Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Regulation of Armaments; Atomic Energy, Volume XX

137. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State¹

London, April 26, 1956—11 p.m.

4914. Department pouch Ottawa. Pass DOD, AEC, USIA. From USDEL Disarmament Subcommittee. Disarmament 128. Report on meeting of US and USSR Delegations, Lancaster House, 3 p.m., April 26.²

Stassen said various conversations to date have made positions of US–USSR quite clear and magnitude of differences seems quite evident. Said he believed most fruitful avenue of approach would be to consider question are there preliminary steps which US–USSR might take together to advance disarmament problem while approach is sought for more significant broad common ground. US–USSR appear well agreed on undesirability of war and dangers to both countries resulting from continued absence of agreement.

Stassen said Bulganin and Khrushchev made important and significant comment about preliminary steps when they stated Soviet readiness make force reductions and asked if US would do likewise.³Stassen said this comment leads to question of exploring whether USSR–US Delegations might recommend to their Governments possible formula for combining such preliminary steps as Bulganin [and] Khrushchev suggested with Eisenhower strip inspection demonstration (including aerial) and technical exchange proposals. Symbolic value of such actions if possible, Stassen said, might be significant even though the steps were very limited.

Gromyko replied first to question of possible reductions of US–USSR armed forces, said Khrushchev and [had] asked how would US react if Soviet cut armed forces voluntarily by specific amount. He remarked Stassen understandably did not spell out answer but seemed to show interest in idea, and this might be valuable sign.

If this question were studied and a common language found, this would be very good. Gromyko continued that if Stassen has any more concrete ideas subsequently, he would be very happy to listen and inform Soviet Government having in mind Stassen report to Eisenhower on Bulganin–Khrushchev talk.

Gromyko said Khrushchev in speaking of possible US–USSR armed force and conventional armament reductions was confining suggestion to those countries, although of course better if other countries brought in. He said Stassen reference to suggestion of reductions brought in other control and inspection questions that go beyond this. By this he said he meant ideas Stassen introduced sometime ago in subcommittee on inspection and control.⁴

Stassen reviewed section of Bulganin–Khrushchev conversation relating to Eisenhower test inspection proposals and Khrushchev reference to inviting some inspectors to “see soldiers coming home.” He said Khrushchev showed some interest in test proposals until Gromyko advised him no reductions were involved. He said Khrushchev–Bulganin discussion on reductions did not have inspection and control attached, but would be voluntarily US–USSR actions. He said highly desirable other countries come in because neither US nor USSR would want to go far with reductions unless other countries included in agreement.

Stassen and Gromyko then agreed to resume US–USSR Delegation meeting after today’s subcommittee session.⁵

The meeting resumed after subcommittee adjourned about 4:15. Stassen said he would endeavor be concrete in private consultations. Said he did not yet see any indications of sound common ground on major issues US–USSR might move to. He said common belief in destructiveness of war and desirability disarmament agreement reducing arms burdens, freeing resources, etc., had not yet led to specific form and substance of agreement in many years of attempted agreement. He said in this respect Bulganin–Khrushchev talk made even more clear degree of difficulties and large gap between governments at present time. He said after reflecting on Bulganin–Khrushchev conversation, basic question appears to be: Is there now anything to be done that would make any more likely motion toward agreement on disarmament and lessening of danger of war, having in mind view shared by Khrushchev that there will be serious future danger in the absence of agreement of 15-20 countries attaining nuclear weapons. He said any partial beginning only possible if it brings together suggestions favorably viewed by Bulganin–Khrushchev and by Eisenhower and respective Governments. He reiterated desirability explore possibility very small conventional reductions as suggested Bulganin–Khrushchev to be carried out concurrently with small beginning inspection and control steps proposed by Eisenhower. He remarked test strip and technical exchange mission proposals not yet commented on adversely by Soviet Union.

He said in speaking of token action he had in mind small step which even if it only covered ten thousand troops with their arms would be, like test strips, a symbol to world of our moving together and studying seriously the disarmament problem. Stassen added that such questions certainly would have to be studied by both Governments. However, such steps might increase confidence, get us working together rather than clashing and talking fruitlessly, and improve prospects future agreement on more significant disarmament issues.

Stassen said he desired make careful exploration with Gromyko to see if progress can be obtained on questions he had discussed, or any matters Soviets wished to raise.

Gromyko replied Stassen had brought in matter of control, even though it was of preliminary nature. This was not the idea Khrushchev had stated.

Gromyko then inquired if Stassen’s comments were his own preliminary reactions to conversation with Khrushchev and Bulganin, or whether they represented official views US Government. Said it was important to know this, for ideas expressed to Stassen on Tuesday were the views of the chairman of the Council of Ministers and an important member Presidium. Said, of course, he would report any ideas Stassen had to Khrushchev and Bulganin.

