98. Memorandum of a Conversation Among the President’s Special Assistant (Stassen) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Pentagon, Washington, January 24, 1956, 4 p.m.1
Mr. Stassen opened the meeting by saying that the time had come when the United States must reach a decision on the question of disarmament. He noted that we had moved away from the old outmoded positions on disarmament and had placed reservations on those positions which needed review. He pointed out that it was time to move from these positions. He spoke of the need for the U.S. to retain the initiative in the disarmament negotiations. He noted that the proposed letter to Bulganin2 does not prejudice the U.S. position and he argued that some such position is essential, for he said if we do not hold the initiative we will lose essential leadership of the free world to neutralistic sentiment. He stated that policy decisions taken now could be modified if future circumstances so indicated. He pointed out that if we cannot get the USSR to open up and accept inspection he would not propose any restraints on U.S. military strength.
The Chief of Staff, Army,3 speaking for himself, said that he appreciated the magnitude of Mr. Stassen’s job and that he was anxious not to be negative. He recognized the need for a U.S. initiative. On the other hand, he was strongly opposed to making any commitments prior to the development of and testing of a reliable inspection system. He pointed out that the U.S. has been disarming since 1945, and now the Army has no room left for even minor reductions in force levels. He noted also that there were many issues not yet resolved between the various departments, and felt that they should be resolved before we make any moves in the Disarmament Commission.
Mr. Stassen replied that he felt we cannot resolve too many minor issues before we make some major moves. We cannot stand still. He agreed that inspection is an essential ingredient in any disarmament policy, and pointed out that the U.S. had taken a firm position regarding the necessity for adequate inspection.
At this time, Admiral Radford entered and Mr. Stassen reviewed his earlier remarks. Admiral Radford was opposed to any commitments on disarmament and called attention to the unfortunate effect the 1.5 million force level had had.
[Page 277]Mr. Stassen remarked that he wanted to put something in place of the 1.5 million figure. He went on to say that a priority objective of the U.S. is to open up the USSR. Otherwise, no ceilings could be placed on U.S. forces. If we can obtain air inspection of the USSR, then he felt that we could take other steps. He pointed out the Soviet propaganda positions.
Mr. Stassen indicated that one desirable situation as far as the U.S. was concerned was to get an openness of the USSR. Radford countered with a statement that China is not in the picture, to which Stassen replied, “If we can maintain approximately our present strength, we can ignore China.” Radford said that this would be OK if we maintained our present strength, but in that case you have no reduction that you can promise the Soviet Union as lying beyond the gateway to the President’s proposal.
Mr. Stassen then asked Radford if he would settle for 21/2 million. It was at this point that Radford pointed out that Russia has only matched the United States reduction of 700,000 since mid-1953, and then asked, “Don’t we get any credit?” He made two other points— one was that he was not certain that we could be as flexible as Mr. Stassen claimed in the application of U.S. policy, and second, that he wasn’t certain that we had seen the last of the proposal to limit armed forces to 1,000,000 or 1,500,000.
Mr. Stassen rejoined that we cannot accept the Soviet reduction unless we can determine it through inspection. He went on to say that the U.S. should not agree to a reduction or elimination of nuclear weapons, nor to the cessation of nuclear tests at this stage in the negotiations. But we can agree to some formulation for the peaceful use of atomic energy, but only when coupled with the Eisenhower proposal.
The Chief of Staff, Army, asked what was the probable size of the proposed inspection system. Mr. Stassen replied about 28,000.
The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Burke, remarked that there were many issues which exist between the U.S. and USSR which create tensions and he wondered how we might determine the sincerity of the Soviet Union. He felt that this could only be done through a rigid inspection system, but even with inspection he felt that much depended on what the USSR would be doing in other areas. He felt strongly that we should not negotiate force levels until after we have proven the inspection system. He also remarked that we do not know the USSR, and therefore we cannot be sure of her intentions.
Mr. Stassen then read from his January 13 report to the NSC4 and developed his argument against the criticisms that his plan either goes too far or not far enough.
[Page 278]Admiral Burke repeated his earlier argument on being sure of the inspection system before negotiating on reductions.
To reinforce this argument, Admiral Radford read a part of the President’s July 21 statement concerning reductions after an inspection system has been proven. He also spoke of the ineffectiveness of the Korean armistice, where the Communists had defeated the purposes of the inspection system.
Mr. Stassen remarked that we would lose out in world opinion if we attempted to cite Korea as an example. He then asked how long it would take to test an inspection system.
Admiral Radford replied that it would take at least one year to set it up.
Mr. Stassen asked how Admiral Radford felt about pilot tests on small strips of territory within the two countries, and of gaming an inspection system. Admiral Radford replied, “I am against these pilot strips and I wouldn’t believe a war game result if I heard it.” He went on to say we always lose out in the struggle for world opinion, and if we worry about world opinion we will go “down the drain.”
Mr. Stassen replied that if we don’t we will go down—we must keep the initiative.
Admiral Burke then spoke of his experience in negotiating with the Communists in Korea, the general point of which was that we can negotiate only when we can apply pressure. He went on to say that somehow we must ease the tensions that exist between the U.S. and USSR. He felt that we could gain by promises of small concessions and moving step by step. He was afraid to try to lay out a program for disarmament too far in advance, and he agreed that, if we can attain a sure inspection system and if tensions are eased, we can then reduce arms in some way. But in what manner and by how much would depend on the situation then existing. He felt that we can say no more now than that we are “willing” to reduce.
Mr. Stassen asked the questions: How can we reply to neutral nations when they ask us our position on reductions? What if someone says we seek only target information?
Admiral Radford replied that we are principally concerned with guarding against surprise attack. He noted that an inspection system would be expensive in manpower and would require long negotiations. He felt that the most we could say to neutral nations is that we will not increase our strength, and he repeated that since 1953 we had, in fact, reduced our armed forces by 700,000 men.
Mr. Stassen then asked the question: What is acceptance of the Eisenhower proposal worth to the U.S.? There was a general discussion, the tenor of which was that the Eisenhower proposal is a great [Page 279] goal, but no answer was given to the question of worth. Admiral Radford stated that it was not, however, worth damaging U.S. security.
Admiral Burke said he wanted to see the whole of an inspection program before he had to agree to a small portion of it.
Admiral Radford and Admiral Burke both asked the question: What do we do if after one year of trying out the inspection system we find that it has not proved successful?
Mr. Stassen replied that we could withdraw from the agreement; and Admiral Radford rejoined that we could not because of the pressure of public opinion.
A member of the JSSC asked whether the first phase plan of Volumes I and IV which called for a leveling off would be an intermediate step.
Mr. Stassen replied that it would not. He felt that some reduction must be proposed now. He went on to say that if we do not agree to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, France and Japan will soon be making nuclear weapons.
Admiral Radford agreed that we could expect that, but he himself did not consider that to be very serious.
He and Stassen then had a short argument over the meaning of NSC Action 1419. Radford indicated that he saw no basis in the policy for advocating numerical limitations on armed forces. Stassen thought the policy did so.
The meeting then adjourned.
- Source: Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Department of Defense. Secret. Drafted by Gladney.↩
- For Eisenhower’s letter to Bulganin, January 28, see Department of State Bulletin, February 6, 1956, pp. 191–193.↩
- General Maxwell D. Taylor.↩
- Document 94.↩