Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Regulation of Armaments; Atomic Energy, Volume XX

37. Informal Notes of a Meeting of the Special Staff, Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, June 15, 1955, 8 a.m.¹

Washington, June 15, 1955, 8 a.m.

PRESENT

• Chairman Strauss, AEC
• Commissioner Libby
• Commissioner Murray, and Members of Staff
• Governor Stassen and Staff

Chairman Strauss welcomed Governor Stassen and his staff and called on the Commissioners to express their views following their study of Governor Stassen’s memorandum dated May 26, 1955.²

Commissioner Murray opened the substantive discussion by declaring that the question of a moratorium on nuclear tests was uppermost in his mind.³ He noted the cardinal aim of the proposed disarmament policy and expressed his view that a moratorium on testing would greatly postpone the attainment by the Soviets of the ability to destroy the U.S. Mr. Stassen responded that under the proposed plan the moratorium would occur only when the inspectors were in place as part of the overall agreement. It could not be isolated from the other parts of the disarmament package. Mr. Murray stressed that time was essential. He hoped that some way might be found to stop the Soviets from testing this coming fall. He feared that if we wait longer the Soviets would approach U.S. technology. A moratorium on testing would be useless at a later stage but very important immediately. He thought we did not need access to all Soviet facilities in order to be sure that the Soviets were not testing weapons.

Dr. Libby expressed his belief that the U.S. was far ahead of the Soviets at this point and a moratorium by itself might cut down the current U.S. advanatage. He stressed additionally the important peacetime uses for existing nuclear materials and said that there may even be peace-time uses for the hydrogen bomb. As a Scientist he was opposed to barriers being placed on any kind of investigation. Mr. Stassen noted that his report did not recommend banning atomic research but Dr. Libby replied that he was still thinking of peace-time use for a hydrogen bomb. Dr. Libby further stated that he was concerned with the problem of getting rid of nuclear materials. It seemed to him a “crime” to dump them into the ocean and referred to them as “treasures” for peaceful uses.

At this point, Chairman Strauss entered a caveat on the assumption that the U.S. is very far ahead. He based his thought on earlier experiences with Soviet advances in atomic and other weapons. He also stated that even the present Soviet weapons were fantastically terrible and reported that Commissioner Murray’s views on the moratorium were not shared by the Commission, by State, or by Defense. He added a purely personal view that a moratorium without controls could work to U.S. disadvantage noting that research without testing was incomplete. He also noted that the Soviets had succeeded in building new types of airplanes without the U.S. having prior knowledge of them. They could likewise conceal important weapon production.

Mr. Stassen then asked the AEC view on the basic proposition in the report concerning unaccountability for previous and future production of nuclear weapons material. Mr. Strauss replied that the AEC agrees with these statements and has done so for a long time. He referred to a memorandum by Dr. Smyth in November 1953 which stated that no technical methods were known which could account for all past production of nuclear material.⁴ As to the problem of future production, the Smyth memorandum called attention to the problem arising from the fact that power production on a wide scale will make available much fissionable material for weapons use. Mr. Strauss said the AEC had adopted this position two years ago and had never changed it. Dr. Libby subscribed to the same position and Chairman Strauss noted that it was never even possible to account for all the U.S. material despite remarkable care. With regard to paragraph 3a on page 22, Mr. Strauss thought the last sentence was a little too general. He granted that uranium could be found almost everywhere but not in concentrations which every nation could extract. Dr. Libby agreed and said that it was a long step from material to weapons. Mr. Strauss commented that the Russians had always been known as good mining people and that the area available for their prospecting was large. Mr. Murray also declared that peaceful atomic programs build up weapons materials and that ores were no problem. As he saw it, it was becoming easier every day to destroy the world. He thought that the Soviet stockpile could be multiplied many times if the Soviets found the key as the U.S. had. Mr. Stassen asked if the Soviets could know the answers without testing it. Dr. Libby doubted it and thought that tests were the only proof. Mr. Strauss said this was probably so unless the “U.S. did the testing for the Soviets,” a possibility which he could not foreclose in view of their previous success at espionage.

Mr. Strauss commended Mr. Stassen’s report for a remarkable presentation and Mr. Stassen asked for views as to the future situation. Mr. Strauss said that the future did not look attractive. (1) The atomic burden was very costly. (2) Military needs (so long as there were needs) would always have priority over the peaceful uses of atomic energy, and (3) when enormous quantities of weapons were stockpiled they might be expected to gravitate to the hands of lower level and less responsible commanders in all countries, thus enhancing the dangers of use. He thought that if the manufacture of atomic weapons could be ended conclusively it would be in the general interest. By “conclusively” he meant “in a manner which would not be to the disadvantage of the U.S. as has been the case with all the proposals to date.”

Commissioner Murray warned against a trend even in our own thinking to view certain very damaging atomic weapons as being merely “tactical”. Chairman Strauss indicated that when Commissioner Von Neumann⁵ returned to Washington he would examine this report very closely and consult with Mr. Stassen. Mr. Stassen asked that the Commission submit its specific dissents by June 25 but Mr. Strauss said he could not promise a formal reply by such a date. He thought no comment was better than a cursory comment. Dr. Von Neumann would not be available until after July 4 and furthermore, had anything particularly disturbed the Commissioners present it would have come up in this meeting. The AEC could, if it was desired, prepare at a later time a more detailed staff study of the technical aspects. As for himself he could buy the report “almost in toto”. Dr. Libby had nothing to add and Commissioner Murray indicated that he would submit a memorandum on the moratorium problem to Governor Stassen.⁶ Mr. Stassen noted that if a policy were adopted the AEC would play a part in devising a detailed inspection system. Mr. Stassen inquired with regard to public opinion what the possibility was of getting outstanding non-governmental scientists to play a part of explaining to the public the impossibility of complete prohibition of nuclear weapons. Dr. Libby thought there was an excellent possibility but he was not sure it would be too good an idea.

Two other specific subjects on weapons were raised. The subjects will be reported separately.⁷

1. Source: Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Meetings of the Special Staff. Top Secret. Drafted by Lippmann.
2. Reference is to Document 33.
3. See Document 15.
4. Not found in Department of State files.
5. John von Neumann was confirmed as member, Atomic Energy Commission, on March 14.
6. Not found in Department of State files.
7. Not further identified.