Stassen said views he had expressed to Khrushchev and Bulganin Tuesday were established positions of US Government. Said he wished emphasize we are in situation in which President’s March 5 letter Bulganin had given expression of US policy, and he could understand, as Khrushchev and Bulganin had stated, their busy schedule had not permitted response as yet, and that, of course, if there was to be any additional proposal from President to Bulganin, such would take form of specific written words in clear fashion. Stassen said his exploration with Gromyko at this time was in accordance with US policy to seek avenues for a sound agreement. Said he was not presenting a US proposal, but was exploring, in manner of San Francisco,⁶ possibility US and USSR Delegations could find some approach to make progress.

Stassen said it was clear that Khrushchev’s suggestion re small conventional reductions, if taken by itself and without inspection and as completely separate proposal, would not be acceptable to U.S. Said he had understood more clearly from Tuesday’s⁷ discussion with Khrushchev that President’s original aerial inspection proposal was not acceptable to Soviets. Therefore, we were left with matter of seeing if some of the views held by Chiefs of both States might be brought together in a new combination and thereby bring improvement in the prospects for further progress.

Stassen said he understood when Khrushchev spoke of reducing Soviet forces to certain amount and inquired how much would US reduce, he was not talking of great reductions but more in the sense of: What do we do now? Stassen said he also noted expressions of Soviet discouragement with negotiating in subcommittee.

In reply Gromyko’s earlier inquiry, Stassen said if it is question concrete written positions backed by formal government approval, such as we have been doing past ten years, this could be continued. However, both he and Gromyko recognize if this done it much more difficult to modify respective positions. It was in this light he was exploring question with Gromyko. Said he was also agreeable exploring question of procedure for negotiations. Stated he understood that it was Gromyko’s feeling present sessions subcommittee have about reached end of their value, and would welcome any suggestions from Gromyko as to future procedures that might be helpful.

Gromyko said if Stassen had any ideas re Stassen–Khrushchev discussion he was prepared hear them at any time. Said Delegations could meet at lunch or in more formal meetings and that was not difficult problem. He said he would inform his government on views expressed by Stassen and that it was for this reason he had asked if Stassen’s remarks were made after received official government reactions to Stassen–Khrushchev conversation. He added he would report in more detail on complete subcommittee series of discussions to Soviet leaders when he returns to Moscow.

Gromyko then said it was important for U.S. pay considerable attention to views expressed by Khrushchev and Bulganin to Stassen. This might lead to further steps “like what we call in physics a chain reaction”.

Stassen replied U.S. had studied disarmament problem from point of view of seeing if one step could lead to another. He then obtained clarification from Gromyko that latter would not return to Moscow until current subcommittee session concluded.

Gromyko then stated that if up to now the Soviet position on aerial inspection had not been made clear “you now have a clear picture of what our position is”. Stassen replied US now had clear picture Soviet views aerial inspection. Said he assumed Khrushchev’s reference to “inspecting bedrooms” was for purpose of oratorical emphasis, and that Khrushchev aware US proposals do not envisage such extreme inspection as implied by Khrushchev remark. Stassen then inquired Gromyko’s views on desirability further exploration before conclusion subcommittee session. Gromyko said he “had no objection” to meeting and exchanging views, particularly if US had further views on Khrushchev’s and Bulganin’s comments. Stassen inquired if Gromyko thought there was any need for him to restate any of Khrushchev’s or Bulganin’s views in order for Stassen make certain US understanding. Gromyko said if there were any clarifications that would be useful he would give them, but his impression was that Tuesday conversation Stassen with Bulganin and Khrushchev did not contain statements that were unclear to U.S.

It was agreed that US and USSR Delegations would meet at 11 a.m. Saturday,⁸ at Lancaster House in order to take advantage simultaneous translation facilities.

Aldrich

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/4–2656. Secret. Repeated to Paris, Bonn, Moscow, and Ottawa by pouch.
2. Another summary of this meeting is the record of conversation, which, though unsigned, was presumably prepared by Benedict and Weiler, who are listed as reporting officers. (Ibid., Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Subcommittee Meetings)
3. References to Bulganin and Khrushchev in the source text are to their conversation with Stassen on April 24; see supra.
4. Stassen introduced U.S. proposals on inspection and control in the subcommittee in the U.S. outline plan for the implementation of Eisenhower’s aerial inspection proposal, August 30, 1955; the U.S. memorandum supplementing this outline plan on October 7, 1955; the U.S. working papers on technical exchange mission, March 21, 1956; the U.S. working paper on a demonstration test area, March 21, 1956; and the U.S. draft working paper on the first phase of a comprehensive disarmament agreement, April 3, 1956. For these proposals, see Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959, vol. I, pp. 501–503, 523–528, 599–600, 600–601, and 608–613, respectively.
5. The verbatim record of the 83d meeting of the Subcommittee of the U.N. Disarmament Commission is not printed. (Department of State, IO Files: Lot 70 A 6871, DC/SC.1/PV.83)
6. See footnote 9, Document 129.
7. April 24.
8. April 28.