Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Regulation of Armaments; Atomic Energy, Volume XX

136. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State¹

London, April 25, 1956—3 a.m.

4852. Paris pass USRO. Department pass Peaslee, DOD, USIA; pouch Ottawa. From USDEL Disarmament. Disarmament No. 121. Impromptu discussion of disarmament developed between Khrushchev and Stassen near the end of the large Soviet reception tonight April 24th upon Khrushchev initiative. Present were Khrushchev, Bulganin (intermittently) Gromyko, Troyanovsky interpreting,² Ambassador Hayter³ and two others of UK FonOff, Stassen, Matteson, also Mrs. Gromyko, Mrs. Stassen, Mrs. Hayter, and a few others in and out.

Highlights

1. Repeated opposition expressed to aerial photography.

2. Reiteration of desire to co-exist in peace.

3. Offer of reduction of armaments and manpower without inspection.

4. Suggestion of reducing armed forces in Germany.

5. Doubt stated as to US intentions in disarmament.

6. Favorable regard reiterated for President Eisenhower.

7. Calculation made that time was not ready and subcommittee could not agree.

8. Direction given that Gromyko should talk to the US further.

Responding to invitation Stassen, Gen. Gerhart, Matteson and wives attended general Soviet reception at Claridge’s this evening April 24th. Tremendous crowd was on hand. Ambassador and Madame Malik received. Bulganin and Khrushchev were surrounded by solid mass in main hall. Stassen made no effort to push through to meet them. After about forty minutes in the hall including general conversation with Selwyn Lloyd, Clement Attlee,⁴ Maudling,⁵ Protitch,⁶ Eddie Gilmore,⁷ Gaitskell,⁸ Fedorenko,⁹ Irvin Levine,¹⁰ Mr. and Mrs. Stassen began to leave and met Mr. and Mrs. Gromyko. Following a brief exchange Gromyko asked whether Stassens had met Chairman Bulganin and Mr. Khrushchev. Stassen replied had met them at the summit conference at Geneva. Gromyko said no he meant this evening and upon being given a negative answer Gromyko rejoined, follow me. He led to the approach to a small room off the Claridge lobby, asked the Stassen’s to wait with Mrs. Gromyko, went inside, came back out and took the Stassens in. Chairman Bulganin came across the room to speak to the Stassens and called over Mr. Khrushchev, Bulganin pulled up a chair for Mr. Stassen and Khrushchev immediately launched into a discussion of disarmament beginning with the statement that the Soviet Union was opposed to the aerial photography scheme and felt that the US attitude made the work of the subcommittee hopeless. Stassen began to respond and requested a Scotland Yard man to find and admit Mr. Matteson and General Gerhart. In a few minutes Mr. Matteson was escorted in and sometime later Scotland Yard reported that General Gerhart seemed to have left the reception. During the ensuing discussion Stassen three times stated he did not wish to impose on Mr. Khrushchev’s time and Mr. Khrushchev rejoined that he wished to talk, that the subject was important, and that such occasions for discussions do not arise often.

Khrushchev launched into a vigorous attack on aerial photography. He stated the Soviet Union could not understand why the US insisted upon it. He said it was unacceptable to the Soviet Union and they had refrained from flatly and openly rejecting it only because of their regard for President Eisenhower. He said they had discussed it with Zhukov¹¹ and Zhukov was against it. He said the Soviet Union did not wish photographs of the US or of any other nation and did not see any good reason why the US should insist on photographs of the Soviet Union. Upon Stassen’s thorough explanation of the US view including description that the jet age required rapid inspection and that the vast territories of the Soviet Union and China and of the world as a whole could not be adequately covered by men on foot or in jeeps but that they must have airplanes available for inspection Khrushchev then stated that he could understand the US viewpoint better but that the premise was that the US wanted to know everything, that this was sort of a mania of greatness, that the US should not seek to know everything, that the US should not try to look in everybody’s bedroom and everybody’s garden, that the US should not try to treat the Soviet Union as a rich man treats a pauper, nor in the way that Guatemala had been handled.

Stassen responded that US views on adequate inspection were not based on any such premise, that they were based on the view that a disarmament agreement would be sound only if thoroughly inspected and only if each side could always be confident that the agreement was being respected, that the lessons of history showed that otherwise disarmament agreements became the center of suspicions, doubts and frictions, and did not improve the prospects of peace. Stassen added that he was surprised to hear Mr. Khrushchev give such a characterization of the US approach to the Soviet Union, that the US in fact recognized the Government of the Soviet Union, knew that Russia was a great country, that it had substantial strength and that it followed an economic, social and political system very different than the US but that such recognition of the Soviet Union as a major power was inherent in President Eisenhower’s participation at the Geneva conference, and did not Mr. Khrushchev recognize this fundamental.

