Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1–July 26, 1956, Volume XV

61. Telegram From the Embassy in Syria to the Department of State¹

Damascus, February 1, 1956—10 a.m.

712. Pass Army. Embtel 710.² In conversation with Army Attaché³ January 31 re situation Syro-Israeli frontier C/S Shuqayr made following points:

(1) Latest Security Council resolution called on Syria and Israel to take no action which might provoke incidents on DZ;⁴

(2) Diversion canal at Jisr Banat Yacoub is within DZ;

(3) Israelis are ready for war, believe they can win a war and are seeking pretext to start a war;

(4) From Israeli point of view, diversion project would be economically profitable; result in Syria, however, would be that large territory would become desert and at least 5 communities would have to be abandoned;

(5) As of January 31, no Israeli construction equipment had been moved into region but Ben-Gurion has again declared he intends start project;

(6) Four Israeli brigades and additional units now in position opposite Syrian frontier;

(7) In November, Israel bought in Italy US M–7 self-propelled artillery (quantity unspecified) and has recently bought other arms in Italy as well;

(8) He expects Egyptians’ reply to request for anti-aircraft equipment (Embtel 688, January 31 or February 1 [January 24]).⁵ If reply negative, he will immediately authorize purchase from Czechs since it is imperative equipment be in Syria by March 1;

(9) If Israelis start diversion project, Syria can wait “a few hours” for UN or tripartite action;

(10) Lacking such action Syria will “interdict” the area (presumably by artillery or mortar fire);

(11) Syria does not want war, but if Israelis want war it will begin at Jisr Bakat Yacoub.

Comment: Shuqayr’s statements confirm Embassy impression that Syrians

(a) Base their opposition to resumption of work on diversion project on UN decisions and recommendations

(b) Believe Israelis intend resume work although Israelis are aware that outbreak of hostilities is likely result, and

(c) Contemplate no aggressive action themselves but, relying on Egyptian help, are determined, regardless of consequences, to resist completion of diversion project.

Moose

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/2–155. Confidential; Priority. Received at 8:21 a.m. Repeated to Amman, Ankara, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Tel Aviv, London, Paris, Rome, Tehran, Jidda, and Karachi.
2. Document 57.
3. Colonel Robert W. Molloy.
4. See the editorial note, vol. XIV, p. 854.
5. Vol. xiii, p. 531.