Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Regulation of Armaments; Atomic Energy, Volume XX

35. Memorandum of Discussion at the 251st Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, June 9, 1955¹

Washington, June 9, 1955

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda item 1.]

2. Report by the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission

Admiral Strauss informed the Council that he had gone abroad at the invitation of the British Government, but that his special purpose in visiting the UK was to satisfy his own curiosity as to the existence of any real basis for the spate of rumors in the press that Great Britain was substantially ahead of the United States in the field of atomic power production. After spending a week in visiting all the British atomic installations except the weapons installations, Admiral Strauss said he had reached the conclusion that while the British achievement does them great credit in terms of the money available to finance the operation, our own effort in the field of atomic power production was ten times as great as the British. Admiral Strauss added that of course the British plants were built and operated by the government; there was no private power production and hence no prospect of competition such as we envisage.

In any event, continued Admiral Strauss, the United States had nothing to worry about as regards the British effort in this field, except the possibility that two of the atomic power plants in the UK might actually be ready to operate late in the year 1956 or early in 1957. This would put the British six months ahead of the expected date when our own plant at Shippingport would be ready. Admiral Strauss said that of course he could accelerate the completion of the Shippingport plant by virtue of overtime and other emergency measures, but to do so would add several million dollars to the costs of building the plant. Instead of this means of staying ahead of the British, Admiral Strauss suggested another possibility. The reactor located at West Milton, New York, the prototype for the second submarine power reactor, was no longer necessary for its original purpose. Accordingly, it could be sold and converted in a few weeks to the production of atomic power on a small scale. If this were done we would not be placed in a bad public relations situation if the British succeeded in announcing that their plants had begun to produce power through atomic energy prior to the completion of the big Shippingport plant.

At the conclusion of his comments on what he had seen in the United Kingdom, Admiral Strauss went on to summarize atomic developments in Belgium, Denmark, France, Spain and Portugal.

At the conclusion of Admiral Strauss’ report, Secretary Dulles commented that Admiral Strauss’ trip had been very useful. The President inquired whether Admiral Strauss had detected any feeling that the British were still resentful that we had not been more helpful to them in solving their engineering problems in the atomic field. Admiral Strauss replied that he had not detected any disposition on the part of the British to blame the present Administration for the McMahon Act.² Besides, they realize that we have been able to give them at least some help on the side. The British he found to be amenable to reason, and not resentful.

The President commented that it was “pitiful” a few years ago when the British were desperately anxious to avoid making the same mistakes in the atomic energy field which we had earlier made. They invoked the Quebec Agreement³ and made all kinds of pleas, to no avail.

Secretary Wilson, referring to Admiral Strauss’ earlier report, inquired precisely why it would be such a serious matter for the United States if the British did succeed in opening a plant for the production of atomic power six months ahead of the United States. On the contrary, would it not be a good thing if the British succeeded in being first once in a while? Admiral Strauss said that he could only reply that he presumed the United States was desirous of protecting its preeminence in the general field of peaceful uses of atomic energy. Secretary Dulles expressed agreement with Admiral Strauss’ point.

The President said he doubted the wisdom of raising too many flags or blowing too many horns over the proposal for selling the West Milton, New York, prototype reactor for conversion to power production. Mr. Rockefeller agreed with the President on this point, and said there was danger that many people would realize that the West Milton reactor had been designed for purposes of submarine construction, and that they were trying to pull a fast one in announcing it as our first reactor for the production of power. Admiral Strauss commented that while Mr. Rockefeller might be right, the United States might find it advantageous to emphasize that it was converting a former military project to one designed for peaceful purposes.

The National Security Council:⁴

Noted and discussed an oral report by the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, on his recent trip to Europe.

[Here follow the remaining agenda items.]

S. Everett Gleason

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason on June 10.
2. The McMahon Act, or Atomic Energy Act of 1946, prohibited all exchange of information on atomic energy with other nations, even in areas having no readily perceptible military bearing.
3. At the Quebec Conference of 1943, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill signed an agreement providing for collaboration between the two governments in the field of atomic energy. For text, see Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943, p. 1117.
4. The following paragraph constitutes NSC Action No. 1413, approved by the President on June 9, 1955. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC Actions)