Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Regulation of Armaments; Atomic Energy, Volume XX

36. Memorandum From the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) to the President¹

New York, June 14, 1955.

1. The following is written solely from the viewpoint of the United States representation in the United Nations.

2. The Stassen Report² has the great advantage that if the Russians agree to it, we will then have inspectors in the Soviet Union whose presence, (assuming that the report is technically correct), should make it impossible for a surprise attack to be made on us. This is a greater advantage for us than the presence of Soviet inspectors in this country would be for them, since, because of our system and traditions, we would never commit the act of aggression. The Stassen proposal, therefore, makes it more difficult for the aggressor than for the aggressee.

3. The Stassen proposal has the further merit that it enables us to have a showdown with the Soviet Union because, if they do not accept some plan of this kind, we then proceed against them in the United Nations on the basis that their failure to do so is a threat to the peace, bringing into play all of the peaceful settlement measures of the Charter and of Article 51 on individual or collective self-defense.

4. The possibility of a compromise inspection system midway between that proposed in the Stassen Report and the Korean Armistice Commission type of control over ports, fairways and airdromes which the Soviets suggest should be examined. But if, after a sincere effort to get an inspection system, the negotiations fail, it is better to have the showdown in the United Nations while we have the edge rather than wait and have an attack later when they are stronger than we. The Stassen Report estimates on nuclear strength five or ten years from now are conclusive on this point.

5. The references to the United Nations are satisfactory, with the exception of the suggestion on page 31³ that the President should present the disarmament proposal to Congress but should not present it to the United Nations. Much as I hate to add to the burdens of the President, I think it would be a serious mistake not to have him present this scheme to the United Nations. He presented the atoms for peace proposal to the United Nations, and this one will certainly be far more important to the security of the United States. If he does not present it, it will be inevitably “down-graded” in the minds of officials and of the public throughout the world.

6. The report is not realistic as regards timing. It cannot be stated too vigorously that, whether we like it or not, disarmament is coming up in the General Assembly this fall—unless we can get an agreement with our allies and the Soviets not to have it come up. Wadsworth points out that both the French and the British think real progress was made in London, and are both enthusiastic and optimistic about pushing ahead vigorously. All these factors make it vital for us to have a United States position by September at the latest. In fact, we will be very much embarrassed without it.

7. It is quite conceivable that such a hue and cry could be raised in the United Nations as to induce the Soviets to accept some form of inspection. They could be placed in a terrible dilemma in which the acceptance of some form of inspection would be preferable to being branded before the world as an aggressor. But, of course, such a result cannot be achieved if they have the initiative and are challenging us on their London proposal.

8. Governor Stassen has rendered a great service in developing a scheme which holds out the prospect of bringing this desperately and vitally important matter to a head.

H.C. Lodge, Jr.

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series, Lodge. Top Secret; Eyes Only.
2. Reference is to Stassen’s May 26 progress report, Document 33.
3. Reference is to Chapter X, section H, of the report.