Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Regulation of Armaments; Atomic Energy, Volume XX

94. Report of the President’s Special Assistant (Stassen) to the National Security Council¹

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

• Proposed Policy of the U.S. on the Question of Disarmament (NSC Action 1419)

I

The point has been reached at which a decision on U.S. policy on the question of disarmament is imperative.

A. The old U.S. policy of eliminating nuclear weapons under effective controls and reducing force levels to one or one and a half million men is outmoded, untenable, and undesirable, under the present and foreseeable international situation.

B. Through a careful and persistent effort, including the placing of reservations on old positions, and an extensive educational program, world opinion has been prepared for the movement away from the old policy. These reservations must now be replaced by new policy.

C. A United Nations General Assembly resolution passed by a vote of 56–7 may be characterized as broadly confirming the U.S. analysis of the problem and the need of moving to new policy.

D. The Subcommittee of the U.N. Disarmament Commission will resume in March, and the U.S. should have preliminary consultations with the U.K. and others in advance of these sessions.

E. The Prime Minister of the U.K. will consult in Washington on January 30th, and this will be an unusual opportunity to obtain the essential close cooperation of the U.K.²

F. Delay in U.S. decision would cause a serious loss of U.S. initiative in world public opinion, would result in a gain for the Soviet Union, and would prejudice many other important interests of the U.S.

G. The decisions recommended have in their broad sense been before the Departments since May 26, 1955; in their major outline were submitted on November 1, 1955; and in their precise wording, taking into account comments of all Departments, were distributed on December 16, 1955 in a memorandum for the December 22, 1955 meeting of the NSC.³

H. There will be ample opportunity to subsequently amend the recommended policy or delay its implementation during the inevitably extensive negotiations, if any scientific, military, or political developments, or any later recommendation of a department, leads to such future conclusion for revision.

I. The detailed implementation of the policy will itself be subject to interdepartmental agreement and NSC decision as appropriate.

II

The policy recommended meets three essential tests:

A. When advanced it will attract the overwhelming approval and support of world public opinion for the United States position.

B. If accepted by the USSR and effectively implemented it will improve the prospects of peace and add to the security of the United States as compared to the situation which will prevail in the absence of any agreement.

C. If the USSR is sincerely interested in a durable peace, acceptance of the U.S. policy will be in its mutual interest as compared to the situation which will prevail in the absence of any agreement.

III

Three general arguments which have been made in questioning the recommended policy affect many of its clauses and are discussed in some detail prior to consideration of specific paragraphs.

A. It does not go far enough, and should include major or drastic ultimate reduction in armed forces and armaments.

B. It goes too far, and should not involve any reductions or ceilings whatsoever on U.S. armed forces and armaments in the early stages.

C. It does not spell out in sufficiently complete and precise detail each item and the method and timing of implementation.

Each of these arguments has been considered thoroughly and has not been adopted for the reasons discussed in the following sections.

A. (It does not go far enough, and should include major or drastic ultimate reductions in armed forces and armaments.)

The conclusion of the extensive studies is that the issues between the USSR and the U.S. are inseparably intertwined with the levels of armaments and that so long as Germany is divided, the China–Formosa issue is unresolved, Korea and Indo–China are split, the European Satellites are within the Iron Curtain, and the worldwide Communist activity is rampant, the United States should not make major or drastic reductions in its armed forces and armaments even if the USSR agreed to do so under inspection. The resolution of these issues must occur in parallel sequence with future important reductions of armed forces and armament, and it is considered to be neither feasible nor fruitful to spell out theoretical situations now. Specific future developments and their interrelationship should be evaluated as they arise. The strategic position of the USSR and of Communist China, in the center of the Eurasian land mass where three-fourths of the population of the globe resides, would give to them a tremendous advantage if both sides were reduced to weak levels of arms. The nature of the totalitarian system would facilitate their rapid reversal of an agreed weak position at a future year, and the United States and other free world countries would have difficulty in rapidly rebuilding their armed strength. A weak armament position will enhance the value of subversive methods, at which the Soviet Union excels. A fresh proposal by the U.S. for major reductions, even though conditional on political settlements and inspection, would contribute to a letdown attitude in free world countries which may lead to unilateral reductions even though the USSR did not agree and did not adopt the inspection system. A major reduction or elimination of an important segment of armament, such as submarines or four-and-more engine bombers, would lead to a false sense of security if not accompanied by a comprehensive inspection system to effectively safeguard against surprise attack by other means.

Thus the recommended policy might be characterized as one of mutual strength plus openness and thorough inspection against surprise, rather than mutual weakness plus openness and inspection.

It is recognized that this recommended policy will require the thorough preparation of world understanding. It is estimated that this can be done. Emphasis should constantly be placed upon the objective of peace with reiterated explanations that U.S. military strength does not serve an exclusively national purpose, but does contribute to free world security and to peace. It may also be desirable to emphasize the moral restraints with which this U.S. strength will be held, the intention to carry out collective consultation whenever feasible before using U.S. armed strength, the study of methods through which the use of a part of our military armament through the forces of collective security groupings, and the firm adherence of the U.S. to the restraining commitments of the United Nations Charter.

