Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Regulation of Armaments; Atomic Energy, Volume XX

212. Memorandum From the Delegation to the Subcommittee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission to the Secretary of State¹

London, May 31, 1957.

Revised basic paper:

Assembled as requested by the President in paragraph 5 of the minutes of the May 25, 1957 Conference at the White House, written by Robert Cutler, cleared with the participating Departments and Agencies, and approved by the President;²

Prepared by the U.S. Delegation in accordance with the decisions reflected in the May 25 minutes, combining the “Policy Recommendation to Washington” of May 9, 1957,³ as modified by the “Informal Memorandum” to the Secretary of State of May 22, 1957,⁴ and as modified and supplemented by the detailed decisions recorded in the May 25 minutes.

1. The agreement for partial measures would include specific authority for a signator to suspend partially or completely the commitments and obligations taken. At the option of such signator this may be done upon written notice by it to the control organization of either an important violation by another signator, or a written notice by it of action by a signator or non-signator which prejudices the security of the notifying state and thereby requires the partial or complete suspension of commitments. This provision is to include a procedure for advance notice, at the option of the signator, of intention to suspend so that an opportunity for prior correction of the adverse condition may be afforded.

2. All signators (except the US, UK and USSR) to agree that they are prohibited from the manufacture, acquisition or possession of nuclear weapons. It should be made clear that the armed forces of one of the three nuclear-weapons-states may possess nuclear weapons on the soil of a non-nuclear-weapons state, unless within a zone in which the stationing of nuclear weapons is specifically and separately prohibited for all. Furthermore, the right of preparatory training of forces of non-nuclear-weapons states in the use of nuclear weapons, and of equipping them with dual purpose means of delivery, is to be definitely preserved for the contingent eventuality of use in event of armed attack within the terms of paragraph 3.

3. The signators all voluntarily agree that they are prohibited from use of nuclear weapons except

(a) in individual or collective self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter if an armed attack occurs which includes the use of nuclear weapons or

(b) if such an armed attack is of such a nature and magnitude that, in the decision of the using state, the attack cannot feasibly be repelled without the use of nuclear weapons.

It should further be made clear that this provision will not imply any obligation to maintain forces of a non-nuclear nature for purposes of repelling non-nuclear attacks. Within the limits otherwise imposed by the partial agreement, it is for each of the “three” signators to decide the most effective distribution of its armament between the nuclear and the non-nuclear.

4. The USSR, UK and US to take a further commitment to cooperate in the prompt design, installation, and maintenance of an effective inspection system to verify the fulfillment of the following provision (installation estimated as July 1959 or later) and one month after the installation of such an inspection system the three will devote all future production of fissionable material exclusively to non-weapons purposes including stockpiling, and will transfer to non-weapons purposes any fissionable material not already contained within nuclear weapons.

The right of refabrication of weapons after the “cut off” date should be definitely maintained.

5. Upon the establishment of a satisfactorily functioning inspection system and the cut-off on production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes; the USSR, UK and US will commence agreed equitable proportionate transfers of fissionable materials in successive increments from previous production over to internationally inspected and supervised non-weapons purposes, including stockpiling either national or international; provided, however, that these transfers shall be carried out to only a limited degree and each of the three will be maintaining a very substantial nuclear weapons capability insofar as the terms of the treaty for the partial agreement is concerned.

The initial agreement will fix the specific ratios between the contributions of the US and the USSR of fissionable materials of comparable analysis to be transferred in successive increments from previous production over to internationally inspected and supervised non-weapons purposes; thereby clarifying the language, “agreed equitable proportionate transfers.”

Unless the Soviets insist on a 50-50 ratio, the following ratios of the quantity in each increment are approved: US 55 and USSR 45, with whatever amount the UK may transfer to be in addition to the amount so transferred.

The commitment for transfers of fissionable materials may call for transfers over and above certain minimums of material, thereby providing a saving clause for the UK. The reservation of intention to maintain a very substantial nuclear weapons capability insofar as the terms of the treaty or the partial agreement is concerned will be a footnote. The right of refabrication of weapons after the “cut-off” date should continue to be definitely maintained.

6. Upon the effective date of the treaty (estimated as July 158). the USSR and US and other states concerned will move promptly to install and begin to operate an aerial inspection system in accordance with the approved Eisenhower method in an initial zone or zones:

(a) The European-Russian Zone

In view of the effects on our NATO allies and the complexity of the multinational interests involved, the European-Russian aerial and ground control zone should be treated separately from the US–Canada–USSR aerial and ground control zone, insofar as possible. Negotiations and arrangements for a European-Russian aerial and ground control zone should be handled in a way allowing our NATO allies (and other affected non-NATO nations) to have a full voice in the development of the position.

