96. Memorandum From the Secretary of State to the Vice President1
SUBJECT
- The Algerian Issue Before the United Nations General Assembly
You may recall my note of May 28, 19572 indicating my wish to confer with you again on the Algerian question when it arose in the General Assembly of the United Nations. The discussions in the [Page 292] First Committee have now begun,3 and I would, therefore, like to advise you of our thinking on this subject as it has developed thus far.
The issue obviously poses a difficult problem in our foreign relations, given the strong feelings of the French on the one hand and of the Afro-Asians on the other. I am frankly doubtful that the United Nations debate even under the most favorable circumstances can make a significant contribution to a practical Algerian settlement. Probably the most we can hope for is that United Nations consideration of the problem will not worsen the situation either by aggravating the sentiments of the French or the North Africans or by pushing them into intractable positions. In any case, it seems probable that a genuine solution of the Algerian problem will have to be found outside the United Nations context.
The French position on the matter, as you know, is that Algeria constitutes an internal French issue and that the United Nations in accordance with the Charter is thus precluded from intervening in such a matter. They have, nevertheless, agreed to set forth their views on the present situation and their basic policies with regard to Algeria. With regard to current developments, the French believe that the military situation in Algeria has greatly improved during the past months, that the Moslem masses are tiring of the rebellion and that continually more Moslems are willing to cooperate with the French in working out a new political solution. The French are adhering to their offer to the Algerian rebels of cease-fire, to be followed by elections and negotiations on a new statute for Algeria. They are unwilling to negotiate with the principal rebel organization, the Front of National Liberation, which they feel is not truly representative of the Algerian people.
In view of the refusal of the rebels to accept the French ceasefire offer, the French have developed a new political program entitled the “Loi-Cadre for Algeria.” Originally defeated under the Bourgés-Maunoury Government, it was passed today with minor amendments. The Loi-Cadre provides for the division of the Algerian departments (exclusive of the Sahara) into approximately six territories along ethnic grounds which will be semi-autonomous units. The Europeans would presumably be in a majority in two of the territories. Each territory will have its own legislature elected on [Page 293] a basis of universal suffrage and a responsible executive. Two years after the setting up of these semi-autonomous territories, an over-all federal government will be established in Algiers, leaving the French Government still responsible for foreign affairs, defense and other such matters. Although it does not appear that the Loi-Cadre is susceptible of creating any significant psychological effect on the Moslem population, at least in the first instance, and it will be difficult to implement, it might conceivably represent a useful step forward in providing for the beginning of a political evolution in Algeria. Probably more important, it may represent an interim measure capable of preparing French public opinion for the more substantial concessions that will be required.
The Front of National Liberation has rejected the Loi-Cadre as a basis for solving the Algerian issue. It continues to insist that it will only enter into negotiations with the French Government after the latter has recognized Algeria’s right to independence. This rebel organization remains confident of final victory and wishes to emerge from the rebellion as the principal political party in Algeria. It is, moreover, understandably inhibited from making concessions, while the Moslem adherents are being urged to fight for the sake of Algerian independence.
Tunisia and Morocco are naturally sympathetic to the FLN and are accordingly supporting it. Concerned, however, by the repercussions of the present conflict in their own countries, Bourguiba and the King of Morocco would prefer an early negotiated settlement between the FLN and French, and to this end have proposed their good offices. We believe this is a meritorious initiative and that the Moroccans and Tunisians may eventually be able to play a useful role in this connection. It seems most unlikely, however, in view of the tenuous Parliamentary situation, that the French could accept such mediation at this juncture. Premier Gaillard has in fact rejected it. United Nations insistence on such a formula, moreover, might prevent the eventual fruition of such a proposal. French opinion appears to be moving gradually in favor of a negotiated settlement and this trend may be accelerated by current financial difficulties. It is important that the efforts in this sense of liberal French elements not be jeopardized by a nationalistic outcry over United Nations action.
We believe our own objectives in connection with Algeria at the present United Nations General Assembly session should be: (1) to discourage statements or actions which might adversely affect progress toward a substantive Algerian settlement, and (2) to avoid any impairment of United States relations with the parties principally concerned. The latter may be rather difficult to achieve. Our relations with France, as you know, have already been [Page 294] strained by our delivery of arms to Tunisia, and we might be running grave risks if we took a position directly antagonistic to the French during the Algerian debate. The fact that this debate is taking place on the eve of the NATO meeting, of course, intensified our concern. At the same time, we are naturally anxious to maintain friendly relations with Tunisia and Morocco and the other states of Africa and Asia.
We see our basic role as one of moderation. So far, no specific resolutions on the Algerian question have been introduced in the United Nations General Assembly. The United States position with respect to individual proposals will have to be developed in light of their particular contents and also in light of the practical alternatives available in New York. I anticipate there will be considerable consultation and negotiation with respect to various proposals, and that the final form of proposed resolutions, as well as our own final position thereon, will only emerge as a consequence of this process.
The French have expressed the hope that the Algerian debate can be concluded without the necessity of voting on any resolutions at all, as was the case in the Syrian item. This procedure might also be desirable in terms of our own interests. However, I think it may be too optimistic to expect this kind of result. The next best alternative, as we see it, would be the adoption of a resolution acceptable to the principally interested parties on both sides, and we intend to use our own influence to encourage the development of such a resolution. If no mutually acceptable formula can be worked out, then we may have to make a difficult choice among the proposals advanced by the contending parties.
I would appreciate any ideas or views you may have on this subject.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/11–2957. Confidential. Drafted by Looram and transmitted to the Secretary by Elbrick on November 29.↩
- Following a meeting of the National Security Council on May 2, Vice President Nixon informed Robert Cutler that he would like the NSC to take up the position the United States would adopt in the United Nations on the Algerian issue prior to the next U.N. debate. (Memorandum from Cutler to Dulles, May 7; ibid., 751S.00/5–2457) Dulles wrote Nixon on May 28 that he would talk to him before instructing the delegation at the General Assembly, but he did not consider it useful for the NSC to take up the issue “at this time”. (Ibid.)↩
- The Algerian question was inscribed on the General Assembly agenda and referred to the First Committee on September 20. That body considered the issue between November 27 and December 6.↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.↩