Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

115. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)¹

Washington, August 24, 1956.

SUBJECT

• U.S. Policy in Mainland Southeast Asia (NSC 5612); Change to Current U.S. Policy Toward the Far East (NSC 5429/5)²

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff submit herewith their comments and recommendations with respect to draft statements of policy, specified as above, prepared by the National Security Council Planning Board for consideration by the National Security Council at its meeting on Thursday, 30 August 1956.³

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the draft statement of policy in NSC 5612 is acceptable, from the military point of view, subject to the following changes:

a. Paragraph 2 b, page 2. Revise the last sentence as follows: “the loss of Southeast Asia mainland could thus destroy the possibility of establishing an equipoise of power in Asia have far reaching consequences seriously adverse to U.S. security interests.”⁴

Reason: The present sentence improperly implies that “establishing an equipoise of power in Asia” is or should be the U.S. objective in the area.

b. Paragraph 19. Delete the last sentence beginning “Provided that …”⁵ and substitute therefor: “The Congress should be requested to give to the President advance authority to act quickly in times of crises, including the use of armed forces. The grant of such authority should be publicized”.⁶

Reason: Full knowledge that the President of the United States has been given authority by the Congress to act, with military force if necessary, in the event of Communist aggression will serve as a strong deterrent to such aggression. Further, it will strengthen the conviction on the part of our allies and other countries in the area, that the United States recognizes the threat to their security and has both the will and the ability to react promptly against such threats.

c. Paragraph 20. Add the following to this paragraph: “gaining authority for such action in advance, when circumstances indicate it advisable.”⁷

Reason: Same as above.

3. With respect to divergent views set forth in NSC 5612, they submit the following:

a. Paragraph 11: Concur in the statement contained in the right column.⁸

Reason: The basic differences between the two views set forth is whether participation in a free world collective security arrangement should be regarded by the United States as reason for giving preferential treatment in fields of economic and military assistance. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that countries openly pledged to render mutual assistance in opposition to Communist aggression should, without question, be treated preferentially in the field of military assistance to those countries that elect to remain aloof from so aligning themselves. Specifically, Thailand as a member of the Manila Pact deserves priority consideration, with respect to military aid, vis-à-vis Burma. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that, of the other countries included within this statement of policy, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos have not joined SEATO because of restrictive features of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and because of other complexities surrounding the formation and operation of SEATO itself. Hence, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would not contend that these countries necessarily be treated less favorably than Thailand. However, even in these countries, a notable difference is observable between the neutralist tendencies of Cambodia and Laos as opposed to the staunch opposition to communism evidenced by the government of South Vietnam. This difference might well influence future military assistance programs in these three countries.

b. Paragraph 36: Concur in version contained in right column.⁹

Reason: Under present conditions, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be unable to justify a provision of grant military assistance to Burma. In event the course of action in the preceding paragraph, i.e. “Encourage Burmese assumption of regional and international responsibilities compatible with our own objectives” met with a favorable Burmese reaction, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would re-examine their views in the light of the new condition.

c. Paragraph 47: Concur either in the statement set forth in the left column,¹⁰ or that in the right column¹¹ with the final phrase “sufficient clearly to identify it as such” deleted.

Reason: The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that the phrase recommended for deletion has no apparent significance and therefore confuses rather than clarifies the policy statement. It is difficult for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to recommend appropriate goals consistent with a mission “to assure internal security and provide limited initial resistance to external aggression.” Indigenous force requirements for “limited initial resistance” will vary with the time it takes to bring effective external forces into action. With the authority to act in the hands of the President, the Joint Chiefs of Staff could compute this interval as an ordinary military time-space problem, and thereby establish a firmer basis for indigenous force requirements.

d. Paragraph 51: Concur in the wording of this paragraph without the qualifying phrases recommended in the footnotes.¹²

Reason: Of the countries included in this policy statement, Thailand is the only one actively to participate in SEATO. As a signator of the Manila Pact, Thailand is pledged to render assistance in opposing Communist aggression in any portion of the treaty area. There has been unanimous agreement of the signators to the Pact that the territories of Cambodia, Laos, and South Vietnam come within the meaning of “treaty area” as set forth in Article 7 of the Pact. Consistent with Thailand’s capabilities, it is in the United States interest to assist in enabling her to fulfill that commitment.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that:

a. Subject to the foregoing, you concur in the adoption of NSC 5612 to supersede NSC 5405¹³ and Annex “A” of NSC 5429/5; and

b. You concur in the draft revision of paragraph 5–d of NSC 5429/5, as modified in subparagraph 2–b above.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Arthur Radford¹⁴
Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff

1. Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5612 Series. Top Secret. Attached to a memorandum dated August 29, not printed, from Lay to the NSC.
2. See Lay’s memorandum, supra.
3. See Document 118.
4. This revision was accepted at the NSC meeting on August 30, and incorporated into the text of NSC 5612/1, Document 119.
5. Ellipsis in the source text.
6. Text of paragraph 19 as it appears in NSC 5612 is incorporated in the enclosure to Lay’s memorandum, supra.
7. In NSC 5612, this paragraph reads: “In case of an imminent or actual Communist attempt to seize control from within, and assuming some manifest local desire for U.S. assistance, take all feasible measures to thwart the attempt, including even military action after appropriate Congressional consultation.”
8. In NSC 5612, paragraph 11 begins as follows: “The United States should continue to make clear its own devotion to the principle of collective security, its belief that regional security arrangements provide maximum protection at minimum cost for all, and its expectation that a country’s decision to participate in such arrangements is based on its own calculation of its best interests and does not of itself constitute a claim for increased financial aid.” Following this first sentence, the “State Proposal” (left-hand column) reads: “Where countries participate, the United States should provide them such assistance in maintaining military forces and such other assistance as is justified by U.S. strategic objectives.” A “Defense–Treasury Proposal” (right-hand column) states: “Where countries participate, measures to assure adherence are desirable, including preferential treatment in the fields of economic and military assistance as justified by U.S. strategic objectives.”
9. The “Defense–Treasury–Budget–JCS Proposal” (right-hand column) for paragraph 36 reads: “Upon Burmese request make available military equipment and supplies on a reimbursable basis, as consistent with U.S. interests.” The “State–ODM Proposal” (left-hand column) follows: “For political purposes, make available at Burmese request, on conditions acceptable to Burma, military aid in modest amounts, using if necessary Mutual Security Act Section 401 funds and authority.”
10. Reference is to the “Defense–JCS Proposal” for paragraph 47: “Continue support of the Royal Lao Army to assure internal security and provide limited initial resistance to an attack by the Viet Minh.”
11. The “State–ODM–Budget Proposal” for this paragraph reads: “Continue U.S. military assistance to Laos to assure internal security and provide limited initial resistance to external aggression sufficient clearly to identify it as such.”

12. In NSC 5612, paragraph 51 reads:

    “Provide military assistance to Thailand for support of forces sufficient:

    • “a. To maintain internal security.
    • “b. To present limited initial resistance to external aggression.
    • “c. To make a modest contribution to collective defense of contiguous SEATO areas”.

    The footnotes mentioned represent a proposal by the Bureau of the Budget to make the latter half of this paragraph read:

    • “b. To present limited initial resistance to external aggression sufficient to identify it clearly as such.
    • “c. And thereby to make a modest contribution to collective defense of contiguous SEATO areas.”

13. “United States Objectives and Courses of Action With Respect to Southeast Asia”, dated January 16, 1954; for text, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. XII, Part 1, p. 366.
14. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.