(b) The US–Canada–USSR Zone

Initially the US will propose that our side include the continental US, Alaska, and Canada, and that the Soviet side include all Soviet territory. If the Soviets should continue to refuse to deal on this basis, the US will accept a limited initial zone, in order to start an inspection technique. This limited zone will comprise roughly the entire area north of the Arctic Circle (except Sweden and Finland), all of Alaska and the Aleutian Islands, and all of the Kamchatka Peninsula and the Kuril Islands. In conducting US Delegation negotiations concerning the area of the zone, the greatest caution should be exercised relative to offering more US territory in exchange for more Siberian territory.

For the method of aerial inspection, reference will be made to an annex to the treaty. This annex will spell out the method in precise details along the lines of the Joint Chiefs and Doolittle detailed work.

7. In addition, upon the effective date of the agreement, the parties will move promptly to establish ground control posts in the zone or zones to be specified in the manner outlined in Paragraph 6, including appropriate radar equipment for added warning safeguards against the potential of great surprise attack.

8. In addition, and in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph 6a, ground control posts will be promptly established in such areas of the Soviet Union, beyond the initial aerial zone or zones, as may be negotiated with the NATO nations having a full voice in these negotiations in the manner outlined in paragraph six.

9. Three months after the effective date of the agreement (estimated as October 1958), signators would furnish blueprints of military forces and armaments within the agreed zone or zones, exclusive of nuclear weapons.

(a) The term “Blueprint” includes both a statement of fixed military installations and also an inventory of military forces and major designated armaments (including nuclear weapons-delivery vehicles but excluding nuclear weapons), together with these locations.

(b) No “blueprint” relating to the whole USSR, or calculations of percentage reductions based on such “blueprints”, would be reliable, until aerial and ground control inspection systems covering the whole USSR territory were established and operating.

(c) A list of armaments prepared by the US and the USSR, as a basis for agreeing to armaments reductions, will state specific quantities of identified types of armaments, substantial in amount, significant in kind, and of post-World War II manufacture. Such list will not relate to a percentage of the nation’s total armaments or of the nation’s armaments located within a certain zone.

10. The following first step is approved:

a. The US and USSR agree on a US–Canada–USSR zone for aerial and ground control inspection.

b. Each of the US and USSR furnish to the other a “blueprint” (as described in 9–a above) of the total military installations, armaments, and military forces located within such inspection zone.

c. The initial agreement will include commitments for each of the US and USSR to reduce military forces to 2.5 million, and a list (as described in 9–c above) of armaments scheduled for reduction; the armaments so listed bearing a rough relation to the stated reduction in military forces.

d. After the treaty becomes effective, each places the armaments set forth in its list in an internationally supervised national storage depot within its own territory.

Military expenditure reductions are to be a supplementary consequence and not a prime factor. The right to check on an endeavor to follow up Soviet military expenditures should be sought, along with a check up of use of major material such as steel and aluminum. Military expenditures inspection is not to be looked upon as a major reliance for inspection purposes.

11. Signators other than the USSR and US would make similar (but not precisely the same) agreed reductions under similar reporting and verified inspected conditions.

The Federal Republic of Germany, if it became a signator, would, of course, not be making agreed reductions, but rather would be accepting a ceiling for its rearmament, in conjunction with the first step partial agreement.

Similar exceptions may apply to other states, such as Japan.

12. All signators specifically recognize the essential requirement of an effective inspection system, to verify and guarantee in the case of all states alike the fulfillment and observance of each commitment. Each signator undertakes to cooperate in the thorough, reciprocal installation and implementation of such inspection, and the continued operation of such inspection is an essential requirement for the continuation of the commitments under the agreement.

This general inspection commitment should apply to both conventional and nuclear aspects of the agreement.

13. Upon the completion of such initial year reductions, each state would file a certificate that it had carried out the reduction, and mobile inspection teams would then have access to the objects of control in the required areas of the signator states to verify the fulfillment of the reductions.

14. If the negotiations conducted with a full voice of our NATO allies (and other affected non-NATO nations) result in arrangements for a European-Russian aerial and ground control zone in accordance with paragraph 6, it shall be a matter for subsequent US decision as to whether or not the US would agree that all states involved would be prohibited from maintaining or from stationing nuclear weapons in that part of the Soviet Union and that part of Europe included within the Russian European aerial inspection zone.

