Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Africa, Volume XVIII

298. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia¹

Washington, November 26, 1957—6:42 p.m.

380. Following is for your guidance on arms for Tunisia.

(1) You should be prepared discourage any move on part of GOT which would result in reopening this explosive question (publicly or otherwise) prior to December 15 NATO meeting. Bourguiba must be fully cognizant serious strains to which Franco–US and Franco–UK relations subjected as result token delivery and threat not only to success forthcoming NATO meeting, but to future strength and effectiveness NATO inherent in failure resolve present US–UK differences with France on this problem. Since principle has now been established in dramatic fashion that GOT has access to US–UK arms if needed, it is also to interest GOT that French tempers be allowed to cool. You can reassure him that no formal consultations re fulfillment Tunisia’s arms requirements will be undertaken without participation GOT and that we would prefer any such discussions be deferred until after NATO meeting. We stand firmly on principle Tunisia entitled have her legitimate arms requirements met by West and present problem is one of tactics and timing.

(2) Department’s position on consultations visualized Pineau Washington talks (Deptel 368 to Tunis)² will be developed in light Bourguiba’s reaction on returning from Morocco and results current Macmillan–Gaillard talks.³ In general, our ideas coincide with those now held by UK, i.e., any consultations should be informal, secret, centered Tunis and provide appropriate Tunisian participation.

(3) Department thoroughly agrees we should not involve ourselves in reaching judgment independent of Tunisian wishes re size armed forces or amounts and types equipment Tunisia requires for legitimate internal security purposes. Would it be possible, nevertheless, for current ICA Police Survey to include estimate as to size Army required to supplement police and National Guard in internal security role? …

(4) FYI. Information and recommendations contained Tunis tel 527⁴ (with which assume USOM agrees) are very convincing and every effort will be made work out procedures for meeting first and second phase police requirements. Even though it might prove possible we would not in line paragraph 1 above visualize any deliveries pending resumption US–UK–Tunisian–French consultations on entire internal security and arms requirements problem following December NATO meeting. End FYI.

(5) You will have noted from Deptel 369⁵ that French have asked for serial numbers rifles included token delivery and that US Army has no record these numbers. We agree Tunis tel 525⁶ Tunisian reaction would be extremely adverse were we to accede to French request and if you think desirable you may reveal request and our negative response adding that for Bourguiba’s own protection, would be desirable for GOT maintain accurate record serial numbers all weapons received from US and UK. If you believe it can be done in context our desire protect GOT against false charges diversion these weapons to Algeria you might also ask for copy of records.

(6) Would appreciate any current information on size, composition, means and date delivery symbolic Egyptian arms shipment.

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 772.56/11–2657. Secret. Repeated to Paris, London, Rome, Madrid, and Algiers.
2. Telegram 368, November 21, contained a summary of the November 19 Pineau-Dulles conversation. (Ibid., 772.56/11–2157)
3. As indicated in telegram 2707 from Paris, November 26, when Gaillard met with Macmillan on November 25 he sought concessions which would help his government survive when the Loi-Cadre came before the Assembly for a second time. Specifically, he wanted Macmillan to acknowledge that he had been mistaken in providing arms to Tunisia and to pledge not to do so again. Macmillan, however, was only willing to agree to consult with France to avoid similar difficulties. (Ibid., 641.51/11–2657)
4. In telegram 527, November 23, Ambassador Jones commented on the preliminary report of the U.S. Police Survey Mission which had been in Tunisia since mid-October. The report pointed out serious deficiencies in small arms and communications and transportation gear which jeopardized Tunisia’s ability to maintain internal security. An immediate grant of $139,000 was recommended with a subsequent program worth $661,000 to follow. (Ibid., 772.5/11–2357) Ambassador Houghton anticipated no problem in regard to jeeps and landrovers, but in telegram 2679, November 25, offered the opinion that even 100 carbines might generate a French protest. He called for a delay or, at the least, urged that prior French concurrence be secured. (Ibid., 772.56/11–2557)
5. Not printed. (Ibid., 772.56/11–2057)
6. Telegram 525, November 22, conveyed Ambassador Jones’ opinion, with which British Ambassador concurred, that the French should not be given the numbers. (Ibid., 772.56/11–2257)