Office of the Historian

64. Message From Robert B. Anderson to the Department of State1

No. 66
Jerusalem, February 1, 1956.
1.
Returned to Israel night of January 30. Was fearful that further delay would increase Israel doubts concerning mission.
2.
… I met with Ben-Gurion, Sharett, Kollek and Herzog for 4 hours afternoon of January 31.2 They were exceedingly anxious to hear the results of my second conversations with Nasser.3 I reported:
a.
Nasser reaffirmed absence of hostile intent;
b.
the resolution to avoid border incidents;
c.
a willingness to still consider some form direct negotiations but that he felt former channel had resulted in his being misled and was concerned with the Abdullah incident.
d.
I went over check list of items which had been discussed with Nasser, pointing out that these represented substantially areas of agreement either in detail or principle.
e.
that Nasser had indicated privately and to me that he was optimistic concerning possible results of this operation.
f.
Sharett asked if progress had been made on the real problems of refugees and boundaries. I reviewed statements on both sides re refugees and said both sides had evidenced flexibility and expressed hope; that we had discussed possible areas of resettlement of refugees in Arab States after determination of number to be repatriated by some formula. On the boundary question I said I could only reiterate that both sides must remain flexible although I understood clearly that to Ben-Gurion the application of the term meant giving up of territory.
3.

Ben-Gurion then made the following points: This mission offers great hope and great danger. The hope lies in its succeeding. Ben-Gurion tries earnestly to believe Nasser is sincere but even with this belief fears Nasser may face pressures from his army and other Arab leaders which will result in his resorting to war in view of the flow of armaments to Egypt. Ben-Gurion insists that shooting on the border must cease if he is really to believe in Nasser’s sincerity. Says shooting has occurred each day since I came but by miracle no one killed. Ben-Gurion states his great objectives are:

a.
Security of his people;
b.
the establishment and continuation of Israel;
c.
the making of an Arab-Jewish alliance.

[Page 123]

Because of the great hope which this mission holds for the achievement of these objectives, he is willing to be patient, understands the necessity of Nasser securing acceptability by his people and other Arab leaders, and states that he is willing to negotiate or be patient for months or years if it is possible for him to remain patient. He points out that he is misleading his colleagues by not informing them of this mission thereby increasing the responsibility of those who know. That there are limits beyond which he cannot go, and if his colleagues cease to believe in Israel’s security, it may not be possible for him to be as patient or take the time necessary to achieve a settlement. He asserts that we urge him to be reasonable but he can be reasonable only if the anxiety of war is removed. He understands the problem Nasser faces of not immediately reopening channel of communication. He wants me to give reassurance to Nasser that security will be maintained and that misunderstanding will be avoided. He feels that direct communication is a necessary step to what he regards as finally indispensable and that is meeting with Nasser. He stated that he was willing to concede “things that Nasser never dreamed of” but only if he could discuss matters with him personally. In reply to my question, he stated that he would never spell out the price he was willing to pay for peace to any third person. He said, “If only we could meet, I know there would be peace in ten days.” He stated that he wanted me to clearly understand that if the anxiety of war continued, it might at some point become impossible for him to continue to be patient and seek peace and that this anxiety had to be measured in weeks or at best a month or two.

4.
I replied that I understood the weight of his responsibilities and wanted him to know our country was concerned with the long-term best interest of Israel as a state surrounded as it is by Arab States, and he must surely realize that this was more desirable than any short-term point of view. That a precipitous course of action might allay anxieties temporarily but could only lead to greater long-term dangers of survival. He said this was so but there were limits to his holding this line.
5.
It seems evident that Ben-Gurion regards this operation as a great personal undertaking. He feels himself on the horns of a dilemma. He says, “Every child in Israel is my child. I am responsible to them and history. I want so earnestly to believe in Nasser’s sincerity, but I look in vain for signs. If only the shooting at the border would cease, I could then believe.”
6.
Sharett asked if I had heard the broadcast from Syria stating that if work was resumed on the Banat Yacov Dam that Syria, Saudi Arabia and Egypt would resort to force. I told him I had not heard the broadcast, but I hoped Israel would not find it necessary to do [Page 124] anything which could be regarded as justification for use of force during the period of our effort. Ben-Gurion said he would make no commitment about what his intentions were regarding Banat Yacov but again stated, “You are asking me to be reasonable and I can only be reasonable if my people feel secure. If they do not feel secure, then unreasonable things become the reasonable.”
7.
Ben-Gurion inquired as to whether Nasser had discussed the Jordan Valley Plan. I replied as reported in my previous telegram to you.4 Ben-Gurion seemed pleased at Nasser’s attitude and stated that he realized the difficulty was enhanced by the instability of the Syrian Government.
8.
During general conversations which followed, the following points of view were put forth:
a.
Israel will accept any form of supervision of the Holy Places suggested by Jordan.
b.
They subscribe to the principle of border adjustments linking villages to farms and making other minor corrections.
c.
They envision free trade without duty between adjacent Arab countries and want to work towards its development although they realize that prejudices now exist.
d.
They look forward to unrestricted transit of planes, trains and other forms of communication across Israel and between Arab States.
e.
They regard with favor the Secretary’s statement of the guarantee of boundaries in August, but want to make clear that their people would not accept the guarantee of any power exclusively and they would always require sufficient weapons for what they regard as legitimate self-defense. They emphasize that theirs is a civilization of “in-gathering” and that the principal ingredient is the morale of their people.
9.
They maintain hope for the success of this operation if we keep it moving. I explained that I might now return either to Cairo or U.S., and was remaining flexible which they accepted as proper.
10.
Sharett was deeply concerned that the British Ambassador to Cairo held a two and one-half hour conference with Nasser subsequent to my departure. He fears the influence of Britain and the doctrine of the Guildhall speech.5
11.
Was prevented returning to Athens late last night due to inclement weather. Now plan to return and meet Russell late tonight.
12.
Have been very worried about effect of reported Black conversations …. Am pleased to receive Hoover’s message to Black.6 Will discuss matter with Black if opportunity arises.
  1. Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518; Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Incoming Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Part I. Top Secret. The source text bears a notation that Dulles saw this message.↩
  2. The memorandum of this conversation is not printed. (Ibid., Meetings with Israeli Officials. January 1956–March 1956)↩
  3. See Documents 45 and 46.↩
  4. Document 46.↩
  5. Reference is to Prime Minister Eden’s speech of November 9, 1955.↩
  6. See Document 60.↩