Khrushchev said that Stassen had a point in this comment but that perhaps President Eisenhower came to Geneva to size up these men who were running the Soviet Union and to gain an impression of their nature and ability, and that furthermore President Eisenhower was criticized in the US because he went to Geneva; Stassen described the naturalness of criticism of opposition parties and of the free press in the US and contrasted the two systems indicating it would always be difficult for Soviet leaders to understand the US system, that it was a system in which we believed, that it had been and was successful, that it was different in economic, social, political and religious matters. It must be expected there would continue to be a diverse viewpoint, but that it was evident, as President Eisenhower had pointed out, that a war would be very adverse to both systems, to both nations, and to a great portion of the world. Khrushchev said he agreed, that he knew there was only a small percentage of madmen in both countries who think otherwise. Nearly everyone knew that war was unacceptable and that co-existence was elementary. Stassen responded that it appeared to the US to be more a situation of competition rather than coexistence.

Khrushchev opined a criticism of Secretary Dulles’ recent speech.¹²Stassen defended it and explained it and further stated that with our systems so different it should not be expected that Communists would approve of Secretary Dulles’ speeches nor that Americans would approve of Mr. Molotov’s speeches.

Bulganin and Khrushchev both expressed doubt that the US really had any intention of a disarmament agreement. Stassen responded that the President’s statements at Geneva were genuine expressions of US policy and that the President’s March 5 letter conveyed the President’s and the US policy specifically and definitely. Bulganin and Khrushchev both commented again that they had a high regard for President Eisenhower but said they had regarded the March 5 letter as simply a method of avoiding the acceptance of the offer of the friendship treaty.¹³Stassen pointed out that it was the fulfillment of the President’s promise given in October that he would make a more thorough answer. Khrushchev then said they had not yet been able to prepare their reply because they had been so busy with visiting delegations and their own preparations for the UK visit.

Khrushchev then added that their doubt as to US intentions was affected by a number of other incidents. He said that they had had some cooks who wanted to visit the US. But the US had refused visas. He said cooks are only armed with knives and forks and spoons, and could not be harmful to the US. He said a US dealer in seed corn had visited him by the name of Kerst and he had decided to buy the corn but wished to send inspectors to look at it, and their visas had been first refused and then after a delay granted for only two inspectors, so he had said that Russia could get along without the corn, but that he had a very low opinion of this action of the US. He said the West had proposed a figure of 1.5 million armed manpower, and when the USSR accepted it the US changed to 2.5 million. He said the subcommittee seemed to split hairs and avoid agreements. Stassen explained the policies and transactions and reemphasized that the Soviet Union had never accepted the consistent US position regarding essential minimum inspection and that if they would accept this requirement the prospects for a mutually sound agreement would be favorable. Khrushchev reiterated Soviet skepticism that the US would carry out any disarmament agreement, and said the US would even permit Luxembourg to stop such an agreement.

Bulganin said that the USSR is now over thirty years old. It is in the prime of its condition. It is not afraid. He said “I will let you in on a secret. Any American who wants a visa can get it. That is our policy”. Stassen commented that Bulganin and Khrushchev would have to admit that this was a big change for Soviet policy and that they should not be surprised if the US took a little time to analyze just what it meant and to consider US response to such a policy. Khrushchev admitted that this was a big change inside the Soviet [Union].

Khrushchev admitted that what Stassen had told him in 1947 was correct, that the US had not had the depression then predicted by Soviet economists and Western Europe had been rebuilt and had reestablished its trade but he (Khrushchev) remained unwilling to agree that the US system could properly be called a people’s capitalism.

Khrushchev then stated that the time did not seem to be ready for disarmament but that was all right because the Soviet could wait and perhaps later the time would be right. Stassen replied that the US could also wait but it would appear that in the meantime perhaps twenty other nations in addition to the UK, USSR and US would develop nuclear bombs and the dangers to peace would become extreme and the developments would be adverse to the interests of all three—the UK, USSR and the US. Khrushchev said that may be true but what can be done about it.

Stassen said common ground should be reached on disarmament between the positions of the Soviet Union and the US including an intelligent use of aerial survey and a moderate beginning reduction of a nature that could be made without a prerequisite of political settlements. This agreed system should then be expanded to all nations with a significant military potential.

