Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Africa, Volume XVIII

18. Memorandum of a Conversation, Mid-Ocean Club Conference Room, Bermuda, March 23, 1957, 10:30 a.m.¹

USDel/MC/8

Bermuda, March 23, 1957, 10:30 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • The Secretary
  • Sen. George
  • Amb. Whitney
  • Mr. Quarles
  • Mr. Murphy
  • Mr. Rountree
  • Mr. Elbrick
  • Mr. Hagerty
  • Gen. Goodpaster
  • Mr. Macomber
  • Mr. Phleger
  • Mr. Wilkins
• United Kingdom
  • Mr. Selwyn Lloyd
  • Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar
  • Mr. P.H. Dean
  • Mr. Harold Beeley
  • Sir Harold Caccia

SUBJECTS

• 1. Communist Influence in Africa
• 2. Baghdad Pact
• 3. Tripartite Declaration of 1950
• 4. Question of Arms Supply to the Near East—Resolutions of the General Assembly
• 5. Agreed Positions, including Guarantees re Pipelines, Palestine, Suez, Oil Study, Aqaba and Libya
• 6. Germany
• 7. Communiqué

1. Communist Influence in Africa. Selwyn Lloyd referred to the paper entitled “Communist Influence in Africa”² and noted that the United Kingdom and the United States had reached an agreed position. He said he thought this subject was important because he believed that the battle for the next ten years would lie on the continent of Africa. He also said that recent Communist activities in Africa had rather taken the UK by surprise.

The Secretary said that we were in agreement with the UK regarding the importance of Africa and observed that we would be in serious trouble if Africa were lost to the Free World. As evidence of the importance which we attached to the future of Africa, the Department of State had recently requested the American Congress to create a separate Bureau of African Affairs, to be headed by an Assistant Secretary.³ We also were somewhat concerned regarding recent Communist activities in Africa and, to take a concrete case, we were a little disturbed to note a report that the new state of Ghana planned to establish diplomatic relations with the USSR, including a mission and staff. This development would, of course, provide the Soviet Union with a perfect opportunity to move into the West Coast of Africa. The Secretary asked Selwyn Lloyd if there was any way in which the establishment of diplomatic relations between Ghana and the Soviet Union could be stopped.

… British information indicated that when this matter had arisen for consideration within the Government of Ghana, there had been a sharp division on the subject, and that it was not as yet quite certain that a decision had been reached to establish diplomatic relations.

Selwyn Lloyd, in response to the Secretary’s statement re the establishment of a separate American Bureau of African Affairs, commented that in England they had three government departments handling British foreign affairs. These were the British Foreign Office, the British Colonial Office, and the Commonwealth Relations Office. It was therefore necessary for Selwyn Lloyd to express his views with care.

Selwyn Lloyd said that the UK considered it important maintain friendly relations with Ethiopia. The UK was endeavoring to reconcile the Ethiopians and the Somalis. If an independent state of Somalia should be created it would be weak and would probably fall under the influence of Egypt. A weak Somalia would be unfortunate because of the strategic importance of that area.

The Secretary said that when he had last seen the Ethiopian Foreign Minister⁴ in London, the latter had expressed apprehension that the UK was trying to slice off a part of Ethiopia.

Selwyn Lloyd said that the British Foreign Office had recently given detailed examination to this question. They felt that first priority should be given to bringing about a reconciliation between the Ethiopians and the Somalis. … Selwyn Lloyd also observed that Italian control of Italian Somaliland was scheduled to end in 1960 and that the UK had urged Italy to make arrangements to remain.

The Secretary said that he thought the terminal date of 1960 for Italian Somaliland would be impractical. He added that the United States had tried to be forthcoming in its assistance programs in this area.

Selwyn Lloyd referred to the West Coast of Africa and said that steady progress was being made toward independent states [status?]. Nigeria would follow the model of Ghana. Three racial groups⁵ were involved in Nigeria which complicated the problem. On the East Coast of Africa a different situation existed because of the mixed communities there which made it desirable to move more slowly. He noted that white elements in the Central African Federation were anxious for independence, whereas black elements in Nyasaland were not so interested. If independence were pushed it might have dangerous effects and be detrimental to the interests of South Africa and Rhodesia. He said that no constitutional review would arise before 1960 and hoped that colored elements would not be encouraged to press for swifter action. He said that Uganda was important because it contained the head waters of the Nile.

Selwyn Lloyd said he was interested to learn the Department planned a new Bureau of African Affairs and that the UK would work closely with it.

Selwyn Lloyd concluded that he thought the African paper on which agreement had already been reached between the United States and United Kingdom fully summarized the present situation in Africa.

The Secretary said that he wished to make a few additional comments. The UK should not feel that the United States was exerting pressure on various areas of Africa which would result in premature independence. If at any time the British thought that we were making statements or taking steps which would have this result, he hoped he could be informed. The Secretary said that he thought that there should be an evolutionary trend toward independence but that attainment of it should be qualified by the ability of the people of an area to sustain the responsibility. As the President had said, we hoped that in some cases these countries would not want to become independent and would retain their relationships with the mother countries. In some cases it was possible that independence might be followed by a Communist takeover. Relationships between the United States and the Philippines which had terminated in Philippine independence had required a period of 50 years. They had recently lost a great leader in Magsaysay⁶ but seemed to be handling this tragic development in a responsible way. The Secretary said that he realized there was a tendency among some groups in the United States to advocate the principle of independence and to press for its immediate application. He thought that this approach to such questions might cause unnecessary activity among some of the peoples of Africa and might raise false hopes among them. The United States for its part did not wish to embarrass the United Kingdom or other countries who had relations with the countries of Africa, but there were steps taken by some which were beyond our control and we could not prevent. We were aware that a grant of independence under present conditions was an important move because it would undoubtedly be followed by Communist efforts to take over the new country. Stalin’s statements on nationality problems clearly indicated his technique of amalgamating all dependent areas by breaking them loose from the countries with which they were associated and thereafter amalgamating them within the Soviet Union.

Selwyn Lloyd said that in Africa we should not seem to be at cross purposes as perhaps had been the case in the Middle East. He noted that one of the Nigerian leaders had told him that all Africans had followed the course of British action in Ghana carefully and had been much impressed that the British had carried out their promises of independence …. All Nigerians know this and … confidence in the British to carry through on their promises has increased. Selwyn Lloyd concluded that if the US and UK would work together there would be an opportunity of keeping the Communists out of Africa.

[Here follows discussion of items 2 through 7.]

1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 861, Bermuda 1957 Memos of Con. (MP). Secret. Drafted by Wilkins on March 25.
2. BEMD–5/la, March 13, was approved in whole by NEA and BNA and in substance by EE. (Ibid., CF 856, Bermuda Meetings—Briefing and Position Papers, Volume II)
3. Congressional approval was delayed and the Bureau was not established until August 1958.
4. Ato Akilou Abte Wold.
5. Reference is probably to the Ibo of the Eastern Region, the Yoruba of the Western Region, and the Hausa and Fulani of the Northern Region.
6. President RamÓn Magsaysay died in a plane crash on March 17.