Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, National Security Policy, Volume XIX

147. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, October 14, 1957¹

Washington, October 14, 1957

OTHERS PRESENT

• Secretary McElroy
• General Goodpaster

Mr. McElroy asked if he might feel free to have General Randall attend future sessions, and the President said to do so by all means, if he wished. In further discussion, in which Mr. McElroy mentioned General Randall’s value for continuity and for bringing out the key issues of important questions, the President indicated that he would readily understand if Mr. McElroy, in replacing General Randall, were, as a means of improving attitudes in the Pentagon, to bring in a well-qualified Army man.

Mr. McElroy said that he foresaw the need for sessions on two days on the military budget this year. On the first day, he would plan to bring up major points for the President’s confirmation; on the second, the Secretaries and Chiefs of Staff would be given an opportunity to make known to the President their views concerning any areas in the military budget about which they have particular concern. The President indicated agreement to the proposal, although bringing out that he did not think the technique of telling the Secretaries and the Chiefs of decisions already made was the best one. Mr. McElroy said he would give further thought to this.

Mr. McElroy referred to the $38 billion figure and said he would like not to regard it as a rigid ceiling. The President welcomed this comment, saying that he had never wanted it to be called that. As a matter of fact, he had not wished to establish a figure at all, but had done so on the repeated request of Secretary Wilson. Although he had set it as a judgment as to a proper level, he promptly found that it was being spoken of as a rigid ceiling. In concluding discussion on this point, the President said Mr. McElroy could bring the group in whenever he wished.

Mr. McElroy next spoke about the anti-ICBM. This is now only at the stage of technological feasibility studies. At this point our interest is chiefly in whether it can be achieved, and what kind of money it would cost. He was thinking of organizing this activity in the Department of Defense, rather than in the services and making an early announcement in order to prevent the matter from getting to the point of intense rivalry. He mentioned the name of a Mr. Zeter (?) of Chrysler² as the type of man he had in mind, and thought he might be available. The President said he is willing to go ahead with this type of organization if Mr. McElroy so decides.

The question of the longer range Redstone was then raised. The President said he understood that there had been argument in the Chiefs about that matter. He felt that if the Army could show that it could carry out this range extension at reasonable cost, then they should go ahead, and Mr. McElroy indicated he would take this action now.

Next raising the matter of the Cordiner Report,³ Mr. McElroy said he had an erroneous impression of the President’s position in this matter initially. Now he understood that the President is not opposed to it. The President said that last year he would have approved a general raise throughout government to cover the cost of living, but the proposals were not limited to that. He would have also approved Cordiner provisions pinpointed to key problems of retaining technicians and highly trained junior officers. He felt that action should go forward this year on a wise application of the theory of the Cordiner provisions. In fact, he would like to put it forward as a first order of business in the new Congress.

G

Brigadier General, USA

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Confidential. Drafted by Goodpaster on October 15.
2. Presumably James C. Zeder, director of engineering, Chrysler Corporation, and President, Chrysler Institute of Engineering.
3. See footnote 3, Document 145.