Office of the Historian

434. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt1

Washington, July 9, 1956—2:27 p.m.

52. Embtel 25152 presents interesting viewpoint towards developments in Egypt as seen in retrospect. However Department desires draw Embassy’s attention to following cardinal aspects of US–Egyptian relations since these factors might be important in discussions with friendly elements in Egypt.

1.
Clearly demonstrated US desire cooperate with present regime as evidenced by: coaching given General Naguib in early days; conclusion reimbursable military assistance agreement December 10, 1952;3 $10 million technical assistance program concluded March 1953;4 part played by US in Sudan Agreement; protracted assistance towards Suez Base Agreement; conclusion economic development assistance agreement November 6, 1954;5 attempts associate Egypt in Middle East defense arrangements (CA–2594, October 19, 1954; Deptel 732, November 10, 19546); continuous efforts restrain Israel; $40 million economic development assistance program for FY 1955;7 restraint exercised in development Baghdad Pact; large CARE and PL 480 programs; efforts of US and West to avoid arms race by exercising restraint in meeting Israel arms requests despite large Soviet bloc shipments to Egypt.
2.
Clearly demonstrated US readiness provide Egypt arms in legitimate quantity on terms compatible with Egyptian sovereignty and solvency. Grant military aid offered Egypt August 2, 1954 immediately following conclusion Suez Base Agreement (Deptel 144 July 28, 19548). Offer kept open until January 1955 despite strong opposition in US and finally rejected by Nasser with specious contention US demanded signature “defense pact” impinging on [Page 794] Egyptian freedom action. Inconclusive conversations June 1955 with Nasser in which he first stated intended purchase arms from Soviet bloc (Cairo 1881, June 9, 19559) and later retreated somewhat (Cairo 1928, June 17, 195510) but never revealed intensions clearly. Agreement in principle to approve Egyptian purchase arms in US given June 1955 (Deptel 2214 June 17, 195511). Submission Egyptian arms request June 30. Specific statement by Nasser first July he would pay in dollars (Cairo 10, July 2, 195512). Agreement in principle by US sell Egypt entire $27 million arms requested (two minor exceptions) with initial increment $11 million and special expedited delivery certain key items (Deptel 244 August 6, 195513). Immediate request by Nasser for special credit facilities and US consent explore with utmost care all possibilities assisting Nasser with respect financing (Deptel 325 August 20, 1955;14 Deptel 515 September 15, 1955).15 Revelation by Ambassador Hussein August 14 that negotiations with Soviets well advanced (Cairo 234, August 15, 1955).16 Termination of negotiations by US upon announcement Soviet–Egyptian arms agreement September 23. US did not make arms sale contingent upon Palestine settlement but stated from political standpoint difficulties posed by Nasser’s request for special financial terms would be greatly increased by hostile reaction to Secretary’s August 26 speech (Deptel 325, August 20, 1955). Reconstruction events suggests Nasser had in fact determined conclude Soviet deal prior to request for special financial terms and this request and subsequent statements made permit him maintain public position approach to West rebuffed.
3.
US efforts assist Egypt with Aswan High Dam. Offer September 1953 finance IBRD engineering study Aswan Dam site and concurrently desk survey Nile Valley (Deptel 309, September 1717). Concentration on Aswan Dam from 1954 in exceptional effort meet Egyptian political desires. Endeavors bring about Sudan–Egyptian agreement on division Nile waters (Deptel 324, August 20, 1955;18 Deptel 1067 November 23, 195519). Prolonged efforts expedite and assist IBRD economic and engineering studies. Invitation to and subsequent negotiations with Finance Minister in Washington culminating [Page 795] in US–UK–IBRD offer including $54.6 million in US grant aid in December 1955 (Deptel 1282, December 16, 195520). Discussions by Black of IBRD with US–UK participation in Cairo, January 1956. Agreement by US consider vague, oral Egyptian counterproposals (Deptel 2076, March 1, 195621). Egypt decided “they would neither start work …22 nor require any amount from grants and aid until agreement had been reached with Sudan Government” (Cairo 1665, Feb 23, 195623). Nasser assured Embassy counterproposals not related to possibility Soviet participation (Embtel 1794, March 8, 195624) but reports now received indicate he in interim actively negotiating in Moscow (London 5752 June 13, 195625). Reiteration US interest in project March 1956 (Deptel 2815, May 24, 195626)
4.
Progressive unveiling true nature Egyptian policy as one of maintaining US expectations future Egyptian cooperation while demanding immediate US assistance and in fact pursuing policies detrimental US objectives. Examples Egyptian promises include: RCC statement to Caffery September 1952 “They (RCC) are completely on side of US and unalterably opposed to communism …27 in exchange (for military and financial assistance) they are prepared to give in secret certain commitments concerning long term objectives of movement including MEDO and/or partnership with US” (Cairo 730, September 18, 195228). Statement by Egypt after conclusion Sudan Agreement of great friendship, pro–Western sympathies and intention eventually to cooperate Middle East defense March 1953 (Cairo 2064, March 15, 195329). Assurances by Naguib in exchange letters with President June 1953 of Egyptian intent after Suez Base settlement cooperate loyally with its allies and do its full part in building military strength and economic and social stability (Cairo 44 of July 11, 195330). Fawzi statement that upon conclusion Suez Base Agreement Egypt would be able come out publicly and flatly On side Western World and especially US (Cairo 1588, June 24, 195431). Expressions appreciation by Nasser on conclusion Suez Base Agreement and assertion time propitious for new leaf in Near East (Cairo 136, July 31, 195432). Statements by Nasser to Allen subsequent to [Page 796] Soviet arms deal to effect he even more concerned than Secretary Dulles to prevent communist activity through military technicians because Egypt country directly involved (Cairo 632, October 1, 195533). In contrast Egyptian acts include: violent attacks on Baghdad Pact; support of leftist elements in Syria (Damascus 870, March 19, 195634); massive, continuing purchases arms from Soviet bloc and efforts peddle Soviet arms to other Arab states; large scale dispatch technicians for military training in Soviet bloc; cooperation with Soviets against West in Libya; active intervention against interests of West in North Africa; activities in Saudi Arabia undermining US position (Jidda 575, June 20, 195635).
5.
Deceptiveness re Israel. Expression by Fawzi of desire get along with Israel August 1954 (Cairo 162, August 4, 195436). Fawzi stated he in complete agreement our suggestion on general approach and timing on Israel problem (Cairo 1458, April 3, 195537). Nasser agreed develop approach to Israel question further after Bandung Conference (Cairo 1482, April 5, 195538). After Secretary’s August 26 speech Fawzi suggested further discussions (Cairo 461, September 14, 195539). In November, Fawzi stated “Egypt prepared to work towards settlement Arab–Israel issues at earliest date” (Cairo 976, November 17, 195540). Nasser confirmed Fawzi position (Cairo 1027, November 27, 195541). In January 1956 Nasser indicated … willingness start at that time definitive negotiations.42 Nature proposals he later advanced and his attitude in March revealed clearly speciousness his assertions.
6.
Current US attitude towards Nasser as clearly presented to Ambassador Hussein by Secretary (Memorandum of Conversation of May 17, 195643), stems from actions by Egypt in Near East furthering efforts Communist bloc. US record since Soviet arms deal clearly shows present situation not result vindictiveness or failure Nasser respond on Palestine problem. US has been and remains ready to respond to acts by Nasser proving he sincerely wishes cooperation and good relations.
[Page 797]

