213. Editorial Note
On May 31, Harold E. Stassen, Chairman of the Delegation to the Subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission talks in London, handed to the Soviet Delegation and to the other Western delegations an informal memorandum (infra) outlining the new United States policy decisions reached at the White House meeting on May 25. Regarding the White House meeting, see Document 206. Stassen gave the memorandum to the Soviets despite instructions that the President expected the decisions to be approved by interested agencies and then submitted to him before detailed negotiations on disarmament began; see Document 211. Stassen responded on May 30 that he expected to cable a basic revised paper the following day. He added:
“USDEL will continue to confine its activities to informal explorations and informal indications of potential movement, drawing out Soviets, and will not table proposals or undertake detailed negotiations based on the revised policy at this time.
[Page 573]“Estimate that we can maintain momentum and essential climate for another week without undertaking detailed negotiations based on revised policy.
“We are well advanced on the initial informal consultations and are pursuing them actively with the governments concerned. Preliminary reactions as favorable as could be expected.” (Telegram 6580 from London, May 30; Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/3057. The basic revised paper is Supra.)
The Department of State first learned Stassen had given the memorandum to the Soviet Delegation on June 1, when John E. Coulson, British Minister in Washington, called on Assistant Secretary Wilcox to express his concern and to state that Stassen’s move appeared to be inconsistent with the agreement that no substantive proposals would be made to the Russians prior to the completion of consultations among the Western members. (Memorandum of conversation, June 3; Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/6–357) The Department of State notified Stassen of the British view, reminded him of the President’s instructions, and requested clarification; see Document 215. Stassen defended his actions in telegram 6633 from London, Document 216.
The matter did not end there, however. Almost simultaneously, the Department of State received numerous reports of widespread Allied concern over Stassen’s action. Essentially, the Allies admitted that Stassen had consulted with them individually and collectively, but argued that these discussions had not gone very far when he chose to submit the informal memorandum to the Soviet Delegation. Telegram 6180 from Paris, June 3, for example, summarized the “very strong and emotional reactions from French Government officials at all levels”:
“Basic concern is that US should give vitally important new proposition on disarmament to Soviets before any real consultation with NATO allies. All French officials have characterized this action as very serious blow to NATO. Typical of statements which have been made are: Action ‘worse than Suez’ in damaging western alliance; greatest impetus yet given towards Europe becoming neutralist ‘third force’; time for France and other European countries to seek new alliance; makes it practically imperative for France (and subsequently other European countries) to undertake own nuclear weapons program. In addition, French are discussing with Spaak (to whom they gave copy of memorandum), with Germans, and Italians.” Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/6–357)
Documentation on this matter is ibid., 300.13 and 600.0012.