307. Despatch From the Embassy in South Africa to the Department of State1
REF
- Embassy Cape Town Despatch No. 2, January 27, 19562
SUBJECT
- Assessment of Developments in South Africa, January-August, 1956
[Here follow sections 1–9, on such subjects as political parties, economic conditions, and Foreign Relations.]
10. United States Policy
During the recent visit of the Foreign Service Inspectors to the Embassy, they indicated that they intend to recommend that a new United States policy paper be drawn up in Washington for South Africa. Our present general policy guidance, which I have attempted to follow, is:
- (1)
- to obtain the Union’s cooperation in the supply of uranium and other strategic minerals and metals needed by the United States;
- (2)
- to encourage the Union to remain in the Commonwealth and on the side of the Western nations; and
- (3)
- to encourage the Union insofar as possible to moderate its policies.
The question which confronts us is how best to implement these policies in the overall interests of the United States.
On the first point I feel that little needs to be done since we have been receiving very good cooperation in the uranium program and our procurement of strategic items is in the best interests of both countries. This situation would probably continue under either the Nationalists or an alternative Government. It is also my impression that South African uranium is no longer of vital importance to the U.S. program, owing to the improvement in supplies from other sources.
On the second point, again there is little which actively can be done except to emphasize in personal contacts and conversations the [Page 792] benefits of membership in the British Commonwealth and our feeling that South Africa can play a more important role in world affairs by being a member of the organization. We can also take advantage of the Union’s fear of the U.S.S.R. to encourage continued membership in the Commonwealth by emphasizing its role and that of NATO as a bulwark against Communism. I have not talked with any responsible Government leaders who envisage the Union’s leaving the Commonwealth, although all of them anticipate the eventual establishment of a republic. I assume we cannot quarrel with their decision to establish a republic so long as it remains in the Commonwealth, is friendly to the United States, and is firmly anti-Communist.
On the third point I do feel that we might take a more active role in encouraging a policy of moderation. I think we have made the United States’ position clear in our attitude opposing colonialism, discrimination and Color legislation. The Afrikaner people are singularly stubborn and determined and so far they have not been deterred from any actions by the unfavorable reactions overseas. They feel so strongly on the question of non-interference in domestic affairs that they have not retreated an inch under pressure by the United Nations. Therefore I am led to the conclusion that the only change we can bring about will be by the slow process of education and encouragement to the more broadminded elements. In this regard I think the exchange of persons program is a most important and useful project, and I should like to recommend that it be enlarged. As I stated above, there has been increasing evidence of a slightly more liberal attitude among some Afrikaners, particularly within the leadership of the Dutch Reformed Churches. This group could have considerably more influence in the future, particularly if we could change the attitude of all the top DRC leaders. Sooner or later I feel the Dutch Reformed Church will be forced by its conscience and its religious tenets to break with the present policies of the Nationalist Government. I feel we should concentrate on the Dutch Reformed Church because of its influence with the Government leaders and because it has more White members than all other churches combined. We might consider doubling or tripling the number of DRC ministers given travel grants to the United States. Obviously, however, we cannot afford to leave other church groups out of consideration, for otherwise our effort would be too pointed. If we go forward with the proposed cultural agreement with the South African Government there might be provided additional revenue of $20,000–$25,000 a year from the Union to be used for cultural exchange. A second group among which we might do more is the Native and non-European, although I recognize the difficulties in the light of the policies of the present Government. Our primary [Page 793] interest is to orient the non-Europeans toward and make them friendly to the United States. We cannot afford to let the attitude prevail that we have no interest in them and the only friend from whom they can seek comfort is the Soviet Union. If arrangements can be made with the Union Government, we might therefore consider the advisability of travel grants to bring some non-Europeans to the United States. We might also seek approval from the Union Government which would permit us closer contacts with non-Europeans and enable us to place more USIA printed materials in their hands. A start on this has been made recently by arranging for several thousand anti-Communist booklets to be given the Natives through the Department of Native Affairs. Any mass program directed to the non-Europeans must have the consent of the Union Government; otherwise it would be counter-productive and our present contacts with the non-Europeans could be disrupted or terminated.
As I indicated in my referenced despatch, I see no prospect of success in a policy of pressure or coercion to cause the Union to modify its policies. I am, however, not unduly pessimistic about this country’s future. I believe that we can have some influence by exercising reason and persuasion and that an integrated society is bound to evolve here in the long run. I am reinforced in this belief by my feeling that South Africa cannot continue to stand alone in its racial policies and eventually it will be influenced by the situation in the rest of Africa and in the world. This will take many years, however, and undoubtedly there will be much friction before that time.
With the exception of certain differences of view in respect to ways and means of bringing into power a more moderate and enlightened government, as referred to on page 14, the foregoing generally reflects the composite view of the officers at this post. The work of drafting has been shared, with the major part having been written by Mr. William L. Wight, Jr. Other officers who made substantial contributions were Mr. W.P. Maddox, Counselor of Embassy; Mr. L.M. Smith, Agricultural Attaché; Mr. Sydney L.W. Mellen, First Secretary; …. Factual data we believe to be correct, but the conclusions drawn I wish to have considered as solely my responsibility as time may well show that I have badly missed the mark.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 745A.00/8–656. Secret. Also sent to Johannesburg, Cape Town, Durban, Port Elizabeth, Luanda, Lourenco Marques, Leopoldville, Salisbury, and Nairobi.↩
- Despatch 2 reported progress on the primary objectives of U.S. policy as outlined by President Eisenhower to Ambassador Wailes. These objectives were (1) increase the production and shipment of uranium; (2) keep the Union within the Commonwealth and an active member of the Western nations; and (3) counsel and influence the South Africans to follow a policy of moderation. (Ibid., 745A.00/1–2756)↩