If the political climate changes and settlements are approached or reached which are significant, major reductions in armament can then be considered by the U.S. in relation to these political developments. It is believed that to propose such major reductions at the present time would be counterproductive.

Furthermore, if the USSR proposes acceptable political settlements along with more drastic but inspectable reductions in armaments, the U.S. can then give appropriate consideration to such propositions.

B. (It goes too far, and should not involve any reductions or ceilings whatsoever on U.S. armed forces and armaments in the early stages.)

The U.S. cannot hold the essential support of world public opinion unless it is made clear that the acceptance of the President’s Geneva proposal for mutual aerial inspection would definitely end the competitive build-up of armaments and would turn the trend downward. The USSR has repeatedly argued that the President’s proposal may lead to an acceleration and expansion of the arms race. Whether these assertions are made through conviction or for propaganda, this argument must be met. It is the established policy that the U.S., in its own interest, should, as interrelated parts of our national policy:

1. “Actively seek an international system for the regulation and reduction of armed forces and armaments.” (NSC Action 1419)

This is a desirable policy. The future outlook in the absence of agreement, with ever greater capacity for mutual annihilation, is singularly unattractive. A determined effort to change the current trend should be made, and as an essential part of that endeavor the U.S. must make clear its willingness to make modest initial reductions if the President’s proposal is accepted. The opening of the USSR to aerial inspection and ground observers would be of great value to the U.S. If this can be obtained along with some reduction in U.S. forces plus U.S. aerial and related ground inspection, the interests of the U.S. and the prospects of peace will both be well served. Furthermore the making of such a proposal will itself serve the psychological interests of the U.S. It will assist in maintaining the essential climate for the continuance of U.S. bases on foreign soil and for the collective defense arrangements with other nations.

The U.S. must not present too tough and militaristic a front to the world. The U.S. should not say to the USSR that it must accept and implement the mutual inspection before we will negotiate any ceilings or reductions. Such a public posture, aggravated by multiple military statements of preparations to use nuclear weapons in various areas of the world, may not only lose essential free world support, but may also contribute to the loss of governments friendly to the U.S. from internal neutralist and Communist opposition. Such a public posture may also contribute toward a conclusion by USSR planners that war is inevitable, and such a conclusion on their part would tend to make war inevitable.

C. (It does not spell out in complete and precise detail each item and the method and timing of implementation.)

It is considered that the preparation to the National Security Council of greater detail at this time would militate against the successful development of policy and the carrying out of U.S. objectives. For example, the detail of modest U.S. reductions should be worked out with the Department of Defense, but this cannot be done effectively at a time when the Department of Defense position is opposed to any reductions whatsoever. The policy decisions are required first, and then the detailed implementation can be worked out with the Departments principally concerned, subject to such later review by the NSC as may be appropriate or necessary. The type of implementation contemplated is that if the USSR accepts the President’s proposal, if the blueprints of military establishments are successfully exchanged, if the aerial inspection and ground observers are initiated, then during the first year of the inspection, the blueprint level would be reciprocally reduced to force levels of approximately 2.5 million men, the military budgets cut 5%, the major weapons carriers—planes, submarines, missiles—would each be levelled off or slightly reduced, and no new foreign bases would be established. But no decision of the NSC on such detail is requested at the present time.

Likewise, the details of timing and staging can be worked out with the Departments and in the negotiations with the other nations within the policy guidance contained in the recommendations submitted now to the NSC.

This policy can be carried out through various alternatives one of which would be the periodic deposit of substantial quantities of weapons grade 235 and Plutonium to the International Atomic Energy Agency or other instrumentality by both the USSR and the U.S. The quantities could be equal, greater, or somewhat less than the future current production of these materials, dependent on specific decisions and negotiations under the total situation then prevailing.

IV

Discussions of Certain Major Proposals of Policy in the Light of Departmental Comments

A. (Para. VI B 4 of Volume V) (Also, Item 8 of December 22, 1955 Memo)

“Provide that all future nuclear material production anywhere in the world will be for peaceful use; to take effect when an international atomic control agency can effectively supervise the material subsequently produced, and maintain it in safeguarded stockpiles of national ownership, within a comprehensive arms control system; all under detailed arrangements to be agreed to by the United States Atomic Energy Commission.”