It would be anticipated that if such an arrangement is concluded, the right of preparatory training preserved in paragraph 2 and the right of stationing dual purpose delivery systems, against the contingent eventuality of war, would continue to be preserved.

15. During the year of fulfillment of the reduction of worldwide levels of armaments and armed forces of the Soviet Union and the US to the force level of 2.5 million, as specified in paragraph 10 (estimated as July 1958 to July 1959), both would also reduce the armaments and armed forces which they had located in the European and Russian aerial inspection zone if such a zone had been established under paragraph 6, to such minor extent as may be agreed with a full voice of the NATO nations in the development of the position.

16. At the end of the first reduction in armaments, armed forces, and military expenditures (estimated as July 1959) progressively to expand the aerial inspection system beyond the original zone or zones, into a series of additional zones culminating in the complete coverage of the Soviet Union and (if the political situation permits) China, and, reciprocally coverage of the Free World areas including the US and the UK to such extent as may be agreed to by the nations affected thereby. The ground control posts to also be progressively expanded and increased to complete effective coverage to such extent as may be agreed upon by the nations affected thereby.

17. During the year of fulfillment of the reduction of levels of armaments and armed forces of the Soviet Union and the US to the level of two and one-half million for forces, including parallel reductions of the armaments and armed forces which the Soviet Union and the US had located in any European-Russian aerial inspection zone

which may be agreed upon in accordance with paragraph 6, by the USSR, the US and our NATO allies; it shall be a matter for subsequent decision, after the full voice of our NATO allies participates in the development of a position, as to whether or not to make an agreed reduction in air bases on both sides within the zone of a magnitude of approximately 10%.

18. Upon the effective date of the partial agreement treaty (estimated as July, 1958), all signators would be committed:

a. to cooperate in setting up an international inspection commission to monitor tests;

b. to refrain from further tests until 12 months after such effective date—with the understanding that the U.S. intends, in the absence of any agreement to the contrary by the end of such 12 months’ period, thereafter to resume testing;

c. if tests are resumed, to give notification in advance of such tests and approximate yields; to provide reciprocal limited access to tests; and to place limitations upon the amount of radioactive material to be released in the atmosphere.

19. The U.S. Delegation may state that if the first stage under the agreement is carried through successfully, the U.S. would be prepared to negotiate for further major reductions in armaments and armed forces. (The possibility of a reduction in the second phase to not less than 2 million men may be discussed, without any commitment.) Such further reductions to be further conditioned upon the assurance of application of the treaty and the inspection system to all essential, significant military states and areas, and therefore requiring prior solution of the political problems in a manner satisfactory to the US insofar as they apply to this subject.

20. Any discussion of the possibility of a reduction in a second phase in accordance with paragraph 19 should not include any discussion of such reduction in relationship to Europe, and the initial agreement should not spell out in detail a second phase of reductions.

21. A hope might also be expressed that further reductions in armaments and armed forces might be negotiated, if the second phase under the agreement is carried through successfully, but no floor below 1.5 million should be indicated.

22. The initial agreement should not spell out in detail a third phase of reductions.

23. The signators agree that within 3 months after the effective date of the treaty (estimated to be October, 1958), they will cooperate in the establishment of a technical committee to study the design of an inspection system which would make it possible to assure that the sending of objects through outer space should be exclusively for peaceful and scientific purposes.

24. The armaments regulation organization administering the system to be established in accordance with Article 26 of the UN Charter within the framework of the Security Council, and to operate through an executive council or board of control on which the affirmative vote of the US and of the Soviet Union is essential for significant decisions.

25. Such board of control to have authority to establish a system for the advance notification by signators of any intended major movement of armed forces over foreign soil or over international waters or through international air space as a part of the system of protection against great surprise attack.

26. The essential details for the evolutionary development of an effective and sound inspection system are to be worked out in keeping with the foregoing outline and consistent with the studies of the eight US Presidential Task Groups⁵ chairmanned by Gen. Bedell Smith. Gen. James Doolittle, and Dr. Ernest Lawrence and others.

27. The armaments regulation organization should be authorized to act through its board of control to establish an appropriate system regulating the export and import of armaments, to take effect after the exchange of military blueprints.

28. The specific provisions of this paper are considered as inseparable parts of a whole, unless the contrary is stated.

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up, Disarmament—Basic Papers. Top Secret. No drafting information is given on the source text.
2. Document 206.
3. Document 195.
4. Document 200.
5. See Document 78.