Khrushchev reiterated that until there was confidence the Soviet Union was opposed to aerial photography. Khrushchev then said if the Soviet Union would reduce a million men in its armed forces and reduce armaments correspondingly, would the US make a reduction and if so, how much. Stassen inquired what type of inspection, and Khrushchev said none should be needed, let us simply reduce. Stassen pointed out that if charges were then made in the US that the Soviet Union had not in fact reduced, how could he answer them, and if some of the generals in the Soviet Union said the US had not reduced would this not cause trouble on both sides. Khrushchev said that the Soviet Government would handle its generals. If they did not accept the political decision they would be changed but that he recognized them as problem and some US representatives could come into the Soviet Union to observe the soldiers being sent home. Stassen said this was not adequate, that it was essential that the kind of inspection system be established which would last for future years. Stassen said the US was thinking of the kind of a foundation system which could be applied to other countries and could last for many years and improve the prospects for a durable peace.

Khrushchev said perhaps we could make a beginning by both reducing our armed forces in Germany. He said the Soviet Union is ready to do this. Stassen responded that any agreed reduction of armed forces in Germany would be very difficult unless the German problem was solved with the reunification of Germany in freedom at the same time. Khrushchev reiterated that the Soviet Union was ready to reduce troops in Germany without waiting for a solution of the German problem.

Stassen suggested the beginning of inspection experiments with a demonstration strip and Khrushchev indicated that that might be a good idea but Gromyko interjected that it was not connected with a reduction in arms and Khrushchev added it would then not be desirable. Stassen then stated that he would be following up the disarmament subject with Mr. Gromyko in the ensuing days. Khrushchev agreed this would be desirable but added that he did not think much of the subcommittee procedure and stated that perhaps he should have some further talks. Stassen replied that if in reflection Khrushchev thought of some additional questions he wished to ask, and if it was agreeable with Prime Minister Anthony Eden, Stassen would endeavor to answer such additional questions but that otherwise he would endeavor to further the consideration of the subject by talking to Gromyko.

Khrushchev interjected that perhaps Stassen should visit Ambassador Bohlen and then an occasion for further talks could arise. Stassen responded that he liked Ambassador Bohlen but that he had no plans to visit him. At this point the discussions closed.

Stassen advised the press who crowded around him in the lobby of the hotel that Khrushchev had initiated the talk, that it concerned disarmament, that it was quite a thorough discussion, that he would report it to Washington and he declined to characterize it in any way in response to numerous questions as to whether it was encouraging, discouraging, opening up, closing down, blunt, surprising or revealing.¹⁴

Aldrich

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series, Stassen. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Paris, Bonn, and Moscow. A copy is also in Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/4-2556. Another account of this Stassen–Khrushchev conversation is in telegram 2788 from London, May 14. (Ibid., 330.13/5–1456)
2. Reference is presumably to Oleg Aleksandrovich Troyanovsky, Soviet Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs.
3. Sir William G. Hayter, British Ambassador to the Soviet Union.
4. Leader of the Labour Party in the United Kingdom.
5. Reginald Maudling, Minister of Supply in the United Kingdom.
6. Dragoslav Protitch, Under-Secretary, Department of Political and Security Council Affairs, U.N. Secretariat, and Representative of the Secretary-General at the Subcommittee of the U.N. Disarmament Commission.
7. Eddy L.K. Gilmore, chief of the Moscow bureau of the Associated Press.
8. Hugh T.N. Gaitskell, leader and treasurer of the Labour Party in the United Kingdom.
9. Nikolai Timofeevich Fedorenko, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister.
10. Presumably Irving R. Levine, chief correspondent in Moscow for NBC News.
11. Marshal Georgii Konstantinovich Zhukov, Soviet Minister of Defense.
12. Reference may be to Dulles’ speech at a luncheon meeting of the Associated Press in New York on April 23, in which he discussed recent shifts in Soviet foreign policy and their implications for NATO, printed in Department of State Bulletin, April 30, 1956, pp. 706–710.
13. The Soviet offer of a friendship treaty is contained in Bulganin’s February 1 letter to Eisenhower, printed Ibid., March 26, 1956, pp. 515–518.

14. A note on the source text in the President’s handwriting reads:

    “The whole thing is the Khrushchev line. He began their talk at Geneva—after Bulganin had expressed great interest in aerial inspection. D.E.”