It is agreed that it is in the U.S. interest to retard or prevent the spreading of nuclear weapons into the armaments of multiple nations. It will not be possible to do so if the U.S. says in effect “we ask that you agree never to fabricate nuclear weapons, but we intend to make as many more as we wish in the future.” It may be possible to obtain this agreement of “fourth countries” if the U.S. says in effect “we ask that you agree not to fabricate nuclear weapons, and we will agree to use our future production of nuclear material exclusively for peaceful purposes, provided the USSR agrees to do likewise and to exchange inspectors and make supervised stockpile arrangements for that purpose, but we will not destroy our existing weapon stockpile because these are needed to deter and counter the USSR weapons stockpile, since the elimination of past production of nuclear weapons cannot now be assured by effective inspection.”

It would be in the U.S. interest if future production of an increased supply of nuclear weapons was effectively stopped on a mutual basis. This proposal will never be implemented unless the USSR accepts and places into effect the Eisenhower mutual aerial inspection plus an adequate inspection of future nuclear material production satisfactory to AEC and NSC. This proposal will have constructive value for the U.S. from a psychological standpoint as soon as it is made. It is a dramatic and appealing follow up to the President’s Geneva proposal and indirectly links that proposal to the President’s Atoms for Peace proposal.

B. (Para. VI B 3 of Volume V) (Item 7 of Dec. 22, 1955 Memo)

Accept modest initial reductions in conventional armed forces and armaments on a reciprocal basis if tied to the first full year of experience in the implementation of the President’s proposal, to be worked out in detail with the Department of Defense, contributing toward the early lessening of the burden of armaments.

(Para. VI E in Volume V) (Item 17 of Dec. 22, 1955 Memo)

If an inspection system such as here described is installed the United States will contemplate a gradual equitable reduction on a reciprocal basis of nuclear weapons carrying capacity and of conventional forces and conventional armaments, but such specific reductions shall be the subject of National Security Council consideration in the light of conditions then existing, and no blanket commitments of figures or percentages or other indication of levels shall be made in advance of such National Security Council consideration.

The U.S. must make it clear that if the beginning proposed by the President at Geneva is accepted, this will definitely be followed by reductions in armaments. The proposed reductions need not be and should not be large, but they must be concrete and specific. The failure to propose any reductions after our thorough review would tend to cast a worldwide doubt on the sincerity of the President’s original proposal. Modest reductions reciprocally made would be in the U.S. interest. The combination of the aerial inspection plus modest reductions would improve the future security of the U.S.

Following such an initial agreement, study and negotiations could proceed on the political issues dividing the world and on the related question of any further reductions in armament.

The UN resolution specifically calls for priority to President Eisenhower’s Geneva proposal and the ground control posts and “(ii) all such measures of adequately safeguarded disarmament as are now feasible.”

C. (Part of Para. VI A 1 of Volume V) (Item 2 of Dec. 22, 1955 Memo)

… “establish current accountability of the movement of armed forces, especially those capable of carrying nuclear weapons in attack;” . …⁴

There has been no dissent on this, but it is brought forward for emphasis as it will be an essential part of any effective program to safeguard against surprise attack. The details will be worked out with the Department of Defense and with reference back to NSC as appropriate and necessary.

D. All other recommendations appear to be sufficiently understood as presented in the December 22, 1955 Memorandum, and all are presented for action as indicated therein; with the continued postponement of the items so marked in the December 22, 1955 Memorandum.

V

A. Upon the establishment of U.S. policy, it is suggested that after consultation with the UK, and to some extent with France and Canada, the U.S. position should be first presented direct to Premier Bulganin through a letter from President Eisenhower delivered and discussed by U.S. representatives. This would be the most effective manner of obtaining thorough consideration by the Soviet Union. It would have world wide value to the U.S. It would make more certain the correct understanding by the top Soviet leaders of the U.S. position. It would desirably label the added proposals as Eisenhower proposals, which would have world wide value to the U.S. It would make more certain the correct understanding by the top Soviet leaders of the U.S. position, [sic] It would minimize the possibilities of misunderstanding such as are frequently noted when the Soviet rulers receive complex information through their UN representatives. It would demonstrate continued U.S. initiative in this field and reflect persistent U.S. endeavors for peace. It would fulfill the promise of a further reply which President Eisenhower included in his acknowledgment which read as follows:

[Here follows text of Eisenhower’s letter to Bulganin, October 11, 1955, printed in Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959, volume I, pages 528–529.]

B. A preliminary draft of a letter from the President to Premier Bulganin, reflecting the U.S. policy recommended to the NSC is submitted.

[Here follows a draft text of a letter from President Eisenhower to Bulganin. The final text of the letter, March 1, is printed in Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959, volume I, pages 593–595, and Department of State Bulletin, March 26, 1956, pages 514–515.]

This preliminary draft letter is of course subject to rewriting and revision by the Department of State and other Departments concerned and finally by the President, and it is submitted now to indicate the manner in which the recommended policy would be pursued and reflected to the USSR and to the people of the world.

Respectfully submitted,

Harold E. Stassen

1. Source: Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Disarmament Policy. Top Secret.
2. Regarding Eden’s visit, see Document 105.
3. See Document 90.
4. Ellipses in the source text.