Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Regulation of Armaments; Atomic Energy, Volume XX

200. Informal Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Stassen) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, May 22, 1957.

Modifications and clarifications of the May 9, 1957 cable² to take account of views expressed by the Secretary and by Defense and AEC.³

Paragraph 1—The provision for advance notice of intention to suspend should be optional and not a mandatory requirement. Actions by either a signator or a non-signator which prejudice the security of a signator state may be ground for partial or complete suspension of commitments.

Paragraph 2—The “prohibition” clause to the non-nuclear-weapon signators is not to prohibit their use of nuclear weapons in the event one of the three nuclear-weapons-states associated in a collective security agreement uses nuclear weapons. Under these circumstances the signators, such as the NATO states, are to be free to use nuclear weapons if the United States uses them. Furthermore, the right of preparatory training for such use is to be definitely preserved as to such non-nuclear-weapon signators.

It should also be clear that the forces of one of the three nuclear-weapons-states may possess nuclear weapons on the soil of a non-nuclear-weapons state, unless within a zone in which the stationing of nuclear weapons is specifically and separately prohibited for all.

Paragraph 3—The exceptions in the manner of use of nuclear weapons by the three nuclear-weapons-states is to be restated so that the exceptions are:

(a) in individual or collective self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter if an armed attack occurs which includes the use of nuclear weapons, or

(b) if such an armed attack is of such a nature and magnitude that, in the decision of the using state, the attack cannot feasibly be repelled without the use of nuclear weapons.

It should further be made clear that this provision will not imply any obligation to maintain forces of a non-nuclear nature for purposes of repelling non-nuclear attacks. Within the limits otherwise imposed by the partial agreement, it is for each of the “three” signators to decide the most effective distribution of its armament between the nuclear and the non-nuclear.

Paragraph 4—The commitment to cooperate in the design and installation of a necessary inspection system, is also to specifically include a commitment to cooperate in the maintenance of such a necessary inspection system, and these commitments are to be stated prior to and be prerequisite for the “cut-off” date.

Paragraph 5—The commitment for transfers of fissionable materials should call for transfers over and above certain minimums of material, thereby providing a saving clause for the UK and likewise making it clear that transfers are not contemplated to the extent of elimination or substantial elimination of nuclear weapons capability. The reservation of intention to maintain a very substantial nuclear weapons capability insofar as the terms of the treaty or the partial agreement is concerned will be a footnote. The right of refabrication of weapons after the “cut-off” date should be definitely maintained.

Paragraph 6—For the method of aerial inspection, reference will be made to an annex to the treaty, which annex will spell it out in precise details along the lines of the Joint Chiefs and Doolittle⁴ detailed work.

Paragraph 6 (a)—For the western half of this initial zone, consider the area of Alaska; and of Canada west of a line from 130 degrees west longitude–70 degrees north latitude, to Edmonton, and from Edmonton to 95 degrees west longitude on the Canadian-US line; and the continental United States west of 95 degrees west longitude.

Paragraph 6 (b)—The Russian-European zone to be for a European decision in which the US is willing to join. So far as the US is concerned it may be independent of the rest of the agreement, or incorporated in the first step if the Europeans wish it to be so.

Paragraph 9—The “blueprint” is to refer to an inventory of major designated armaments, and of the armed forces, and to be spelled out in detail in an annex worked out by the technical experts. It is, of course, to be exclusive of nuclear weapons.

Paragraph 10—The internationally supervised national storage is to be only of a percentage of the major designated armaments as reported in the inventory. The military expenditure reduction is to be a supplementary consequence and not a prime factor. The right to check on and endeavor to follow up Soviet military expenditures should be sought, along with a check up of use of major material such as steel and aluminum. Military expenditures is not to be looked upon as a major reliance for inspection purposes.

Paragraph 11—The Federal Republic of Germany would, of course, not be making agreed reductions, but rather would be accepting a ceiling for its rearmament, in conjunction with the first step partial agreement.

Paragraph 12—This general inspection commitment should apply to both conventional and nuclear aspects of the agreement.

Paragraph 14—This restriction on stationing nuclear weapons in the Russian-European aerial inspection zone, applies only to the nuclear warheads and nuclear bombs. It does not restrict the stationing of dual purpose delivery systems, and does not prohibit the preparatory training of armed forces in the zone for the contingent eventuality of war. The provision does safeguard against the hasty triggering of nuclear weapons in close proximity in the central European area, which could otherwise occur without deliberate decision by the top command in either the US or the USSR. Such a local triggering could institute a nuclear war which the responsible leadership of neither country intended. It also provides additional assurance to fourth countries, such as France, that if they abstain from nuclear weapons production the German armed forces are not likely to have nuclear weapons placed within their control by either the United States or the Soviet Union.

Paragraph 15—This is intended to indicate that there will be some reduction in the major designated armaments in the Russian and European aerial inspection zone, but that such reduction will be of such a modest amount as to negate any implication of future complete withdrawal.

Paragraph 16—The commitment to progressively expand the aerial inspection system and to progressively expand the ground inspection system would not include the precise steps or timing for such expansion.

Paragraph 17—This provision would indicate on the one hand some reduction in bases, but on the other hand would affirm that the reduction would be of such small magnitude as to reflect the fact that complete elimination of foreign bases is not contemplated in any disarmament agreement which the US would accept.

Paragraph 18—It would be made clear that the temporary suspension for twelve months of all nuclear tests contemplates the possibility of resuming limited testing by the three after such temporary suspension, but that such limited testing would be with unilateral restraint, with due regard to health, and with advance notice of intention to test. Or such resumed testing would be specifically limited under inspection to an agreed safe amount of fissionable material.

Paragraphs 19, 20, 21 and 22—The effect of these four provisions is to indicate a willingness to move further in the event of full compliance with the first step, and in the event of satisfactory political solutions, but at the same time to make clear that a reduction to a point of extreme weakness or of internal security forces definitely is not contemplated in US policy, even under the most favorable circumstances.

Paragraph 25—The system of advance notification is to be developed along the lines of the Doolittle and Colclough report,⁵ to cover submarines as well as bombers, and to add to the safeguards against great surprise attack.

HES

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/2–2257. Secret.
2. Stassen’s cable, transmitted in telegrams 6122, 6123, and 6124 from London, is printed as Document 195.
3. See Documents 196 and 197.
4. The air section of the inspection organization, prepared by J. H. Doolittle, chairman of the Task Force on Air Inspection, is contained in “A Plan for a Comprehensive Armament and Armed Force Inspection System, 20 January 1956,” pp. 150–161. (Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Comprehensive Inspection Plan)
5. The Navy section of the inspection organization, prepared by Oswald S. Colclough, chairman of the Task Force on Navy Inspection, is printed ibid., pp. 126–149.