230. Despatch From the Consulate at Mogadiscio to the Department of State1

No. 60

SUBJECT

  • Visit of Ambassador Bliss

Ambassador Bliss and party arrived Mogadiscio on October 9, in the plane of the Naval Attaché at Cairo, and departed on October 11. In the course of the stay, Ambassador Bliss made calls on Ambassador Anzilotti, Aden Abdullah, President of the Legislative Assembly, and Abdullahi Issa, Prime Minister. He met, at lunch given by me, Hagi Farah, Minister of Economic Affairs and, at dinner given by me, Aden Abdullah and Abdullahi Issa.

1. Ambassador Anzilotti

Ambassador Anzilotti offered little of interest in his hour-long conversation with Ambassador Bliss. The border negotiations were discussed, but no new information offered. Mr. Anzilotti observed that they should be ending just about this time, with no results. He also observed that it is difficult, in view of the impending 1958 elections, for the Somali Government to agree to any proposals which might be used to embarrass them politically within Somalia. Asked about the probable outcome of the 1958 elections, Mr. Anzilotti said that it is still a little early to make predictions but that he did not expect any great change, unless there should come a split in the SYL. He said that such a split is possible but that he rather expects that it will be avoided and, if it is avoided, that the SYL should probably emerge again as the majority party, although perhaps with a smaller majority.

2. Hagi Farah

At the lunch with Hagi Farah were present also Dr. Gasbarri2 and W.E. Corfitzen, ICA Representative.

Of greatest interest here were Dr. Gasbarri’s defense of the future of the banana industry and Hagi Farah’s interest in construction of a port at Chisimaio. The two are related. It was Dr. Gasbarri’s contention that there exists a good chance of reducing the cost of Somali bananas to the competitive world level provided [Page 618] production is shifted to the lower Giuba and a port is constructed at Chisimaio. Dr. Gasbarri also argued that the European Common Market will help Somali bananas, since it will exclude from Europe Somalia’s keenest competitors, namely, Spain and the Canaries, and Brazil. Hagi Farah intimated that he is planning to raise the question of U.S. financing for the Chisimaio port scheme when he visits the United States this fall.

3. Prime Minister and Aden Abdullah

As expected, these two gentlemen were interested mainly in four subjects, Ethiopia’s aims on Somalia, the Ethiopian-Somali border, U.S. aid to Somalia and U.S. arms for Somalia.

Federation with Ethiopia. Ambassador Bliss introduced this subject, referring to Somali fears of Ethiopia and of U.S. support for Ethiopian aims.3 The Ambassador stated that the Somalis need have no fear of U.S. intentions, that we are not backing federation with Ethiopia but are supporting, as we have already shown in many ways, a free and independent Somalia. This statement was received with much gratification by both men.

Ambassador Bliss continued to the effect that U.S. hopes are for mutually satisfactory relations between Ethiopia and Somalia, so that these countries together can work out their common problems.

Greater Somalia. Ambassador Bliss asked about Greater Somalia. The two men asserted that this is a concept which Somalis and a Somali State will always have in mind but the Prime Minister repeated his standard observation on this theme, to the effect that Somalia will never try to achieve a greater Somalia except by “legal, peaceful” means. It was observed by the writer that “legal, peaceful” means would probably never succeed in detaching the Somali occupied areas from Ethiopia and that Somali persistence in claiming those areas might be a significant factor in provoking Ethiopia to make gestures toward Somalia. The Prime Minister agreed but said again that Somalia could never abandon its claim to those areas. He added that, as a practical matter, however, Somali thinking for the near future was concentrated upon the British Protectorate and he said that he expected success in that aspiration. The writer asked if Somali thinking on this subject encompassed the idea of Commonwealth membership and if such membership was under consideration. [Page 619] To this Aden Abdullah replied, “No, not at all.” The Prime Minister was not so outspoken in his denial, saying that Commonwealth membership would not be accepted as the price of union.

Somali-Ethiopian Border. Both men expressed dismay at the failure of the border negotiations and the Ambassador observed that the U.S. firmly supports the view that the border should be settled prior to independence. The two Somalis indicated their agreement, but expressed doubt that any conclusion could be reached in bilateral negotiations. They indicated that Somalia would like, as has been indicated before, to see the matter go to mediation in accordance with the UN resolution.

The writer observed that current Mogadiscio rumor credits to the Somali Government a preparedness to accept the existing provisional line as permanent but adds that the Government is unwilling, for internal political reasons, to do this in bilateral negotiations (Consulate despatch 56, October 94). The Prime Minister agreed that internal political factors did complicate the Somali position on the border but denied that the Government had ever expressed a willingness to accept the existing provisional line. He said that the Somalis were keeping the idea of greater Somalia separate from that of establishing a border and that they did not expect to achieve control of the Somali areas of Ethiopia by way of border negotiations. He added that the Somalis did hope, however, for something approaching the 1934 boundaries.

