109. Letter From the Counselor of the Embassy in Ethiopia (Taylor) to the Director of the Office of African Affairs (Cyr)2
Dear Leo: You will receive in this same pouch a despatch setting forth the recommendations of our Country Team on a longer range military program for Ethiopia.3 You will remember that we have already sent the documents which were presented to General Cook during his visit here and the military comments on them by Colonel Berry, the new MAAG Chief.4 It may be helpful to set forth a little additional background.
As you know, the military assistance program here was until recently in a very bad way. For one thing, there was no clear cut [Page 326] program envisaged; for another our deliveries of matériels already promised have been very slow and haphazard; thirdly, the relations between the military officers concerned were very inadequate; and finally the whole program, such as it was, was geared rather to American concepts of fighting units than to those which fit the situation here.
As you know, the Emperor has been making a heavy onslaught on all these points, first when the Congressmen came5 and second when General Cook and his party came. It is fair to say that General Cook and his party were not much impressed with the needs of Ethiopia. They felt that the requests made were far too large, and they pressed us here to give some kind of estimate as to the needs.
The Emperor hit General Cook especially hard with the charge that someone had in 1953 committed the United States to support four divisions.
Since that time Colonel Berry has done some very good work, and we in the Embassy, together with him, have given thought to the position as a whole.
Colonel Berry has ascertained that the kind of military organization favored by the Ethiopians is quite different from that which the MAAG has heretofore been thinking of. It is a much lighter and smaller unit which he calls a “command”. This discovery seems to put a quite different light on the whole military assistance program, since the support for one American type division would cost us as much as support for two plus of the lighter “commands”. Working with these lighter type units would enable the United States to proceed with a military assistance program on approximately the same budgetary scale as heretofore by spreading its support over a larger number of units and thus come far closer to meeting the Ethiopian wishes than we had thought possible.
We are very keenly aware here, as I am sure you will be, of the political disadvantage of permitting the United States military effort here to go down the drain. We will have sunk $10,000,000 in Ethiopia when the program is completed. During this time, military relations with the Ethiopians have suffered severely because of the local military conditions. We feel that the Army has made a fine start in sending here an officer of the energy and common sense of Colonel Berry. He has already done some good. But it seems clear to us that if the military assistance program is not continued on a minimal basis, this will have a serious effect on our political relations. As you know, the Emperor has an inordinate interest in [Page 327] military affairs, and our failure to follow through with him on some kind of a program is bound to react very seriously on his orientation to us.
We are very well aware of the problem that is likely to exist in connection with appropriations for foreign assistance this coming year. If the total program of foreign military and economic assistance is cut, as it is likely to be, any country with as low a priority as Ethiopia is likely to be cut out altogether. In past years it was only the strong pressure of the State Department for political considerations that led to any money at all being allocated to Ethiopia. We assume that the same kind of effort will probably have to be made this year by the State Department.6
If there is any additional material which we should provide, we will be glad to do so. For one thing we have in mind an over-all statement by the Country Team concerning the defense needs of Ethiopia.
As you see, I still haven’t had a chance to sit down and write more general impressions of the country. With best regards to you and the others in AF.
Sincerely yours,
- Source: Department of State, AF/NE Files; Lot 67 D 226, Military Assistance 1955. Secret; Official–Informal.↩
- Despatch 141, December 2, recommended that Ethiopia be explicitly informed regarding previous deliveries of arms under the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement of May 22, 1953 (5 UST 749; TIAS 2964); that a long-range aid plan be formulated; and that deliveries be more vigorously completed. It called for documentation to ascertain the truth of the Ethiopian contention that U.S. support had been pledged for four divisions. A reorganization plan calling for a small augmentation of the MAAG complement was also submitted for consideration. The retention of U.S. military bases and furtherance of U.S. political objectives was seen enhanced by a minimum annual military aid program of $5 million in addition to some reimbursable assistance. (Ibid., Central Files, 775.5–MSP/12–255)↩
- Colonel Edward S. Berry arrived on October 18. General Orval R. Cook, Deputy CINCEUR, together with Major General W.M. Morgan, Major General J.A. Dabney, and Brigadier R.V. Lee (all of EUCOM), visited Ethiopia on an inspection tour November 17-19. Despatch 134, November 23, conveyed the documents under reference. The Chief of Staff of the Imperial Ethiopian Army, General Muleguetta Bulli, presented a lengthy memorandum entitled “Defense Needs of Ethiopia” to General Cook on November 18. The Ethiopians expressed a desire for firmer assurances of greater military support and dissatisfaction with the program as implemented theretofore. (Ibid., 775.5–MSP/11–2355)↩
- Despatch 130 from Addis Ababa, November 15, summarized the paper presented to Chairman Melvin Price and other members of the Subcommittee of the House Military Affairs Committee on November 10. (Ibid., 033.1100–PR/11–1555)↩
- Murphy wrote to Gordon Gray on February 27, 1956, to indicate the Department of State view that unless some satisfaction could be given to Ethiopia in response to the plea for additional aid then the good relationship which the United States currently enjoyed with that nation might be prejudiced. He urged the Department of Defense to take under consideration the funding of a military program for Ethiopia in fiscal year 1957. (Ibid., 775.5–MSP/2–2156)↩