247. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Palmer) to the Ambassador in Tunisia (Jones)1
Dear Lewis : I just wanted to let you know what we all agree here that you took the right line with Ladgham on November 27 (your telegram 267)2 regarding economic and technical aid. Without in any way giving the appearance of prior clearance with the French or that we are unmindful of Tunisian sensitivity to French financial pressures, I feel it most important to discourage illusions on the part of the Tunisians with respect to levels of economic assistance and numbers of technicians the U.S. would have available. This is very much in accord with the line we have been taking here.
With regard to military aid, we must, at least for the time being, discourage requests from the Tunisians. As NSC 5614, paragraph 213 (of which you should now have a copy) makes clear, we should try to avoid getting mixed up in this matter except as a last resort and [Page 659] in fact should seek to maintain France’s responsibilities on this field as far as we can. It seems obvious that the success or failure of Franco-Tunisian military cooperation will ultimately be determined by their ability to reach an accommodation on the whole range of their relationship. This will not be easy in itself and will, of course, be greatly complicated if the Tunisians gain the impression that we are willing to provide easy alternatives for them.
We would be interested in knowing what other “multinational arrangements” you think Bourguiba or Ladgham may have in mind as a solution to the Bizerte problem. There has been in the past some rather casual talk in the Department about the possibility of a Western-Mediterranean grouping which might include France, as well as Spain, Morocco and Tunisia, and thus get around the difficulties which the prospect of NATO membership of the last three would probably create for certain members of the club, particularly the Northern European countries (and, I presume, also for Morocco and Tunisia themselves). This thinking has never crystallized, and I am not myself convinced of the wisdom much less the practicability, of a “pact solution” to the problems of Western political and military relationships with North Africa. However, we welcome all ideas and if you have any idea as to what the Tunisians might have in mind, we would be much interested.
With kindest personal wishes, I am,
Sincerely yours,
- Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 58 D 545, Tunis–1956. Secret; Official–Informal. Drafted by Bovey.↩
- In telegram 267, November 28, Jones reported on his conversation of November 27 with Vice Premier (then Acting Premier) Bahi Ladgham. Ladgham suggested, as his personal opinion, that U.S. aid should be made available when France was unable or unwilling to contribute to a project. He also revealed his desire for U.S. military assistance to supply an army of 5,000 (later 10,000) men. Tunisia was willing to contribute to collective defense, but not exclusively through arrangements with France. Jones reminded him that U.S. assistance could only be modest and not enough to replace the French. (Ibid., Central Files, 772.5–MSP/11–2856)↩
- Not printed. (Ibid., S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5614 Series) NSC 5614/1 is Document 36.↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