455. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State1
70. Deptel July 9 sent Cairo 52.2 It is not unusual for there to be an honest difference of opinion as to interpretation facts between Department and field. In our opinion the factual record in reference telegram, as far as it goes, is some 90 percent accurate, although it records a far more complete explanation of United States than of Egyptian policy and in certain vital aspects we believe the facts themselves are expressed in misleading manner. Reference telegram ignores developments in and around Egypt during period under discussion, which cannot be disregarded if we are to understand nature and reasons for our current difficulties in area. Since Suez [Page 833] evacuation agreement was signed there has been very basic change in Soviet tactics, and Western statement after discussions with Soviet leaders have added to impression Soviet policy has, at least for near future forsaken use of dangerous military adventures. Most of all however I am concerned over fact the “why” of things is entirely omitted from reference telegram. I believe this “why” is pretty important ingredient in foreign affairs analysis and absolutely essential to positive thinking about developments this area.
Expanding area of Arab-Soviet cooperation results primarily from Soviet initiative in coming to the Arabs rather than Arabs running after the Soviets. In accepting the Soviet cooperation Egypt is motivated by what its leaders consider to be compulsion to move in direction of meeting basic national requirements. GOE does not consider its aspirations to be contrary to legitimate Western objectives in area. It is a misinterpretation to view this cooperation as a reflection of basic Egyptian sympathy for Soviet Union in its struggle with West.
Those aspects of American foreign policy directly related to our efforts organize forces of area to resist Soviet aggression have had only limited appeal in this area. Unfortunately they appear to be even less welcomed in face of a growing belief in pacific intentions of Soviet Union and growth of neutrality sentiment as apparent parallel between Soviet and Arab objectives became more apparent.
Telegram under reference strongly suggests we continue to judge Egypt solely by whether—measured by our own criteria—she is for us or for the Soviets. It appears to dismiss possibility that from national Egyptian viewpoint GOE might have a legitimate reason for close cooperation with Soviet Bloc. We ourselves have repeatedly announced we believe Soviets do not want make war and that we would welcome more cordial relations if Soviets would meet our criteria. In effect we give impression we expect Middle East to adopt our views and those of our European allies that cordial relations with Soviet Union would only be justified if Soviets met Western positions reference Germany, disarmament, greater freedom in satellites et cetera. We apparently expect Arab states attach so much importance such Western objectives that they will defer their own objectives, rejecting Soviet cooperation in Arab-Israeli dispute, Soviet arms required for defense against Israel, Soviet support in freeing Arab world from colonial domination and substantial Soviet economic cooperation and assistance.
These are basic and deeply felt objectives of Egyptian foreign policy. Department knows that while economic assistance provides a very useful lubricator for foreign policy operations which become closely intermeshed with those of other countries as result of joint approaches to common objectives, economic assistance does not in [Page 834] itself establish basic common bonds between US and recipients and does not buy repudiation of national objectives which may not coincide with our programs and policies for containing Soviet threat. For example economic aid will never resolve our difference over Israel just as it could not buy Greek abandonment of concept of enosis. Value of offer to sell arms to Egypt was offset by announced American policy of maintaining existing ratio whereas Egyptian requirements was for substantially greater shipments in order to achieve what they considered to be prime national requirement—an adequate defense posture. I do not know in what terms Department defines “legitimate” defense requirements but it may be well to bear in mind that proportion of Egyptian economy devoted to defense is less than that of many of our allies some of whom have gone higher at our own urging.
Relationship between basic Egyptian, Soviet and United States policies rather than record contained in telegram from Department under reference, is key to Arab-Soviet cooperation which has as one of its main objectives displacement of colonial influence in this part of world. In long run such a move if successful would also engulf American military base positions as it did British position in Suez. We should resist any efforts to push us out but if we are to resist effectively and protect these and other interests we should lose no time in recognizing fact that it is becoming increasingly difficult for governments in this area to justify foreign manned bases against Soviet threat when an increasingly large part of area is becoming more and more dependent upon Soviet Union for support against an Israeli threat and for general build up of their forces.
Neutralism exists over a large portion of this part of world. If we fail to develop means of fruitful cooperation with this large body of people and continue to consider them as being either in enemy camp or as “fellow travellers” I fear that before too long we will begin to appear in eyes these people as being the unreasonable member of East-West struggle. If we are to adopt in this area positive type of thinking which is necessary to developing successful policies we should be less concerned with reacting against neutralists and devote our best efforts towards developing policies and programs which would create a community of basic interests. We believe such basic interests can be found without resort to appeasement of Egypt or abandonment of soundly conceived positions elsewhere in ME. This Embassy has on several occasions emphasized its hope such positions would be strengthened by communication with Department and in talks with George Allen last September.3 But we may not be able in end to hold these positions unless we can [Page 835] address ourselves positively and with greater understanding to those issues which encourage drift around us toward neutralism or anti-Westernism.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/7–1356. Top Secret. Received at 3:47 p.m. Repeated to Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Jidda, Amman, Addis Ababa, Ankara, Belgrade, Bonn, Karachi, Khartoum, London, Madrid, Moscow, New Delhi, Paris, Rabat, Rome, Tangier, Tehran, Tel Aviv, Tripoli, Tunis, and Valletta.↩
- Document 434.↩
- See telegrams 632 and 654, vol. XIV, pp. 537 and 551.↩