59. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State 1
1450. No discussions today between Black and GOE. Black’s staff called on me this morning. After some discussion, and at their request (prompted by Black) I had private talk with Kaissuny in which I made clear my belief Black sincere in stating he saw no purpose in continuing discussions regarding preparation at this time on even draft basis of a loan agreement. This subject had been thoroughly gone over between Kaissuny and Black in Washington and Black had not expected nor intended proceed Egypt to discuss this point. Informed Kaissuny Black’s interest in project as high as ever but unless GOE dropped insistence on this topic Black had made it known to me he planned to leave Saturday2 and had reservations. Black’s offer of exchange unilateral declarations of intention still stood.3
There followed lengthy conversation during which Kaissuny repeatedly urged me to press upon Black need for patience and his belief that matters could be worked out with time. Casting about for a formula Kaissuny proposed: (1) a letter by GOE to Black covering all basic conditions required by Bank including necessity Sudan waters agreement. This would be a unilateral statement of undertakings by GOE.
(2) Bank’s reply would take note of undertakings in GOE’s letter and would be voted by Bank’s board before despatch to GOE. Kaissuny emphasized vote by Bank board important as Black himself had stated such procedure would make Bank’s undertaking more formal and binding. (GOE considered Black’s latest proposal of exchange of letters of intent without vote by Bank board as not constituting firm commitment by Bank.) He suggested that Black volunteer at next meeting with GOE (without of course naming [Page 116] Kaissuny as originator of idea) that if and when such exchange of letters consummated Black would be willing to start drafting a letter of agreement which would necessarily take considerable time and could in any case not be signed until GOE’s undertakings complete.
Conveyed Kaissuny’s suggestion to Black and staff who seemed interested but obviously wished discuss it among themselves. Black’s personal reaction appeared somewhat more negative than positive but he did not close door.
During my conversation with Kaissuny in lobby Semiramis, Black stepped up and made inquiry regarding forthcoming [meeting?] in view his desire visit Suez Canal and his reservations for departure Saturday. Kaissuny asked whether he could not stay longer and Black replied “That depends upon tomorrow’s meeting”. (Scheduled for 11:00 a.m.).
Kaissuny made very clear to me he personally working hard for success present negotiations and having rough time with some his colleagues. His own repetition of questions to Black regarding possibility loan agreement had sole purpose of permitting new ears to receive Black’s expected replies.
Would summarize situation as follows: Black and staff obviously interested concluding agreement with GOE and openminded on phraseology any exchange of letters with Egypt provided basic conditions met. Kaissuny understands Bank’s position thoroughly and sympathizes but so far unable carry his government with him due suspicions regarding Bank’s unwillingness spell out new provisions loan agreement so that GOE would know where it stands. Deadlock just about at hand and probably can only be broken by Nasser. Early meeting Black with Nasser likely, results of which can by no means be forecast.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/1–3156. Secret; Priority. Received at 10:23 p.m. Repeated to London and Paris.↩
- February 4.↩
- See Document 50.↩