Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Regulation of Armaments; Atomic Energy, Volume XX

97. Letter From the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) to the Secretary of State¹

New York, January 24, 1956.

Dear Foster: Attached is a memorandum on the subject which we discussed on Saturday, January 14 at your house.²

1. The prime purpose of this suggestion is to enhance the security and national defense of the United States. This is because communist propaganda has, in the vernacular, “given the atomic bomb a bad name,” and to such an extent that it seriously inhibits us from using it in case of need. Obviously, therefore, a measure which makes it easier for us to use the atomic bomb when we feel it is to our interests is advantageous to our national defense.

2. Another purpose of the suggestion is to promote world peace. The greatest single factor in the world today for peace is our atomic superiority. As the idea gains ground that we are inhibited from using the atomic weapon because of the bad name which it has received its influence as a peace preserver naturally diminishes. To remove—or reduce—the existing inhibition on its use, therefore, promotes world peace.

From a strictly military point of view there are no short-range drawbacks to this proposal. The time factor involved is insignificant. Inherent in the proposal is the right of self-defense with the right of immediate reaction in the case of our self-defense. General Assembly action to prevent our use would require a two-thirds vote.

Foreigners could not justifiably complain that the proposal lacks substance—because it gets the General Assembly into the blood and sand of the arena just as intensely as it is possible to do without actually putting the defense of the free world against aggression at the mercy of a United Nations filibuster.

I suggest that the President make this proposal in June. The best place to make it is at the United Nations, lf, however, he cannot do that, then thought should be given to calling all the diplomatic corps to the White House.

Faithfully yours,

Cabot L.

[Enclosure]

January 24, 1956.

Following are the bare bones of a statement for the President:

Although the atomic danger has grown greater than ever, the world has found no protection against it.

The Soviet proposal to “ban the bomb” is a mere slogan and is absolutely meaningless in terms of actually preventing the manufacture, stockpiling and use of atomic bombs.

The West’s proposal for disarmament plus inspection has not been attained because of Soviet unwillingness to agree to it.

Yet there is now enough fissionable material in the world to destroy all human life.

We must, therefore, constantly keep trying to find methods which will protect humanity from being destroyed. As none of the old proposed methods have been put into effect, we must look for new ones.

I propose, therefore, that the atomic powers, as the nations possessing fissionable materials, agree to internationalize the use of atomic weapons under the aegis of the United Nations, and I hereby pledge that, in accordance with such an agreement, the United States will internationalize the use of its weapons.

This internationalization would be in accordance with the Charter and in the spirit of the Uniting for Peace Resolution of 1950³ and would, of course, be supplementary to and not in substitution for the Charter provisions covering self-defense and regional arrangements.

My proposal means that we renounce the use of the atomic weapon if objection thereto is made by the United Nations General Assembly—the only world forum and the most representative existing body of world opinion. It means further that when there must be a resort to collective action against aggression, as the Charter provides, and when the speedy threat of the atomic weapon is thus required because its deterrent effect will prevent a world war, that the nations possessing atomic weapons withhold their use long enough to give the General Assembly time to forbid them from using these weapons.

What this interval of time shall be can be negotiated between the Powers. Obviously, it must be long enough for members to meet and to consider. Obviously, too, it must not be so long that the aggression which it is planned to prevent nevertheless takes place because the Assembly “fiddled while Rome burned”. The aggressor must not have the sole ability to act with speed. The Uniting for Peace Resolution says that the Assembly shall be called on 24 hours notice. I suggest for discussion that there then be 3 days deliberation.

The United States agrees to place the use of its atomic weapons under this United Nations ban only after deep and careful thought. No nation lightly surrenders its sovereign prerogatives. We too are reluctant to do it. We ask others to join us in doing it now because we are willing to do it ourselves and because we think it may prevent annihilation of the human race. Such a concession of national sovereignty seems small indeed when matched against the lives of all humanity. To paraphrase the words of the American Declaration of Independence, we make this offer not only because of a decent regard for the opinions, but also for the very existence, of mankind,

HCL

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/1–2456. Top Secret. Lodge also sent a copy of this letter to President Eisenhower, January 24 with the following covering note:

   “Attached is the ‘line’ to which, I think, the Soviets are sensitive.

   “I suggest that all those in the United States Government who have anything to do with talking about disarmament to foreigners should stress this thought—that a nation which does not accept your plan lays itself open to grave suspicion.

   “If we “worry’ this thought like a dog with a bone, they will either eventually give in, or the world will know whom to suspect. This would put us in a position to rally world opinion against them in the United Nations with a good chance of broad support.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series, Lodge)

2. No record of this meeting has been found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.
3. For documentation on the Uniting for Peace Resolution, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. II, pp. 303–370.