Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Africa, Volume XVIII

64. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, November 1, 1955—1 p.m.

Delga 190. Re Algeria, Delga 184, October 31.² Alphand telephoned me at 11 a.m. today to say that, after reflection, he had decided to put off the operation in the Plenary session under Rule 22 for eight days.

He urged me to use my influence with Guatemala and Bolivia, in addition to Iceland, Ethiopia and Liberia. He said with a laugh that we have powerful arguments of a very practical character with both Guatemala and Bolivia which we could use if we wanted to. I said that I did not know what they were, but none of these countries were satellites, as the record amply proved.

FYI: I feel that sooner or later—and preferably sooner, we must make it clear to Alphand as we must to everyone, that while the US is powerful, it is not all-powerful and we cannot work miracles. End FYI.

I asked him who was going to be his floor manager, which had the advantage of at least making it clear that I was not going to be. He said it is someone I knew very well and who would be in touch with me later on during the day. When I expressed some surprise at this extreme secrecy, he said that the man who would be in touch with me later in the day would be President Maza.³

I pointed out that on October 15 I had discussed with President Maza the possibility of moving under Rule 22 and he had voiced strong objections to it at that time on the grounds that it would start an acrimonious colonial debate.⁴ Alphand replied that that was all different now and that Maza was strongly in favor of it. That, of course, still does not take care of the question of who is to be the floor manager, a matter of critical importance to the success of such an undertaking.

FYI: This whole conversation inspires no confidence whatever. It is perfectly clear that the French are maintaining an impossible attitude of wanting to get a result achieved without lifting a finger to do it, which never works in any department of life. It is perfectly clear that he has not done his homework, that the texts of motions have not been drafted, that speakers have not been lined up, and that none of the essential practical steps have been taken. Nor is there sound basis for hope that they ever will be.

In all this there is one thing which the US should avoid, by every means within its power, and that is to become the so-called muscle man who is required to lead a strong fight in defense of French colonialism. I have now agreed to speak to Iceland, Liberia, Ethiopia, Guatemala and Bolivia. I will also make a brief statement in the Plenary. I feel that I have agreed to enough and that I should not be required to agree to anything more. I very much fear that Pinay will ask Secretary Dulles to direct me to organize a big fight in defense of French colonialism. I cannot find words to express how strongly I feel that this would be most harmful to the American position throughout the whole non-white world.

I took advantage of Alphand’s call to give him the gist of Gadel 75.⁵

Lodge

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/11–155. Secret. Repeated to Paris.
2. Delga 184 reported Alphand’s opposition to a motion to adjourn since that would signify General Assembly competence to deal with the Algerian matter. He preferred that the issue be taken up in plenary under Rule 22 of the Rules of Procedure whereby a majority vote of those present and voting could delete it from the agenda. Alphand claimed to have Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld’s support. Alphand also asked Lodge to seek the support of Bolivia, Iceland, Liberia, and Ethiopia and indicated that France would be willing, in return for a favorable vote, to support the Philippines for a seat on the Security Council. (Ibid., 751S.00/10–3155)
3. José Maza of Chile, President of the General Assembly, called on Lodge on November 2 and revealed that Francisco Urrutia of Colombia had agreed to act as floor manager. (Delga 201, November 2; ibid., 751S.00/11–255)
4. Reported in Delga 104, October 1. (Ibid., 320/10–1555)
5. Gadel 75, November 1, warned of the consequences if the French moved prematurely and suffered another reversal. Though the timing was up to the French, Hoover wished France to be informed of U.s. trepidations. (Ibid., 751S.00/10–3155)