Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1–July 26, 1956, Volume XV

60. Message From the Under Secretary of State (Hoover) to Cairo¹

Washington, January 31, 1956.

REFERENCE

• State cable 1432 Jan 30, 2 PM²
• Message No. 56³
• Message No. 55⁴

1. We appreciate gravity of situation described above refs and its impact upon Bob’s mission. Accordingly if Bob is not available Cairo to handle this matter himself you are authorized to give Eugene Black following message from Hoover and to give him such background info of Bob’s mission as in your opinion is necessary to reinforce urgency of this message.

“For Eugene Black from Hoover… , Secretary and I are most anxious that at this particular juncture Nasser should not be faced with a take it or leave it proposition if this can in any way be avoided. As you will realize … , vitally important considerations of highest interest to entire Western world all involved. While we do not wish in any way to bring pressure to bear on you on the business side of your important negotiations we felt you should know the background which bears upon the question of maintenance of peace in the area. This is of course essential to the realization of the great project on which you are negotiating. Bob if he is able to visit Cairo shortly will give you further details.”

1. Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Outgoing Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Secret. Repeated to Jerusalem and Athens for Anderson.
2. Document 51.
3. This message from Cairo, January 31, reported that the High Dam negotiations were “on the verge of collapse.” The message noted that Black was considering issuing a “take it or leave it” ultimatum and then leaving for the United States. (Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Incoming Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Part I)
4. This message from Cairo, January 31, noted that the Anderson Mission would certainly fail if Black’s talks failed. It was feared that an ultimatum from Black, which Nasser would reject, might drive Nasser to accept the Russian offer of aid. In addition, one of Anderson’s strong bargaining points, the promise of U.S. assistance on the High Dam, would be “gravely weakened.” (Ibid.)