60. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State1
1522. At my request I was received this morning by Pinay. When I arrived I found Alphand in his office and Pinay said that as the conversation would probably cover the UN2 he had asked Alphand to be present.
At the beginning of our conversation the atmosphere was one of heightened dignity and restraint stemming from badly hurt feelings. I asked Pinay what in his view could be done to restore the situation and his first attitude was that France had no suggestions to make and that this was a question for the UN to decide itself.
Pinay then said that as he had always been extremely frank with me he felt he must tell me that the support which he had received from the US had not been what he would have expected or hoped for. He said that it was a sharp contrast to the support which he had received from Spaak, and in contrast to the British position which he termed entirely satisfactory. As the conversation developed it became clear that this feeling of Pinay’s arose from two separate sources. In the first place he said that he did not consider Lodge’s speech had been as forceful as it could have been and that the American Delegation had not made any visible attempt to work on other delegations on France’s behalf. Alphand interjected that Lodge [Page 223] had only arrived a few minutes before the meeting from Washington and apparently had not felt it necessary or advisable to be available for consultations with other delegations prior to the vote.
In this connection Pinay further specified that he felt the US could well have influenced the votes of such countries as Guatemala, Costa Rica and Liberia. I pointed out that contrary to what seemed to be the general impression that the US could control the Latin American bloc, such was not actually the case, that there had always been a great deal of independent action among the Latin American nations. Pinay said that he recognized this in some cases but he nevertheless reiterated he thought we could have influenced the vote of the three nations which he previously mentioned, as well as Uruguay and Iceland.
The second main reason for Pinay’s hurt feelings toward the US was that he had not received any word from the Secretary or any other American representative after the vote. He pointed out that in contrast to this Macmillan had immediately called him and assured him of full British support for his action and he had also received similar expressions of support from practically all the smaller countries of Europe. This feeling on his part that he had been neglected by the US in his moment of trouble obviously was of equal importance in his mind to the supposed inadequate efforts by the American Delegation prior to the actual vote.
By this time as a result of a few minutes conversation, the atmosphere had changed considerably and became much more relaxed. I asked whether it would be any help if the GA should decide to reverse the vote on Algeria. Pinay made it very clear that this was the solution which the French desire and is the only solution which they will accept, while at the same time emphasizing they are asking for nothing and would ask for nothing. He said that an adjournment sine die of the debate would be totally unsatisfactory as the French felt that what was at stake was not the question of their actions in Algeria but the basic principle of whether or not the UN was competent to meddle in the internal affairs of any and all countries. He said that it was obviously the policy of the Soviets to stir up trouble throughout the world by maintaining this principle and felt that unless the Western powers reacted to this Soviet move the unity and vigor of the UN would be permanently lost to an alliance of the Bandung and Soviet blocs. He said that if this philosophy was accepted no country would be safe and cited as instances of questions that might be raised the situation of the Negroes in the southern part of the US, the situation in Northern Ireland, the division of Belgium between Walloons and Flemish, etc.
[Page 224]In passing he said that Macmillan had felt that this vote was a very dangerous precedent for Great Britain in connection with Northern Ireland.
I then asked whether there was any parliamentary method by which the situation could be retrieved and Alphand answered very promptly that if the commission to which the subject was referred so desired, it could declare itself incompetent to handle the matter and refer it back to the GA for action, at which time it would be possible for the GA again, if it so desired, to reverse its previous vote and decide that Algeria was not a proper subject for debate. Pinay was in full accord with this thesis and this obviously is the French hope.
Pinay then commented that he felt that public opinion in France had reacted with great dignity and pride and that this action had helped to unite the French people and had opened their eyes to the hollowness of the Soviet pretensions of friendship. He said there was extreme bitterness in the French Government towards the Soviets and that he had spoken very severely to Anikine, the Soviet Chargé d’Affaires, when he announced the indefinite postponement of the French visit to Moscow.
In response to a discreet question on my part regarding Alphand’s status, Pinay said that he was presently on vacation in Paris. I asked if that might last for several weeks and Alphand mumbled “probably not that long”, to which Pinay made no response. Alphand then said that if there should be any necessity of calling a meeting of the Security Council this month he, as President, would of course return, and Pinay confirmed this.
In closing Pinay said that he felt that the French had rung the tocsin of alarm over the tendency of the UN to interfere in the internal affairs of all countries for the purpose of stirring up trouble that could redound only to the benefit of the Soviet bloc, and he hoped that the warning would be heard and understood. He said his personal feeling was that the US had not fully recognized the dangers inherent in the fusion of the Bandung and Soviet blocs, which he considered the gravest threat to the stability of the world.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/10–455. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London and USUN.↩
- On September 30, the General Assembly voted 28 to 27, with 5 abstentions, to place “The question of Algeria” on the agenda. Lodge spoke in support of the General Committee’s report, which recommended against inscription. For text of his comments and the roll call, see U.N. doc. A/PV.530, September 30, 1955, pp. 187 and 196.↩