifying it as such;

(4) the first, the third, and, in addition, the mission of making a contribution to collective defense.

In para. 47 on page 16 regarding Laos, Defense and JCS prefer the third mission whereas State, ODM, and Budget propose to continue support for the Royal Lao Army only for the second. The representative of the Policy Planning Committee will explain these definitions and the position taken by the State Department in the NSC Planning Board. I personally prefer and recommend the Defense–JCS language.

1. Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5612 Series. Secret.
2. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1956, pp. 526–537.
3. See footnote 2, infra.
4. Paragraph 33 in NSC 5612 is identical to paragraph 33 in NSC 5612/1, Document 119.