Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Africa, Volume XVIII

141. Memorandum of a Conversation Between President Tubman and the Ambassador in Liberia (Jones), Cape Palmas, April 7, 1956¹

Cape Palmas, April 7, 1956

SUBJECT

• Liberian Relations—USSR and Red China

The President met Ambassador Jones at the latter’s request at his home in Cape Palmas, April 7, 1956, 12:00 noon to 1:15 p.m.

Four subjects were discussed: 1) Red China’s admission to IPU; 2) Liberia’s reaction to the proposal of Red China to establish diplomatic relations;² 3) Liberia’s reaction to the Soviet invitations for the President, Vice-President and Speaker of the House of Representatives to visit Moscow this year;³ and 4) the hiring of Filipino engineers for the road program in Liberia. They were discussed in the following order:

Introductory remarks included comments on the success of the American athletes in Liberia among which Ambassador thanked President for his letter to the athletes; regrets of

Mr. G. Allen that he was unable to come here March 29, but said that he intended coming;⁴ and presented President with Congressional Record containing Mrs. Bolton’s⁵ remarks on the President’s speech of March 8 which was included in the Record. The President expressed his appreciation for Mr. Allen’s wishes to visit Liberia and Mrs. Bolton’s comments.

1. Red China’s Admission to IPU: The Ambassador went over the U.S. position, i.e., a) Red China not in UN which has refused former admission to General Assembly or any of its affiliated agencies, b) Red China using every means possible to break solid stand against entrance through lower organs of UN, c) this question for Liberia related to establishment diplomatic relations with Red China and USSR, d) U.S. Congress will not appropriate funds for sending delegation to meetings at which Red China delegates are meeting, and e) U.S. Congress will not tolerate any weakening of position and its delegation will have to walk out if Red China is admitted. The Ambassador said that the President’s good friend Senator Barkley⁶ was the head of the U.S. Delegation and would be disappointed.

The President said that he thought the U.S. was making too much over Red China whose position was enhanced by the opposition being shown. He said that no progress in the situation would occur so long as Red China was being kept out of all organizations, and that when it was in some organizations there was a chance to improve Red China. The Ambassador pointed out the U.S. efforts over a long period had been directed toward that end only to find that Red China’s conduct had not improved. It was, therefore, impossible, he said, to have confidence that Red China would act any differently after it gained admission to these organizations.

When the President learned of Congress’ strong stand and Senator Barkley’s heading up the U.S. Delegation, the President asked if it was too late to act. When the Ambassador said the meeting was not over until April eight, the President called for his assistant and sent out two radiograms, one to his Ambassadors at Bonn, Paris and Rome requesting them to instruct the Liberian Delegation to vote against Red China’s admission to IPU, and the second to the Delegation—the message to the latter saying “After further study and consideration of the issue, you are instructed to vote ‘no’ on the admission of Red China to IPU.” This message was sent to Senator Frank Tolbert and Representative L.E. Mitchell.⁷

2. Status of Liberia’s Action on Establishment of Diplomatic Relations with Red China: The Ambassador said that in the light of the President’s March 8, 1956 speech on foreign policy many governments are watching Liberia, and especially the President, to see what he will do toward Red China. They understand, he said, that this is another form of Soviet pressure being exerted on Liberia to weaken its affinity to the West. He said that if Liberia accepted the Red China proposal it would indicate a readiness to do business with all Communist countries. Many of the President’s admirers, he said, would find it difficult to reconcile his acceptance of such a proposal with his strong pronouncements of March 8, 1956.

The President said he was aware of these pressures. He also said that he did not intend to accept the proposal. He stated that he was going to use the same arguments that he used in the Soviet case in January 1956 to answer Red China, namely, lack of funds, no plans made in the past, and lack of legislative authority. In response to a question of when he intends to give a reply, he said he was waiting his time. The Ambassador said that he hoped the President would so word his reply that it would not give the Communists another diplomatic victory similar to what it obtained in the January Communiqué. When the President said he could not reject outright the Red China proposal, the Ambassador said that while he understood that, yet it was important from Liberia’s point of view not to give Red China or the USSR any diplomatic advantage from this situation. The President admitted that he was aware of the problem, but said that he was taking no action on this problem at this time.

3. Soviet Invitations for Liberians to Visit Moscow: The Ambassador asked the President what he intended to do about these invitations. The President said that he was not going to Moscow because he was going to other European capitals. He said he was going to West Germany and if he heard from Italy he would go there. No date was set for his trip to Germany, but he intended to go. He said that last Fall it was determined that he was not going to Lebanon because it did not want him to go to Israel afterward.

The President said, however, that he felt that someone ought to go from Liberia, either the Vice-President or the Speaker; that it would be discourteous if someone did not accept this invitation. The Ambassador said that while it would be an act of courtesy to accept the invitation, yet there was no compulsion making it necessary to accept. The President said that he disagreed with this view. The Ambassador pointed out that if this was true, then Liberia must accept all invitations which the Soviet Union was bound to send once a penetration had been made. The President admitted that this was probably so.

The Ambassador said that it was dangerous for Liberia’s own well-being to accept this invitation for anyone and especially the Vice-President and Speaker. He suggested that if the latter went, the Soviets would attempt to create internal division in Liberia. The President responded with much conviction that he had implicit confidence in the Vice-President and Speaker, he felt that they could handle the situation, and he was not afraid that they would be subverted. Then he said, if they do come back and attempt to divide the country, he (the President) will put them out. He said he did not believe that the Vice-President and Speaker could be “touched” by the Soviets.

The President asserted that Liberia had certain rights as a sovereign nation, that as a sovereign nation it must act as such, and that it should assume its full position in international relations. By refusing to send anyone to Moscow, Liberia’s position in the world would be belittled.

The Ambassador said that if any Liberian went to Moscow at this time it would be another diplomatic victory for USSR. He restated the view that such a visit to Moscow would not add to Liberia’s prestige in the Western world, and certainly would not enhance the President’s position. He pointed out that Liberia’s position was being watched very carefully and people were gaining much respect for his stand in the past. What he was doing would have an effect not only on Liberia but on West Africa. What he is going to do will also affect Liberia’s internal economic development since foreign investors will be affected by his stand, indeed, it could harm his unification and open door policy. The Ambassador said that all these efforts on the part of the Soviets were aimed at getting Liberia to establish diplomatic relations and acceptance of the invitations would only intensify Russian efforts toward that end.⁸

The President reiterated his views, given on several earlier occasions, that he was fully aware of what the Soviets were doing. However, he said, he has no fear of what they would be allowed to do in Liberia, for he did not intend to let them do as they would like. He said that he did not propose to accept them in Liberia.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 661.76/4–1756. Secret. No drafting information is given on the source text.
2. Telegram 168 from Monrovia, March 6, reported the Chinese proposal. (Ibid., 601.9376/3–656)
3. Telegram 186 from Monrovia, March 29, reported the Soviet invitation. (Ibid., 661.76/3–2956)
4. Allen visited Liberia May 27–30. His visit is described in despatch 369 from Monrovia, June 14. (Ibid., 110.15–AL/6–1456)
5. Representative Frances P. Bolton (Ohio).
6. Former Vice President Alben W. Barkley of Kentucky.
7. He was appointed an Associate Justice of the Liberian Supreme Court in March 1957.
8. Telegram 207 from Monrovia, April 20, reported that the President, Vice President, and Speaker had all declined the Soviet invitation. (Department of State, Central Files, 661.76/4–2056)