Office of the Historian

42. Message From the Secretary of State to Robert B. Anderson, at Cairo1

Washington, January 27, 1956.
1.
I accept at face value Nasser’s assurances to you as summarized para 2 your message January 27.2 I fully appreciate his need to assure secrecy during period in which he would prepare Arab public opinion and understand his taking position that if secret agreement became public before then he would have to disavow it. It is my very strong belief, however, that unless some substantial and concrete advance toward a settlement can be worked out consistently with foregoing conditions, either during or as an immediate consequence of your trip, the situation will rapidly deteriorate and require emergency measures to maintain peace.
2.
It is difficult to see how Nasser could expect to be in stronger position than at present to engage in negotiations with IG. His arms strength is increasing rapidly. West is temporarily denying arms to Israel. He has Aswan Dam within his grasp. He has possibility of [Page 83] acquiring our support for Arab unity and Egyptian leadership in it. Israel has just been censured by Security Council for its policy of retaliatory raids.
3.
It is doubtful that present situation in area can be maintained for as long as six months unless there are definite prospects of a settlement on agreed terms. Mere understanding that both sides would commence negotiations on specific terms of settlement at end of six months would in all probability not suffice. Possibility has to be faced that Israel would in meantime force some issue that would provoke Arabs in such way as to take blame away from itself, such as commencement of construction at Jisr Banat Ya’quob or sending ship through Gulf of Aqaba. It is difficult to see how anyone, including Arab states, could benefit from hostilities that might result and in any event possibility of settlement in near future would be lost.
4.
I therefore attach greatest importance to “willingness of both sides to continue talks with emissary so long as secrecy is maintained” (your para 3D).
5.
While preoccupation on part of both sides with one or two issues is understandable, it seems to me to be particularly desirable to work out with Nasser in specific terms Egypt’s position on issues listed my tel January 263 and not let him take position of refusing to go beyond mere statement that those questions would “work themselves out in event of end of hostilities” (your para 2E). As you will have seen from summary my talk with Eban January 25,4 we are prepared to take strong position with Israel in order to maintain atmosphere conducive to settlement and to induce her to adopt reasonable position on major issues. If we can have Nasser’s agreement in specific terms on issues listed my tel January 26, we can take position with IG that reasonable settlement is within reach and urge it make reasonable concessions. We cannot, however, do this on mere basis of Nasser’s statement that in event settlement is reached in six months on one or two issues, the others “would work themselves out”.
6.
For above reasons, I hope that it will be possible for us to secure Nasser’s agreement to continue with discussions on concrete and specific aspects of all issues.
  1. Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Outgoing Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Top Secret. Drafted by Russell, cleared in substance with Rountree and Byroade, and approved by Dulles.↩
  2. Supra.↩
  3. Document 39.↩
  4. See footnote 2, Document 38.↩