Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Africa, Volume XVIII

216. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco¹

Washington, October 17, 1957—4:59 p.m.

368. Joint State-Defense Message. Rabat’s 267² and 271.³

1. Department and Defense appreciate your efforts encourage Moroccans deal more concretely with base negotiations and believe we should endeavor make such progress as we can prior King’s visit. We are not certain however that present more forthcoming Moroccan attitude represents more than temporary acquiescence to US pressure designed evoke information re aid level for FY 58 and incidentally draw us out on question of “framework”, both questions on which their own ideas seem largely undeveloped.

2. It seems clear that base negotiations unlikely be sufficiently advanced by time King’s visit to permit conclusion any formal, definitive agreement. Additionally as indicated earlier messages⁴ we concerned at situation developing during course of King’s visit where we shall be subjected considerable pressures for economic assistance under conditions in which insufficient progress made on base negotiations to give us something concrete in return with respect future tenure. We wish avoid situation in which King might wish utilize Washington visit to launch some premature plan for multilateral area pact for which we unprepared. However we view visit as opportunity agree broad principles which can be basis subsequent completion detailed negotiations.

3. In light foregoing circumstances desire on urgent basis your views re advisability your seeking early audience with King in which you would make following points:

a. We have been greatly interested in indications we have received in course base negotiations that Moroccans wish examine possibility fitting new arrangements re US bases (as well as French and Spanish forces) into some kind of multilateral framework.

b. As GOM knows US has many different types of agreements in various parts world covering status our forces and use of facilities on behalf free world. In some cases we have resorted bilateral agreements with countries concerned. In others there has been sufficient regional identity of interests to permit common cooperative defense undertakings among a group of states. Either or both could contribute to free world defense.

c. We are examining closely possibility multilateral framework in North African-Mediterranean area and we retain completely open mind re possibility multilateral cooperative effort within which US-Moroccan cooperation re US bases might be brought. King may have views re difficulties in securing effective area defense cooperation so long as divisive Algerian struggle continues and US also recognizes this likely have serious adverse effects on possibility West Mediterranean Pact.

d. As GOM knows we strongly hope this major obstacle to area peace and stability can be overcome. Meanwhile there would appear to be no reason why bilateral arrangements could not be worked out which could be adapted to a multilateral framework at a later date if necessary and desirable.

e. It may well be HM has thoughts on subject which have not occurred to us and which in his view make area defense cooperation immediately possible despite difficulties we foresee. If so we would welcome them and wish give them most careful consideration.

f. In any event it now appears improbable any definitive agreement can be reached on base matters in time for HM’s visit and question arises what if anything should be said this subject during course King’s visit. As HM knows, US ready and anxious reach mutually satisfactory agreement with Morocco re this matter. Possibility occurs to us US and Morocco might during course of visit find it mutually advantageous declare joint determination achieve detailed long-term agreement re continued US use bases in interests free world defense. Such declaration might usefully contain statement that pending conclusion formal agreement, US and GOM will continue cooperate to facilitate normal military operations and conduct such cooperative effort on basis friendly relations existing between two Governments.

4. We would also hope foregoing approach would draw King out on scope of consideration he desires be given to framework question while in US. Without discouraging King, if he desires broach it while Washington, believe you should point out dangers involved in possibility of leak before advanced diplomatic preparation with other countries, and absence of discussion with US Congressional leaders, etc.

5. Dept, Defense and ICA appreciate that such discussion may also require frankness in treatment of economic aid matters. Believed here that strains in Morocco likely increase greatly within coming year unless French-Moroccan relations take turn for better which unlikely if Algerian conflict continues. Our principal concern is maintain present moderate pro-Western outlook of King and Government by aiding them cope with rising internal social and political pressures, and thus protect our strategic interests. Limitations on our ability aid them, arising from reduced budgets however are known to Embassy. Given the scale of Moroccan needs and extent of our interests there however Dept and ICA doing utmost provide maximum help within limitations referred to above. We would prefer avoid saying anything to Moroccans on this subject as yet but, if conversation during audience makes this unavoidable, and if reaction to presentation bases problem appears to warrant, Ambassador would be authorized to indicate we prepared a) provide $20 million defense support for Morocco subject satisfactory arrangements with GOM regarding uses and compliance US legislation (this is maximum available this source in view total appropriation less than administration’s request and world-wide demand far in excess availabilities), b) work with GOM in developing TC program, c) consider PL 480 sales program at level to be determined based on justification Moroccan request (Embtel 221)⁵ according to established criteria, d) Morocco also eligible to submit projects to Development Loan Fund. You should emphasize need for coming up with suitable projects soonest, and e) in addition, expect continue assistance voluntary agency relief programs under Title III, PL 480, as well as fulfill commitment deliver 50,000 tons wheat under Title II by March 1958.⁶

6. Department and ICA realize DS level substantially less than FY 58 aid proposed by Embassy and USOM. Earmarking full amount DS contained illustrative program presented Congress despite reduction appropriations reflects Washington recognition importance defense support to base negotiations. (FYI only. Any additional economic aid would have to be provided from approximately $100 million special economic aid reserve set aside for meeting worldwide contingencies for which many requirements already exist.) End FYI.

7. We hope that aid matters in general can be handled so as to give us some leeway in dealing with Moroccan pressures during King’s visit, and, subject Embassy and USOM comments, believe we should make every effort avoid discussing figures before visit.

8. In field of military assistance which is even more delicate than usual because of current Tunisian pressures, Department most desirous not get involved and for Moroccans continue to look to French. We of course bearing in mind comments Embtel 232.⁷

9. Your reply urgently needed.⁸

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.56371/9–1557. Secret. Repeated to Paris, CINCNELM, London, and CINCUSAFE, Wiesbaden; and by pouch to Tunis and Tripoli; sent to Paris to be passed to USCINCEUR and Knight. Drafted by Porter and cleared with ICA, E, RA, WE, AF, U/MSA, S/P, L/SFP, and the Department of Defense.
2. In telegram 267, September 13, Cannon indicated that he had discussed the principal outstanding problems dividing Morocco and the United States with Balafrej on September 12. (Ibid., 711.56371/9–1357)
3. Telegram 271, September 15, noted that an understanding had been reached on September 12 with Balafrej’s assistant, Mohammed Boucetta, to resume negotiations on the framework issue and technical provisions. (Ibid., 711.56371/9–1557)
4. As, for example, telegram 181, August 28. (Ibid., 711.56371/8–1057)
5. Telegram 221, September 4, reported that Morocco officially had requested $46 million in P.L. 480 assistance for fiscal year 1958. (Ibid., 411.7141/9–457)
6. Title II of P.L. 480 is “Famine Relief and Other Assistance”; Title III is “General Provisions”. (68 Stat. 454)
7. Telegram 232, September 6, reported that Morocco had previously stressed economic aid and the framework issue more than military assistance. (Department of State, Central Files, 700.5/9–657)
8. Telegram 380 from Rabat, October 19, responded that, except for the economic section, the Ambassador had already taken up all the subjects raised in telegram 368 with Balafrej on October 15. (Ibid., 711.56371/10–1957)