Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Regulation of Armaments; Atomic Energy, Volume XX

138. Report by the Chairman of the Delegation at the Working-Level Meetings on the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (Wadsworth)¹

New York, undated.

[Here follows the body of the report.]

Conclusion

The agreed Statute provides, in my judgment, a sound and workable basis for an effective Agency, provided that the powers granted by the Statute are actually exercised. I must point out, however, that despite an open challenge by the Indian delegate,² the United States has refrained from undertaking a commitment in advance as to the amount of fissionable materials it will contribute. There is understandable interest among many countries about the extent to which the United States will furnish nuclear materials through the Agency rather than bilaterally, and about the extent to which we will put our bilateral agreements under Agency safeguards. In view of the Indian reservations on control and safeguards, we must continue to reserve this position in order to maintain our bargaining power and protect our own security. At the opening of the September conference, however, we should be prepared to announce an initial substantial commitment. The full measure of our material support of the Agency, as well as our position on putting our bilateral agreements under the Agency safeguards system, cannot be determined until the adequacy of the safeguards and the responsibility and efficiency of the Agency’s management are proven.

One outstanding aspect of these negotiations was the spirit of cooperation which prevailed throughout discussion of even the most controversial issues, which led to the final unanimity.

From the very outset, Ambassador Zaroubin, Chairman of the Soviet Delegation, exhibited a willingness to be cooperative and to seek agreement. He actively sought consultations with the United States Delegation, and emphasized the importance of achieving unanimity. While he adhered tenaciously to many of the standard Soviet ideological positions, he was apparently given considerable leeway in his instructions to accept compromise, and, in fact, at times to suggest them. He initiated the suggestion that a final vote be taken on the Statute as a whole so that we could announce, despite certain reservations on details, that the Statute had been adopted unanimously. During the final meeting he reaffirmed his Delegation’s reservations, but the tone of his statement was restrained and conciliatory and probably can be considered a foreshadowing of the positions the Soviet Union will take at the September conference. This statement suggests that the Soviet Union by its vote on the Statute as a whole has assumed an obligation to support that Statute at the conference in all its particulars except for those points on which it has entered specific reservations.

The Soviet Delegation’s show of cooperation should be evaluated in the light of the worldwide approval of the President’s proposal, and of the minimal commitments of the major supplier countries such as the United States and the Soviet Union deriving from the present Statute. These do not include commitments to furnish fissionable materials, to participate in an atomic pool, to submit bilaterals to Agency supervision, or to accept any form of inspection. The only specific commitment undertaken by adhering to the Statute is the obligation to pay the small assessment required for the administrative budget of the Agency. It seems clear from their conduct at the negotiations that the Soviets have accepted the fact that there will be an international agency in the peaceful uses field and that it would not be in keeping with their present posture to oppose such an agency to which most other countries look with real hope. They apparently intend to take an active role in the operation of the Agency, steering it as far as possible in the directions which best suit their interests and gaining as much propaganda benefit for themselves as possible; at the same time they have tried to make sure that their membership will put them under no obligation to make any substantial sacrifices for the Agency.

In spite of the degree of unanimity achieved, the reservations entered particularly by India and the Soviet Union presage a lively and spirited conference this September. The present text of the Statute, however, represents a sound and reasonable approach which should command widespread support even from the smaller and less developed countries. The safeguards provisions, while adequate, cannot be considered unduly onerous when viewed in the light of the gravity of the security problem or the benefits to be derived therefrom. Representation on the Board of Governors is equitable and quite generous from the point of view of the less developed areas of the world. With appropriate advance preparation and explanation of the U.S. point of view, there is every reason to expect that the September conference will adopt a Statute substantially similar to the present draft.

In closing this report, I should like to pay tribute to the ability, imagination, and energy displayed by the advisers provided me by the Department of State and the Atomic Energy Commission. I am particularly grateful for the understanding and support which I received at all times from you and Admiral Strauss.

1. Source: Department of State, Atomic Energy Files: Lot 57 D 688, Working Level-Meetings. Confidential. Regarding the working-level meetings held in Washington February 27–April 18, see Document 120. The report was transmitted to the Secretary of State under cover of a letter by Wadsworth, April 26, which briefly summarized the salient issues at the meetings and recommended “the revised Statute as an acceptable basis for continuing negotiations to establish this Agency at an early date.” (Ibid.)
2. Arthur S. Lall.