Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Africa, Volume XVIII

175. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Libya ¹

Washington , October 5, 1957—3:08 p.m.

276. Tripoli 193,² 195, 197 and 203.³

FYI. 1. Department fully concurs in emphasis in reftels re importance acting vigorously to assure continued pro-Western orientation Libyan Government. We also concur Embassy’s estimate re dangers inherent in Libyan situation as result British retrenchment plans at time when Egyptian and Soviet intentions in area are becoming increasingly aggressive.

2. It was precisely in anticipation foregoing circumstances that Executive Branch of Government earlier this year reviewed on urgent basis US policy toward Libya. Resulting action by NSC,⁴ of which you informed, provides far-reaching guidance and authority calculated we believe to achieve our objectives.

3. In accordance this authority, Department:

a. Authorized Embassy last May to inform GOL that we prepared review with GOL economic and financial situation created by UK cutback plans and to consider Libya’s needs for assistance (Deptel 769):⁵

b. Embassy recently authorized inform GOL that US expediting equipment promised for 1000 men and is prepared assume responsibility training Libyan Army and discuss GOL army equipment needs.⁶

4. Department sure Embassy appreciates that within constitutional and budgetary limitations under which USG operates, foregoing constitutes far-reaching and flexible grant of authority. We are not yet aware that Embassy has yet found occasion to make use of this authority. Nor, indeed, do reports from Tripoli and London indicate precise extent to which Libyans have been informed of UK decisions. End FYI.

5. Department has always assumed that coordination of UK and US approaches to Libyans could best be undertaken by US and UK Ambassadors Tripoli. Thus, we were under impression that at such time as UK decisions re reduction subsidy to Libya were communicated to GOL, US Ambassador would immediately reassure Libyan Government in sense Deptel 769, as was done (Tripoli’s 744),⁷ and would, when possible, follow up with discussions with Libyans re their FY 59 financial situation. Military assistance would similarly be handled along lines Deptel 230.⁸

6. In light foregoing, Embassy London should request FonOff concurrence in US and UK Ambassadors jointly preparing plan of coordinated action based on authorities available to them in order assure readjustments US and UK responsibilities in Libya are presented to Libyan Government in manner which will (a) best assure Libya’s continued pro-Western orientation; (b) minimize possibility Libyans playing US and UK off against one another and (c) minimize financial burdens on both US and UK.

7. We believe foregoing also largely answers preoccupation reiterated London’s 2187⁹ insofar as Libya concerned. Embassy London should also reiterate to FonOff reasons why US cannot constitutionally commit itself at this time re future level of aid to Libya. FYI. We have repeatedly made this clear in course of numerous conversations with British and, in fact, have adduced it as major reason why in interests continuity it would be desirable for British continue meet Libyan deficit. End FYI. London should also reassure FonOff that we will, of course, do everything possible keep Libya oriented free world but that we cannot admit this as unilateral US responsibility and we continue look to British to share this vital task with us to maximum extent possible.¹⁰

Department hopes that it will be possible US and UK Ambassadors Tripoli submit proposed joint plan of action by October 15. If in meanwhile US Ambassador feels it desirable at any time make use of authority referred to in two numbered paragraphs above, he should feel free to do so.

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 773.5–MSP/9–2157. Secret. Repeated to London.
2. Telegram 193, September 21, reported that the West could not afford the psychological effect that Libyan adherence to the Moscow–Cairo axis or Nasser-style neutralism would have on the Arab world generally and particularly the oil-rich states. Tappin urged the necessity of a coordinated U.S.-British position to thwart the Soviets. (Ibid.)
3. Regarding telegrams 195 and 197, see footnotes 2 and 3 to telegram 203, supra .
4. Reference is to Document 173.
5. Document 171.
6. Telegram 272 to Tripoli, October 4, authorized the Embassy to inform the Libyans that every effort would be made to ensure delivery of the equipment and uniforms by December 1. (Department of State, Central Files, 773.56/10–357)
7. Telegram 744, May 9, summarized Tappin’s discussion with the King. The question of U.K. withdrawal was not raised. Bin Halim subsequently raised the issue, however, and remarked on the need to separate the issues of reduced subsidies and troop levels. Tappin informed him that the United States would be undertaking a financial and economic review of the situation. (Ibid., 611.73/5–957)
8. Telegram 230 to Tripoli, September 19, instructed Tappin to undertake an approach to the Libyans who would be told that the United States had learned of British intentions and was aware of the problems they posed. He was further to state that past U.S. commitments would be honored and that the United States was prepared to assume the responsibility of training the Libyan army and to consider equipment needs. The situation had been complicated by the delayed signing of the MAAG Agreement, which came too late to use the $1,575,000 programmed for 1957 thus making it necessary to wait for the 1958 appropriations. (Ibid., 773.5/9–357)
9. Telegram 2187 from London, October 1, called for an immediate and coordinated U.S.-U.K. response to the Soviet attempt to become more involved in Libyan affairs. Great Britain seemed to feel that the United States should assume a heavier financial burden. (Ibid., 670.00/10–157)
10. In telegram 2307 from London, October 8, the Embassy reported that the British had presented details of the troop withdrawal to the Libyans on September 6, but awaited further discussions of the subsidy issue with the United States before taking up that question with Libya. The Libyans wanted a response by late October. The British still insisted that £1.25 million annually was all the assistance they could afford and hoped the United States would assume the deficit. (Ibid., 773.5–MSP/10–857)