Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Africa, Volume XVIII

78. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France¹

Washington, November 27, 1956.

2024. Paris 2508.² Agree you should at first appropriate opportunity make démarche re Algeria. It would seem preferable that démarche be made Mollet, although recognize that with Pineau’s return Paris this may not be feasible. You should speak along following lines:

1. Reiterate our desire be as helpful as feasible in UN debate;

2. As we have already said, we will cooperate with French efforts get Algerian item postponed to latter half GA session. French will of course have to take initiative on this, although press of other items may automatically delay consideration Algeria;

3. While fully realizing that Algerian crisis is not susceptible of easy solution and that Mollet is confronted with very difficult Parliamentary situation this connection, we fear that in absence new concrete and far-reaching French plans that can obtain Algerian, as well as Moroccan and Tunisian, acceptance, debate will be rough and outcome uncertain irrespective US action;

4. US position not yet formulated (Paris 2486).³ It will only be formulated prior UN debate when we know French plans and in light international developments at that time. Difficult predict what stand we would take as much depends on course of debate and type of resolutions presented, including position and tactics adopted by French. We would, however, expect exercise a moderating influence;

5. It seems to US that irrespective UN debate which may go badly despite French efforts new French policy towards Algeria now essential in effort improve French relations Tunisia and Morocco and restore stability North African region which is so important US, French and NATO security;

6. US fully recognizes that despite our interest North African stability decision on Algeria must be French one and US not desiring or in position give advice or comment re specifics French program. As Mollet must know we have always leaned over backwards in not intervening in Algerian issue which would seem frankly however no nearer settlement than it did at outset rebellion. It is still not our intention pressure French into taking steps which they may not believe to be wise but we believe it important try peaceful political approach to problem and hope French will view matter in same light.

FYI Dept concurs that especially in light French requests from several quarters for our views on Algerian issue in connection UN debate, discreet and high level démarche on US part might be useful in contributing to bring about difficult decisions by French Govt re Algeria which Govt appears inclined put off as long as possible. At same time we must avoid any attempt by French Govt get US identified with any specific new French plan. US Govt can obviously not give blank check for support for new French Govt policy which may turn out to be meaningless and unrealizable formula. Accordingly we wish to avoid giving impression we attempting advise French re basic Algerian policies at this time in order avoid possibility US being used shoulder responsibility vis-à-vis French cabinet, Parliament or public opinion for unpopular steps French Govt may have to take to get out of present Algerian impasse. In light information presently available here, it frankly seems doubtful that any new French proposal short of negotiations with FLN on basis firm commitment complete autonomy Algeria now with possibility eventual independence would resolve Algerian crisis or improve French relations Morocco and Tunisia. End FYI.

Dept concurs with line you took with Joxe (Paris 2543).⁴ We assume you do not consider that this conversation has overtaken your recommendation for démarche and in fact it would seem confirm desirability of approach to Mollet providing of course no new Govt plans formulated by cabinet in meantime.

Re Pineau’s idea for Algerian elections with UN observers (New York Delga 175,⁵ repeated info Paris 1992), difficult judge whether such proposal would markedly influence Algerian situation or what Moroccan and Tunisian reactions would be, much less Afro-Asian bloc. It is not clear to us how elections could be held under present climate terrorism or what prospects there are for obtaining cease fire prior substantive negotiations with FLN. Accordingly endeavor avoid comment this idea on basis lack of information makes it difficult for us judge how effective any such specific French plan may be.

Hoover

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/11–2156. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Algiers, Rabat, Tunis, and USUN. The time of transmission is not legible.
2. Supra.
3. Telegram 2486, November 20, reported that when Robert Felix, the local representative of Lacoste, approached the Embassy to learn the U.S. position, he was told that it had not yet been formulated. Lacoste was said to favor a delay in the debate, though he tended increasingly to believe that significant reforms should precede the debate. (Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/11–2056)
4. Telegram 2543, November 22, reported Joxe’s concern that the Algerian problem would damage French-U.S. relations. Dillon responded that one difficulty was the apparent French retreat from their intention to institute reforms prior to the U.N. debate. Joxe affirmed his agreement that such a course would be preferable and held out hope that this might yet be the case. (ibid., 751S.00/11–2256)
5. Not printed. (ibid., 783A.56/11–2356) Lodge endorsed the idea as well as the démarche suggested by Dillon, but he disapproved of any advance commitment to support the French who had failed to produce acceptable proposals. (Delga 195, November 26; Ibid., 751S.00/11–2656)