287. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France1
1812. Please deliver following from President to Prime Minister:
“November 13, 1957. My dear Mr. Prime Minister:
I received late yesterday your message2 with respect to the furnishing of arms to Tunisia for its defensive purposes. I cannot at this time deal with all aspects of your message as I am leaving this noon for Oklahoma and the matter permits of no delay.
Secretary Dulles in his message to Foreign Minister Pineau of November 11 reviewed the history of this matter. He recalled our position that Tunisia as an independent nation was entitled to arms for security and defensive purposes and that, in order that Tunisia might not have to turn to dangerous sources to fill its needs in this respect, the US had pledged itself last September to see to it that Tunisia obtained a limited supply of small arms for defensive purposes in the near future. We had hoped that the Tunisian Government would be able to get them from the French Government as a normal source of supply.
About mid-October we had told President Bourguiba that if he could not get arms from France or elsewhere in Western Europe we would get him some by the first of November. The UK associated itself with this position. Your Government was informed accordingly.
On October 18 the French Ambassador urged that we should delay until there should be established a new French government and indicated that he personally felt that a first act of any such government would be promptly to arrange to deliver arms to Tunisia.
As the result of subsequent effort we obtained the agreement of President Bourguiba further to postpone the date of our delivery from November 1 to November 12. Your Government was informed of this on November 4.3
In reply to the Secretary of State’s message of November 11 we received word that your Government would itself be prepared to deliver to the Government of Tunisia arms on November 12 if we did not do so.
Accordingly on November 12 the Secretary of State informed your Government and the Government of Tunisia that it would suspend the delivery of arms on that day and understood that the Government of the UK would probably do likewise on the understanding so far as the US was concerned that the French Government would itself that day be delivering to Tunisia ‘an equivalent in arms and ammunition’ to that which had been planned by the US and the UK with no conditions other than that the arms would be [Page 751] for defensive purposes and not transferred elsewhere. It would be further understood that this initial transaction would not of itself solve the basic problem but that Tunisia would remain entitled to get further arms, preferably from France but if not elsewhere from a Western country and that the US would supply them if need be.
Our Ambassador in Paris communicated this message to Foreign Minister Pineau and understood that the terms under which we would suspend delivery were acceptable and that the French Government would itself make the equivalent delivery yesterday November 12.
I must point out that the Secretary’s message above referred to was sent prior to my receipt of your message of November 12 and that there is a variance between the terms of your message to me and the Secretary’s message to Foreign Minister Pineau which we understood to be acceptable to your Government. One notable difference is that you state that …. While we appreciate the traditional concern of France in the area of North Africa and while we hope that in fact France would continue to be a normal source of supply of Tunisia we could not agree that Tunisia, as an independent country, should feel constrained to accept any one country as a sole supplier of arms and thus in effect make its own defense and security requirements a subject for determination by another country and not of its own government. This, in our opinion, would be incompatible with genuine independence.
I do not at the time of writing this message to you, Mr. Prime Minister, know what may have transpired today but I greatly hope that arrangements have been concluded on the basis of what we thought was the understanding with Foreign Minister Pineau of yesterday. If unhappily this proves not to be the case then we feel in honor bound to carry out our engagement to the Government of Tunisia and will plan to make delivery to them tomorrow morning November 14, Tunisia time, of the token delivery of arms which had been planned.
I have naturally taken most serious note of your suggestions with reference to the possible impact of this action upon the enactment of the Loi-cadre for Algeria and also upon the position of the French Government in relation to the projected meeting of the NATO Heads of Government. I would assume that if the Loi-cadre is voted upon that vote will be determined by the judgment of the French Parliament upon the merits of the matter and upon whether or not it is judged that this law will in fact promote a just and peaceful settlement of the Algerian problem. As far as the NATO meeting is concerned I most earnestly hope that there will prevail the atmosphere of friendly cooperation without which the meeting would indeed be of doubtful value. If there should unhappily subsist any differences between us that would be an occasion for you and me to talk them over in an atmosphere of friendship and of earnest search for that mutual understanding which has so long characterized the relations between our two countries.
Sincerely, Dwight D. Eisenhower.”
Confirm time and date of delivery.4
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 772.56/11–1357. Secret; Niact; Presidential Handling. Drafted and approved by Dulles. Repeated to London and Tunis.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 284.↩
- See footnote 5, Document 275.↩
- Although by the time this message arrived the French had already responded negatively, the decision was made after consultation with Washington to deliver it in the hope the French might be induced to change their course. It was handed to Gaillard’s Chef de Cabinet at 11:50 p.m. (Despatch 1069; Department of State, Central Files, 772.56/12–3057)↩