13. Editorial Note
Note No. 347 of May 25 from the British Ambassador to the Secretary of State protested United States support for the April 2 Trusteeship Council report on Tanganyika (cited in footnote 2, supra), which had included the recommendation that the British Government should indicate target dates for steps in the political, economic, social, and educational fields which would create conditions for Tanganyika’s attainment of self-government or independence. (Department of State, Central Files, 350/5–2556)
A note of July 2 from the Secretary of State to the Ambassador stated that the United States continued to agree with the British concerning the “impractibility” of long-range timetables for the attainment of self-government or independence but defended United States support for the principle of intermediate targets. The note concludes:
“It is the belief of the United States Government that the establishment of intermediate targets and dates is not only a basically different concept but represents sound planning and will be advantageous to the United Kingdom in Tanganyika and to both Governments in the United Nations, particularly since, as was stated by the Deputy United States Representative in the Council, ‘it is for the Administering Authority in every case to decide how far and how fast such programs can be carried out’.
“For the reasons elaborated above, the United States Government considers the principle of intermediate targets to be practicable and sound. The British Government, moreover, will appreciate that the United States Government cannot disregard opinion in the United States which is particularly sensitive regarding colonialism, even in its most enlightened form. Consequently, impatience tends to develop if the United States Government does nothing more than voice its opposition to proposals for long-range timetables looking toward the ending of the admittedly temporary colonial relationship.
“The United States Government, therefore, feels impelled, in rejecting impracticable proposals for final time limits, to support the constructive counterproposal for intermediate targets and dates. It is the hope of the United States Government that the British Government, upon closer study, will find itself able to apply the recommendation without in any way damaging its vital interests.” (Ibid.)
The United Kingdom and United States Delegations met in Washington, October 10–11, for the third in a series of discussions on colonial matters. (Informal Summary Record of the U.S.–U.K. Colonial Talks, October 10–11; ibid., IO/ODA Files: Lot 62 D 182, US–UK Colonial Talks) The British subsequently placed on the record their understanding of what transpired. (Note 49 to the Department of State, January 28, 1957; ibid., Central Files, 320/1-2357) The United States position was principally stated by Christopher H. Phillips, [Page 44] Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs. Emphasizing that the United States should not be stereotyped as defender of colonialism, he assured the British that the United States had no intention of supplanting any colonial power, but in deference to nationalism was obliged to assume a more liberal and independent position. The United States, Sears added, could not “stop being the United States” and would therefore continue on its course except where security interests intruded. The Position Papers prepared in the Department of State for the use of the Delegation to the Eleventh Session of the General Assembly (Attainment by the Trust Territories of the Objective of Self-Government or Independence) called for continued support for intermediate target dates “primarily because it is practicable and right in itself, and incidentally because it would help to defeat unrealistic long-range timetable proposals.” (SD/A/C.4/159, October 30; ibid., IO Files)
On February 26, 1957, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 1064 (XI), which recommended that the administering authorities of the trust territories of Tanganyika, the Cameroons, Togoland, and Ruanda-Urundi take the necessary measures to ensure that those territories achieved self-government or independence at an early date. It also invited all administering powers to estimate the period of time required for this in their trust territories. The United States voted against the resolution. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1956, pages 159–160.