There was then discussion of the border crossing problem, with everyone agreeing that, wherever the border was fixed, it would probably still divide Somali tribes, so that border crossing arrangements would be of great importance.

U.S. Aid to Somalia. On the question of aid, both men observed that they were hoping for much from the U.S. Ambassador Bliss explained the difficulties which stand in the way of the United States’ making advance commitments but he referred to the increasing U.S. interest in Africa and to the existing program of U.S. technical assistance in Somalia. The writer observed that, although we cannot make advance commitments, the existence and steady growth of the U.S. program here should be assurance of our continuing interest.

Aid and Premature Independence. The Prime Minister observed that, with regard to foreign aid, the Somali Government is becoming increasingly anxious, particularly since it understands that Italy plans from now until 1960 to cut back steadily the level of its aid to Somalia. Under these circumstances, he said, the Somali Government [Page 620] is very eager to come in touch with other nations, and particularly the U.S., and, in order to do so, it is planning to ask for its independence in January 1959. Ambassador Bliss said that the United States hoped that Somalia would not anticipate independence because we believed that Somalia would profit by having the full period in which to develop its technicians and to assimilate techniques of government. The Prime Minister observed that a difference of two years would make very little difference and that, to the Somali Government, it seemed more important to have control of its own foreign affairs, so that it could deal directly with foreign nations for aid and, perhaps, arms. Aden Abdullah added that if the United States or someone would increase its aid in this trusteeship period to take up the increasing slack being left by Italy, it might be possible for Somalia to wait until 1960 but that otherwise he, too, believed that independence in 1959 would probably be in Somalia’s best interest. (Writer’s Note: So far as I can establish, the reduction in Italian aid referred to by the Prime Minister is only the normal and expected “phasing out” of Italian civil servants in Somalia.)

Arms Aid to Somalia. Aden Abdullah referred to U.S. military aid to Ethiopia and asked if anything could be done for Somalia. Ambassador Bliss explained at some length that the American arms agreement with Ethiopia stipulates clearly that these arms shall be used for internal security only and not for foreign adventuring. There was then some discussion of the type of arms aid which the Somalis had in mind. This discussion did not produce any real clarification and it seemed that the Somalis have not yet thought through their requirements. The possibility of an ICA police training program was raised and the Somalis expressed interest.

Somali-Ethiopian Relations. On this subject, Ambassador Bliss, speaking generally, said that the United States hoped that Somalia and Ethiopia would make every effort to understand one another’s point of view and to work toward an amicable settlement of any differences. The invitation of the Ethiopian Government to Aden Abdullah and Abdullahi Issa was then mentioned. Abdullahi Issa said that this invitation had been accepted in principle but that no date had been set. He added that he doubted very much whether it would be possible to go before February. Both of them seemed most reluctant to undertake the visit and Aden Abdullah observed that it might be a touchy project to undertake in an election year. “Besides,” he added, “What will we talk about once we get there? We can’t handle our own foreign relations.”

[Page 621]

Comment

It is considered that the Ambassador’s visit and these conversations were well worthwhile. The two Somali leaders were particularly gratified to hear that the U.S. is not supporting federation with Ethiopia. The Ambassador’s statements putting U.S. military aid to Ethiopia in its proper perspective were also most useful.

On the Somali side, of greatest significance were the statements about seeking independence in January 1959 and the inquiry about arms and/or police aid. The statement about early independence is the most unambiguous one I have yet heard from a leading Somali. It is also the first reference to arms from either the Prime Minister or the President.

On the border, I believe that the Prime Minister was being less than frank when he denied Somali willingness to accept the present provisional line as a permanent one. The report of this willingness has come from several sources and seems to me to be reasonably reliable.

John B. McGrath
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 123–Bliss, Don C., Jr. Confidential. Passed to Rome and London. The Ambassador’s account of his visit is in despatch 151 from Addis Ababa, October 28. (Ibid., 121.752/10–2857)
  2. Dr. Luigi Gasbarri, President of Somalia’s Economic Development Agency.
  3. In despatch 49 from Mogadiscio, September 18, McGrath reported rumors of U.S. support of federation with Ethiopia. He urged that a prominent U.S. official indicate that the United States desired a free and independent Somalia. (Department of State, Central Files, 777.00/9–1857) The Department replied that, since U.S. support for Somali independence was a matter of public record, U.S. interest would be better served in private discussions. (Telegram 37 to Mogadiscio, September 27; ibid., 123–Bliss, Don C, Jr.)
  4. In despatch 56, McGrath indicated one of the sources of this report was Ambassador Anzilotti. (Ibid., 675.773/10–957)