Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1–July 26, 1956, Volume XV

46. Message From Robert B. Anderson to the Department of State¹

No. 34

Cairo, January 28, 1956.

1. … and I met with Nasr and Zacharia from 5 PM to 7:30.² …

2. I told Nasr that I would like to summarize the various discussions which we had had to be sure that I had correctly interpreted his opinions and conclusions and the actions he has agreed to undertake in order to secure peaceful settlement. I then proceeded to outline in some detail a summary of our various conversations which Nasr said he thought fairly represented his views and the various proposals, principles and possible solutions which we had considered. In more specific detail we developed and discussed the following points:

a. We pointed out that there were suspicions on both sides and it was important that Nasr make known again his real desires and intentions. He stated emphatically that his own desire was for the attainment of a settlement and intended to work toward that end.

b. Pursuant to this objective we asked if he would issue instructions to avoid all border incidents. He stated that he would issue such instructions and appropriately punish those who violated his instructions although open court trials of offenders at this time would probably increase rather than decrease internal tensions. He also pointed out that incidents could take place as a result of transient refugees over whom he could establish little control. He would do his best.

c. He would continue to consider the reopening of direct secret channels of communication. However he feels he was deceitfully misled when such channels existed in 1954. He also feels that such a direct channel might be used against him with other Arab leaders. He authorized saying to the Israeli he would continue to consider the possibility and meanwhile Israeli views could be presented to him through [other] … channels.

d. He will take positive action designed to lessen inflammatory statements in press radio speeches and other media.

e. We arranged … to maintain continuous contact with Zacharia and Ali Sabri to discuss technical problems and to evaluate the progress that has been made and to be made in bringing the Egyptian population and other Arab areas into an acceptance of an Israeli settlement. They will also explore such problems as what can be done now about the refugees etc. This we thought would be a useful device to keep attention centered on the problem, keep up momentum and work toward an area of solution of secondary problems.

f. It was also agreed that at regular intervals Nasr would confer directly … concerning progress made and to be made in the staff work outlined in e above.

3. At this point I told Nasr that I would like to review in some more detail various problems and proposals in the interest of clarity and to that end would like to re ask him certain questions applying for the most part to things we had discussed previously. While our discussions were quite detailed we developed the following:

a. He was asked to review his position with reference to his concept of Arab security arrangements. He regards Iraq’s membership in the Baghdad Pact as his principal problem. He said that he envisions unified Arab military planning within the framework of an ALCSP Pact which he regards as now defunct. This arrangement would deal with strategic planning, unified commands, force levels and similar military plans. He did not envision including unified budgetary planning. We pointed out that it was important to us whether the arrangement would be orientated toward defense from aggression from the north or for other purposes. He said it will “be used only for legitimate self defense”, as he had previously expressed in a letter of 10 Dec 52 to President Truman.³

b. Responding to a question of what we could do about the problem of refugees now he suggested that Col. Zacharia would prepare and send to us a full report of the thinking of his experts on the refugee problem. Nasr said pointedly that he was not personally familiar with the technical thinking of his experts in this and like matters.

c. He thought that regional economic surveys and plans should be considered but had no definite ideas and thought this was another kind of question ….

d. When asked if he had any thoughts as to where refugees could be most desirably resettled, he again referred to the fact that he “thought” his experts looked with favor upon the “Blandford” Plan which had proposed resettlement in the Sinai Area.⁴ He would include more elaborate thoughts in the report to be prepared by Col. Zacharia. (In an earlier conversation he had stated that he thought some refugees could be settled in Syria.)

e. He has not given any thought to such problems as what is reasonable compensation and how the refugees would be most benefited. He will include any current thinking in Zacharia’s report and continue his thinking in staff work ….

f. Such problems as overflights, telecommunications, he has not thought about personally. This will also be the subject of staff work ….

g. Nasr looks upon the territorial guarantee suggested by the Secretary as “A good thing” but he must depend upon his own capabilities to assure his boundaries. His people would not be content to depend upon assurances by any foreign power.

h. Nasr believes that Syria presents the only real Arab stumbling block to the Jordan Valley Project. He stated that “All the other Arab States had agreed”. When questioned closely he stated that Jordan “Would not oppose the plan”. We indicated that perhaps Jordan still constituted a problem and he agreed. He will continue to discuss the approval of the Jordan Valley Plan with other Arab leaders but is pessimistic about Syria agreeing at this time.

i. … raised the question of Israel beginning work on Banat Yacov Project in the near future if the Jordan Valley Project was not approved. Nasr stated his Govt had considered this possibility and believed that Syria would take military action against Israel if the project was begun. He stated that his Govt had taken the military and political decision to support Syria in that event.

j. Nasr will look forward to a continuation of conversations when we believe it desirable to resume discussions like those now being conducted.

k. Nasr continues to work on draft of proposed letter to the President giving assurances of his efforts to avoid hostilities and work toward peaceful settlement.⁵ He will continue working on draft … tomorrow.

1. At the conclusion of our talks I asked Nasr if he thought that progress had been made. He studied for some moments and he replied that he thought he could only answer my question honestly after lapse of two or three weeks during which he could observe the Israeli attitude and actions taken indicating their sincerity and desire for settlement.

m. I pointed out the importance of his own actions in orienting his Govt and military planning toward the West in legitimate self defense since we would be assuming greater moral responsibility in making our own decisions such as a decision with reference to arms to Israel. He said that he understood our problems and that his intentions were not aggressive and his arms were intended only for his self defense.

n. We reemphasized the urgency of time and the necessity for continuing actions toward peaceful settlement as important in decisions facing all the countries involved.

4. We have continuously probed to ascertain Nasr’s views with reference to the various items suggested in yours of January 20 and 27.⁶ During the course of our discussions these items have constantly reoccurred. For the most part both Nasr and Zacharia are unprepared to discuss them and frequently state that they have not given thought to possible solution in these areas. I believe however that the positions stated above represent the best summary of their views on the various items obtainable during these conversations.

5. Plan to depart Cairo noon Saturday⁷ arrive Israel 6:30 Sunday. Currently plan to arrive U.S. on Thursday⁸ with Gen Gruenther.

1. Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Incoming Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Part I. Secret.
2. January 27.
3. Not found in Department of State files. Prime Minister Mohammed Naguib and Ambassador Jefferson Caffery had exchanged formal notes on December 9 and 10, 1952, in order to bring into force a Mutual Defense Assistance Understanding under Section 408 (e) of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 (64 Stat. 373) and the Mutual Security Act of 1951 (65 Stat. 373). See TIAS No. 3565; 7 UST 844.
4. John B. Blandford, Jr., Director of the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), July 4, 1951–March 7, 1953, helped conclude a broad program agreement between UNRWA and the Government of Egypt on June 30, 1953, which sought to encourage practical development projects in the Sinai Peninsula and in the Gaza Strip that would enable Palestinian refugees to become economically self-supporting.
5. See Documents 30 and 32.
6. Documents 24 and 42.
7. January 28.
8. February 2.