Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Africa, Volume XVIII

319. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Embassy in South Africa (Maddox) to the Ambassador (Byroade)¹

Pretoria, July 19, 1957.

SUBJECT

• Conversation on U.S.-South African Relations with Dr. W.C. Naude,² Undersecretary for External Affairs

OCCASIONS

• (1) On July 17, in Dr. Naude’s office, in the course of a courtesy call to introduce Drs. Campbell and Karis³ of the Embassy staff, and Dr. Baum⁴ of the Department of State

The following points of possible interest emerged from our conversation on the first of the two indicated occasions.

(a) On the subject of the United Nations, Naude expressed regret that South Africa’s position, especially with respect to “domestic issues,” was not better understood in the United States. He wondered how we would feel if the positions were reversed. I pointed out that we were generally disposed not to oppose the insertion for open discussion of an item on the agenda if it had international interest, even if we thought the UN had no powers with respect thereto. He admitted that, but thought that if the U.S. Government acquiesced in the discussion of, say, U.S. race relations, there would be a terrific hue and cry in the country (U.S.) generally. Dr. Campbell suggested that U.S. delegations had tried to steer a middle course on South African questions; if, for instance, we came out positively in support of South Africa, there would be public criticism within the U.S., and South Africa might become an issue in U.S. domestic politics, which would not be good.

I expressed the personal view that the U.S. Government would like to be helpful in getting South African delegations back into the UN, and wondered whether something could be worked out. Would South Africa, for instance, be willing to make some gesture, say, in regard to the South West Africa issue? We both recalled the negotiations of several years ago which came to nought. Would it be worth while to get our heads together informally on the South West question and see if we could come up with a solution which might be acceptable to our respective Governments. Naude seemed to like the idea and said he would like to talk about it again.

(b) Naude referred to the criticisms of South African racial policies in the United States, mentioning Mrs. Bolton⁵ among others. He understood why Afro-Asiatic delegations in the UN struck out at his country but why did the United States have to do so? We in the West had to stand together. I remarked that Americans wanted to be friendly but, while trying to understand and to be sympathetic, certain things like some of the recent legislation just rubbed the wrong way. I then suggested, half jokingly, that maybe a year ago we should have talked of a two-way moratorium; a moratorium on discriminatory native legislation, in return for a moratorium on discussions in the United Nations. Naude replied in respect to the legislation, “What you call pin-pricking”.

Just before our departure, Naude referred to the esteem in which South Africans held the United States and emphasized his point by a story to the effect that once when (I don’t know how recently) a senior External Affairs official wanted a decision on something we had requested, all the Cabinet Ministers were out of town. The official managed to locate one in the Free State and started to explain the matter over the phone. The Minister, he said, cut him off with, “Don’t bother to explain. If the United States wants it, that’s enough. We’ll go along with it.”

In the evening discussion referred to, Naude again raised the subject of U.S.-South African relations, stressing what he said was the unfortunate impression created among South Africans by American criticism and lack of American understanding. He then represented (very well, I thought) the orthodox historical and teleological justification for apartheid. I suggested that while there was much to be said for the strict, vertical, territorial theory of apartheid, it had very little to do with current realities of policy and practice. The Tomlinson Report,⁶ which was an effort to blueprint territorial apartheid, seemed to have little chance of being implemented, and, even so, it still left 6 million non-Europeans in white areas in the year 2000. Another External Affairs officer present referred to the different social ratios in South Africa and the United States—the problems were utterly different. I mentioned that before coming to South Africa I had been in the British West Indies where the ratio was not 5 to 1 against the whites, but 10 to 1, and in some cases 20 to 1. And yet a mutual adjustment was being made, without any serious threat to Western civilization, the white community, and, except in rare cases, to “racial purity”. Along with the other American officers present, I spoke of “human dignity”, the desirability of establishing a different “direction” of policy, (but no one expected full equality or complete abolition of segregation) the need to grant concessions to win over the educated leaders, etc.

While our remarks were friendly, but critical, Naude seemed a little taken back. At one point he said, “If this is the way the American Embassy feels, then I can imagine the kind of report you send back to Washington.” And then, reverting to the theme of the importance of friendly relations between our two countries, he asked, “What is your Government trying to do down here? What does it want from us, what does it expect us to do?” My reply, ducking the question, was something to this effect, “Alright, let us forget about moral questions, who is right and who is wrong. As Americans, we realize the importance of western civilization, and of White leadership and control, remaining in South Africa. We sympathize with you in your problems and we want to remain friends. At the same time, we have a stake in your stability and in the spread of repercussions to other parts of Africa. To put it simply, we disagree that the measures you are taking will lead to a healthy social order. To some of us, they seem to spell trouble—and that would not be in our interest.”

And then, he asked, “Have you put this to any of the Ministers this way?” I said that to some extent we had. (I might have added we hoped to do more.)

On departure, Naude’s last remark was, “Now if your Government really had to choose between South Africa and India, which would it be?” My only reply was that I hoped we wouldn’t have to make a choice.

William P. Maddox

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 111.45A/7–2557. Confidential. Enclosure to despatch 24 from Pretoria, July 25.
2. Willem Christiana Naudé was the senior official in the South African Department of External Affairs.
3. Waldemar B. Campbell and Thomas G. Karis had recently been assigned to Pretoria as Second Secretaries.
4. Robert D. Baum, chief of the African branch of the Division of Research for Near East, South Asia, and Africa.
5. Representative Frances P. Bolton was the ranking minority member of the Subcommittee on the Near East and Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives. She had recently led a Special Study Mission to Africa. (House Report No. 307, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1957)
6. See footnote 4, Document 10.