Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Africa, Volume XVIII

154. Telegram From the Embassy in Libya to the Department of State¹

Tripoli, February 7, 1956—2 p.m.

400. Further to Embtel 399,² I must emphasize that viewed from here hinge of Deptel 304 is “assumption some reasonableness on part of Libya.” Issue clearly set forth paragraphs 2 and 4 reference telegram has been emphatically and repeatedly presented to Ben Halim by me in terms that leave no room for doubt concerning US position. Basic questions therefore are:

(1) What is Ben Halim’s true intent?

(2) To what extent is his hand being forced by his Ministers and Parliament?

(3) To what extent is he using “opposition” as bargaining device increase amount US aid?

(4) To what extent is threat to deal with Soviets his own tactic?

(5) To what extent are his Ministers and Parliament threatening force him deal with Soviets?

(6) Does Ben Halim enjoy full support of King in contemplating deal with Russians or is King unaware extent dangerous flirtation already in process?

(7) To what extent is King in process voluntarily abdicating much of his power to central executive?

In seeking answers above questions, following background must be kept in mind:

(1) Ben Halim in connivance with Egyptians brought about establishment diplomatic relations with Soviets concealing plans from friendly allies and planting with King transparent and invalid justifications. There no justification for Libyan-Soviet diplomatic relations beyond Soviet desire penetrate North Africa and Libyan willingness strengthen bargaining position even by dangerous move.

(2) Ben Halim maneuvered King into ridiculous marriage with Egyptian, using necessity for male heir as subterfuge. Given King’s inclination towards monogamy, warm 25-year relationship between King and Queen Fatima, aging record of Queen Alya it clear that Egyptian-inspired maneuver was purely political attempt compromise King’s position. King may or may not now recognize this fact. (In any event, he has ignored Alya for many months, leaving her contrary all Arab customs in Tripoli while he resides in Tobruk with Fatima.)

(3) Essential nature recent throne council law construed by qualified observers here as clear indication King prepared see Libya abandon constitutional monarchy upon his death.

(4) All diplomatic mission chiefs here with whom I can talk confidentially are convinced that Ben Halim especially since recent elections is bloated with power and possessed of insatiable appetite.

It is my personal evaluation that we are dealing in Ben Halim with something close to “split personality”, dangerously intelligent, opportunistic, young, shrewd and ambitious both for political power and personal gain. … Yet when he states his conviction that Libyan long-range future should be tied to west, particularly to US, and begs as “champion of US position in Libya” (with considerable justification) for augmented dollar assistance as measure of “sympathetic consideration” for essential Libyan economic developmental needs, he is most persuasive. Thus it appears to me absolutely essential that we force his hand by participating in international effort survey Libya’s true economic development requirements as described in closing paragraphs Embtel 381.³

In fact, before receipt Deptel 304, Ben Halim had already proceeded with establishment informal “working party” including representatives GOL, LPDSA,⁴UNO, LARC and Embassy.⁵ Stated purpose this survey is obtain on urgent basis more accurate documentation and validation in “balance-sheet” form Libya’s true economic development difficulties than currently available, for exposure all her friends. There is no real or implied commitment that US will close gap. It is solely long-needed realistic appraisal. Will of course take precaution to personally brief US representatives to make clear our “no commitment” position.

Real gains this process would be following:

(1) Get away from politically-conceived and unsubstantiable “five year plans” and loose bargaining figures picked from air like recent $5 million request; or

(2) “Corner” Prime Minister by forcing him submit Libya’s developmental requirements to realistic review by international “working party”;

(3) Put on paper for first time balance sheet Libya’s needs in terms her absorptive capacity;

(4) Bring into being set of figures which will reveal how many of Libya’s demands are economically demonstrable and how many are purely politically motivated;

(5) Force Prime Minister accept set of specific figures as true basis for discussion with own government and with US of Libya’s needs, in order emerge from the present unhealthy situation in which we are in effect being told that we must for political reasons give Libya in economic assistance an amount greater than an unknown amount which the Soviets are willing to offer.

(6) Provide concrete basis for possible subsequent discussion with King specifically concerning Prime Minister’s attitude toward US assistance offers in terms demonstrable Libyan needs and demonstrable US assistance.

If working party finds (as is distinctly possible) that Libya’s true current developmental needs are in fact being met by contributions from several friendly foreign sources, we will have spiked Ben Halim’s gun or given him ammunition with which to repel assaults from his Cabinet and Parliament. If on other hand working party finds that reasonable developmental needs are greater than total current outside assistance, Libya’s Western Allies would at least have in hand vital measure of vulnerability to Soviet offers, regardless of whether or not we were able or willing close gap.

Tappin

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 773.5–MSP/2–756. Secret. Repeated to London, Paris, and Benghazi.
2. Telegram 399, February 7, expressed Tappin’s agreement with the instructions contained in telegram 304, supra. (Department of State, Central Files, 773.5–MSP/2–756)
3. See footnote 5, supra.
4. The Libyan Public Development and Stabilization Agency was created in 1952 to supervise programs financed by British funds.
5. Telegram 410, February 11, noted that Bin Halim had set up a working group of U.S., U.N., and Libyan officials which met for the first time on February 7. The latter indicated their requirements through 1961 came to $118 million, of which $76 million remained to be secured. (Department of State, Central Files, 773.5–MSP/2–1156)