To summarize—from beginning, present Administration has based its Near East policy in large part on cooperation with Egypt often at considerable political cost, both domestic and foreign, relying upon repeated assurances Egypt intended work with West. US took numerous concrete steps showing its support while Egypt made vague promises contradicted by acts. By summer 1955 Egypt intentions had become apparent. Nevertheless US made further effort by offer sell arms and offer on Aswan Dam. These in turn rebuffed by Soviet bloc arms deal, recognition Communist China and strongly anti–US and anti–West propaganda and activities in Egypt and abroad. US relied to outer bounds of prudence upon Egypt’s promises. In face of record Department would be negligent if it continued proceed on faith while Egypt follows course detrimental to US. It beside point argue for reaffirmation sympathetic attitude or that Egyptian regime represents new force with which US must do business. Regime bears responsibility for emergence of forces which it now may be powerless control and which pose serious problem for US future in Middle East. Further moves in direction appeasement with nothing more than vague hope of still eliciting positive Egyptian response would involve abandonment soundly conceived positions with possibility far reaching adverse repercussions and result in further strengthening regime extent whose activities against US and West becoming steadily more apparent.

Dulles
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/6–1656. Top Secret. Drafted by Burdett, Geren, and Hoffacker; cleared with Russell, Allen, Rountree, and Wilkins; and approved by Hoover. Pouched to Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Jidda, Amman, Addis Ababa, Ankara, Belgrade, Bonn, Karachi, Khartoum, London, Madrid, Moscow, New Delhi, Paris, Rabat, Rome, Tangiers, Tehran, Tel Aviv, Tripoli, Tunis, and Valletta.↩
  2. Document 399.↩
  3. TIAS No. 3565; 7 UST 844.↩
  4. The agreement was concluded March 19, 1953; TIAS No. 2843; 4 UST (pt. 2) 1761.↩
  5. TIAS No. 3156; 5 UST (pt. 3) 2985.↩
  6. CA–2594 is not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 674.82/10–1954) Telegram 732 to Cairo is printed as telegram 548 to Ankara in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. IX, Part 1, p. 557.↩
  7. See footnote 5 above.↩
  8. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. IX, Part 2, p. 2289.↩
  9. Vol. XIV, p. 237.↩
  10. Ibid., p. 255.↩
  11. See ibid., footnote 2, p. 256.↩
  12. Ibid., p. 270.↩
  13. See ibid., the first footnote 2, p. 339.↩
  14. Ibid., p. 376.↩
  15. Ibid., p. 471.↩
  16. Ibid., p. 355.↩
  17. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 874.211/9–1753)↩
  18. Vol. XIV, p. 371.↩
  19. See ibid, footnote 6, p. 801.↩
  20. Ibid., p. 868.↩
  21. See footnote 5, Document 127.↩
  22. Ellipsis in the source text.↩
  23. Document 121.↩
  24. Document 179.↩
  25. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 641.74/6–1356)↩
  26. Document 365.↩
  27. Ellipsis in the source text.↩
  28. Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. IX, Part 2, p. 1860.↩
  29. Ibid., p. 2019.↩
  30. Ibid., p. 2115.↩
  31. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 641.74/6–2454)↩
  32. Not printed. (Ibid., 641.74/7–3154)↩
  33. Vol. xiv, p. 537.↩
  34. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 783.00/3–1956)↩
  35. Not printed. (Ibid., 711.56386A/6–2056)↩
  36. Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. IX, Part 1, p. 1598.↩
  37. Not found in Department of State files.↩
  38. Vol. XIV, p. 141.↩
  39. Ibid., p. 468.↩
  40. Ibid., p. 781.↩
  41. Ibid., p. 807.↩
  42. The agreement was concluded March 19, 1953; TIAS No. 2843; 4 UST (pt. 2) 1761.↩
  43. Document 353.↩